June 22nd, 1941

[Deesse23]

All was quiet since France fell in last June. Some stuff happening in Eastern Africa, and now in northern Africa. Balcans got overrrun (not after the Italians got some bloody noses from the Greek). Bulgaria and Jugoslavia were quite confusing too.

I hope you will enjoy Indys coverage like i do. Each week one part about the according week 79 years ago. Rumors are that in December he will have to cover something just as decisive.  

[Minimalist]

"Rule #1 in the Book of War:  Do not march on Moscow."

Bernard Montgomery

[Szuchow]

"Rule #1 in the Book of War:  Do not march on Moscow."

Bernard Montgomery

Git gud, noob.

Sincerely: Mongols, Poles and French.

[abaris]

Family anecdote from that very day. The 22. of june was my father's birthday. In '41 they celebrated it in Budapest with my mother's family. Occasionally my father used to joke about his memories of this day. My father always claimed when hearing the news about Hitler invading the Soviet Union that he was sure that Hitler would lose the war. My mother on the other hand is said to have been excited over having roast pork for dinner.

[Deesse23]

"Rule #1 in the Book of War:  Do not march on Moscow."

Bernard Montgomery

"Hold my Airag"

Batu Khan

[Thumpalumpacus]

Hitler's biggest blunder deserves a toast.

[Minimalist]

Napoleon's too.... and he captured Moscow.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Napoleon's too.... and he captured Moscow.

If the fighting doesn't kill you, the winter retreat just might.

As an aside, I always thought the Germans should have masked the land-bridges between the rivers (not try to capture either city), and gone hell-for-leather south in 41 rather than 42. That would obviously bring issues of its own, but would bring quicker return on resources. You'd still have to capture Crimea, but under better conditions, I think.

[Minimalist]

Complex set of issues.  Had Japan provided some measure of distraction for the Russians in 1941 Stalin would not have been able to transfer troops to the West but the Japanese had plans for their own disaster in late 1941 and even though it did not involve the Kwantung Army there were considerable Army units earmarked for SE Asia, the Philippines and Malaya.  In 1941 the Kwantung Army might have been able to give the Russians some headaches as opposed to 1945 when it was a shell of its former self.  Japan did not have the resources to sustain far-flung operations in Manchuria, Indo-China, the DEI and still fight off the US Navy in the Pacific.

Hitler's best move would have been NOT to invade Russia and concentrate on the British.  But he did not trust Stalin any more than Stalin trusted him and was determined to fuck him first.

It's probably for the best.  Had Stalin attacked Hitler it is doubtful if the Russian army - which looked so pitiful in offensive operations against Finland - would have been able to make much progress through Poland against the Germans.  Tannenberg redux.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Had Japan provided some measure of distraction for the Russians in 1941 Stalin would not have been able to transfer troops to the West [...]

Understanding that the two European Axis powers were so imbalanced, and the other powerful one aside from Germany was half-the-world away, I still don't really understand why they were so out of step diplomatically that it really hampered their co-operation. Had the Japanese simply raised tensions using Manchuria, they would have given good aid to their German allies. Instead, they sign a non-aggression pact.

I know about the north-vs-south debate in the Emperor's cabinet, but it seems to me they could have at least put on a dog-and-pony-show to tie down some (though not all) Soviet units in the theater.

The two nations could and should have co-operated more closely through diplomacy. The Japanese didn't tell the Germans about Pearl Harbor, either, as you know. Another failure in that alliance.

Hitler's best move would have been NOT to invade Russia and concentrate on the British.  But he did not trust Stalin any more than Stalin trusted him and was determined to fuck him first.

Sure. The Ribbentrop pact was an act of convenience on both sides and neither side trusted the other, or the pact itself. If I remember correctly, the last Soviet freight train delivering treaty goods crossed the Vistula as Barbarossa  opened up.

It's probably for the best.  Had Stalin attacked Hitler it is doubtful if the Russian army - which looked so pitiful in offensive operations against Finland - would have been able to make much progress through Poland against the Germans.  Tannenberg redux.

No way in hell the Red Army undertakes a successful strategic offensive in 1941 anywhere, save against the Japanese in northern China. Against the Germans?

I sometimes agree with Wedermeyer's opinion that the Allies should have sat that out and let the two dictatorships chew each other up.

ETA: I know @Deesse23 follows his own threads and will opine on this, hope @Szuchow and @Mr Greene do so as well.

[Minimalist]

Absolutely.  A solid logistical line is needed to support offensive operations and the Russians lacked that.  Further, that line must be capable of advancing as the front advances and the road network has to be able to handle not only loaded trucks moving forward but empty trucks moving back.  Add in German dive bomber capability and every bridge becomes someplace that needs an anti-air defense or the supply line is broken.

There is a reason why it is easier to defend than attack.

[Szuchow]

@Thumpalumpacus

From what I read part of the reason for USSR poor showing (apart from obvious things like purges, fear of making decissions and Stalin not wanting to "provoke" Germans) was that they positioned their forces in way that would be better suited to aggression than defence. Don't know how true it is but to non military mind it sounds plausible.

As for other parts. Axis states had problems with information sharing, which considering antics of leaders like Hitler and Mussolini (or clowns like Ribbentropp) should not be a surprise.

However I think that worst Axis problem was ideology - in the beggining Wehrmacht was greeted with flowers in SU. How it looked later you all know. Were Hitler more sensible his lack of cooperation with Japan wouldn't be a big issue.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Spoilers, please, I'm not done reading.

[abaris]

Hitler's best move would have been NOT to invade Russia and concentrate on the British.  But he did not trust Stalin any more than Stalin trusted him and was determined to fuck him first.

But that was the war Hitler always strived for. He's quite explicit about that in "Mein Kampf" where he talks about "Lebensraum" (space to settle) in the East. He never wanted to go to war with the West and was rather surprised, they declared war on him after invading Poland. It was the years of appeasment after all and Hitler fully believed them to be weak and not the least bit ready to really stand for the agreement they had with Poland. Stalin was in disbelief, even after the invasion started. He didn't expect Hitler to strike at this point in time, but after he defeated the UK. In '42 or '43. Stalin was willing to sit it out and let the - what he considered - West weaken each other, while he had time to prepare himself.

When Hitler invaded the Soviet Union there was also the false belief that the UK would seek peace if he was able to beat the Russians and in December he needlessly declared war on the USA after Pearl Harbor. A burn the bridges move, which ultimately led to his certain demise, seeing as the USA was the major force in supplying the Soviets with arms and raw materials.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Hitler knew the US would declare war on Germany, this was why he said "Great nations declare war, they are not declared on." The Atlantic Conference had confirmed the decision made in the ABC-1 talks that the common goal would be "Germany first". So Hitler's decision to declare war on the US was ego-driven and the results would have been the same if he hadn't.

[Mr Greene]

Should (or could) the Germans have knocked Britain out in 1940?
The Army had brought back ~300,000 troops from Dunkirk but lost all the heavy kit.
Planning and preparations for Seelowe certainly took place and the invasion was penciled in between 22nd and 26th Sept.
Admiral Raeder was insulted by General Jodl describing the Channel as a river. Meanwhile Reichsmarshall Goering claimed the Luftwaffe would beat the RAF in 3 days. Raeder later claimed that 'air superiority wouldn't be enough' though that may be a case of arse covering.
There is the question of whether Adolf had begun to believe his own propaganda, though they set up a deception to threaten a landing in Scotland (Herbstreise) to distract from the south coast.
RAF Fighter Command was certainly on it's last legs in late August, though Adolf and Goering seemed to get distracted by London and the moment was lost.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

The Kriegsmarine couldn't guarantee control of the Channel, so it was never going to happen.

[Mr Greene]

If Adolf said yes then it would have regardless of Raeder's protests.
Regarding the claim that "We could have sat out of it and let the Nazis and Soviets slug it out".
I think that can only be made in Washington. Not in the bomb craters of London, not standing amongst the Free Poles, the Free French, the Free Czechs, the Norwegian Royal Family, the Dutch Royal Family and who knows how many escaped Jews.
It would have been like Wilson going to Pearl Harbour and saying they'd let the Japanese and Chinese slug it out.

Ultimately we had to make an all out charge at Lubeck to prevent Stalin getting to Denmark at all costs. (Something the originators of the Seven Days to the Rhine plan should have been made aware of, but that's another subject entirely...)
America's lack of support for the Free Polish gov. effectively handed Poland to the Soviets though it had at one point appeared possible that the Soviets might accept the same partition of Poland made with Ribbentrop.

[Deesse23]

I just like the way the events are presented, in a kind of "real time" way, week by week, so people get a feeling how slowly everything evolved over the course of 6 years, and how many stories evolved that seem so small and insignificant to us now, because we are so far removed from the actual events and know the outcome already. How many *minor* fronts (like East Africa campaign of the UK, or the events pre-balcan invasion of Germany) evolved, that they were the *big thing* in absence of the major campaigns (hindsight again!) and in what context this was i find fascinating. How Bulgaria was pushed into giving way to the axis. How Yugoslavia had a fascicst government that was overthrown, before Germany decided to invade! How tedious the Battle of Britain was, even long after the "Seelöwe" was canceled. The political struggles in the UK when Fall Gelb was called out (Churchill vs. Halifax). They also give more background about the politics behind the war, how leaders negotiate, internal quarrels, the confusion of those people involved (without 20/20 hindsight).

Longs story made short, I dont like this series alone because of the information it gives, but because of the presentation, because of the perspective we as viewers are put it. Imo it gives a pretty good feeling of how it must have been for the peopel back then, without all the spoilers.

At least thats what i take from the series since i am watching it.


As for the speculation(s) about "Barbarossa", meh...what i never understood is why Stalin seemed to have been so naive. A guy so ruthless, so paranoid.....he fell for Hitler, who already betrayed the *west* over and over, of which he was himself a part (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact)!? Why and how could someone like Stalin be so wrong? Abaris makes some good points, but to me they dont fully explain Stalin seemingly being so comletely in denial of the obvious. Is it so simple that we are all human and all fail at some point, and Stalin just failed once, at the worst time about the most important issue?
And even if the red army was prepared. Would the result maybe have been even worse? An army ready to fight (but in no shape to fight the Wehermacht in 1941) that would have lost even more armies in even bigger encirclements?

Also: As the Wehrmacht assembled over 140 divisions (including 17 panzer divisions), the Africa Corps had like one panzer division and one motorized. Rommel just besieged Tobruk. In a previous episode they said that Rommel had exactly TWELVE FLAK36 88mm to stop the Mathildas, while 3.5mio german soldiers were preparing to invade Russia. Did it escape the OKW that taking away Suez by giving Rommel another panzer division and maybe another mechanized one could have severe global strategic implications? Were they so obsessed with "Lebensraum im Osten" that they didnt see that chance? Without Suez the british position in the Med would have been untenable imo. Crete jsut fell. Malta, Gibraltar...? Hell most countries in the near east were rather anti-british and anti-french. The brits just invaded what is now Iraq in order to remove a government that was supported by Germany and Italy.
If Suez could have been taken, and if the main thrust of barbarossa was towards the Caucasus, a giant encirclement could have made the complete medierranean axis territory exclusively, and the Levant could have been a launching stage for further operations, with Ukraine and Caucasus oil fields secured.
But i guess the ideology of blood and soil was in the way, and everyone was focused on Russia alone, because Adolf wanted to. The original plan and order for Rommel was to be purely defensive anyway. He should have never taken Tobruk or threatened Suez in the first place.

Little fun fact: When Rommel went offensive towards Tobruk, against orders from OKW, they sent a high ranking staff officer to monitor and gather info about Rommels plans. His name was Friedrich Paulus.

[abaris]

Should (or could) the Germans have knocked Britain out in 1940?

Impossible, since there was neither air nor sea superiority. They occupied the channel isles, and that's about it.

[Szuchow]

As for the speculation(s) about "Barbarossa", meh...what i never understood is why Stalin seemed to have been so naive. A guy so ruthless, so paranoid.....he fell for Hitler, who already betrayed the *west* over and over, of which he was himself a part (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact)!?

Obviously there is as much answers to this question as there are historians writing on the subject but consider this. You're most important guy in huge country, surrounded with almost cultish reverence and yes men. At some point you will begin to think that you can't be wrong, and your ego will prevent you from admitting such if thoughts about being fallible will appear. Stalin I think wasn't naive, just convinced that he know better.  

There is also issue of German-SU pact - admitting that nazis attack is imminent would made this entire pact looks insane and could cast suspicions on it's architects political skills.

Why and how could someone like Stalin be so wrong? Abaris makes some good points, but to me they dont fully explain Stalin seemingly being so comletely in denial of the obvious. Is it so simple that we are all human and all fail at some point, and Stalin just failed once, at the worst time about the most important issue?

Belief in his own cleverness could be answer. This situation is perfect illustration of failure of dictatorships - one man failure results in catastrophe that could have been easily prevented if there would be someone with veto power.

For what it is worth Roger Moorhouse in his book posits that Stalin hoped that he will be able to appease Germany and postpone attack to next year.*



*BY JUNE 1941, THEN, STALIN WAS IN LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS staring down the Nazi barrel. Although he had tended to close his ears to the increasingly insistent news of German preparations, his actions of the previous months demonstrated that he was most certainly aware of the growing threat on his western frontier. He had hoped that by appeasing Berlin he could buy time to see out the summer and effectively postpone any German attack until the following year. As he would later confess, "I did not need any warnings. I knew war would come, but I thought I might gain another six months or so". Stalin also expected that demands, negotiations, and an ultimatum from Berlin would precede any hostilities. Until that happened, he reasoned, his brinkmanship had not yet edged to the brink. [Roger Moorhouse, The Devils alliance, chapter 8, epub edition]

[Mr Greene]

I just like the way the events are presented, in a kind of "real time" way, week by week, so people get a feeling how slowly everything evolved over the course of 6 years, and how many stories evolved that seem so small and insignificant to us now, because we are so far removed from the actual events and know the outcome already. How many *minor* fronts (like East Africa campaign of the UK, or the events pre-balcan invasion of Germany) evolved, that they were the *big thing* in absence of the major campaigns (hindsight again!) and in what context this was i find fascinating. How Bulgaria was pushed into giving way to the axis. How Yugoslavia had a fascicst government that was overthrown, before Germany decided to invade! How tedious the Battle of Britain was, even long after the "Seelöwe" was canceled. The political struggles in the UK when Fall Gelb was called out (Churchill vs. Halifax). They also give more background about the politics behind the war, how leaders negotiate, internal quarrels, the confusion of those people involved (without 20/20 hindsight).

Longs story made short, I dont like this series alone because of the information it gives, but because of the presentation, because of the perspective we as viewers are put it. Imo it gives a pretty good feeling of how it must have been for the peopel back then, without all the spoilers.

At least thats what i take from the series since i am watching it.


As for the speculation(s) about "Barbarossa", meh...what i never understood is why Stalin seemed to have been so naive. A guy so ruthless, so paranoid.....he fell for Hitler, who already betrayed the *west* over and over, of which he was himself a part (Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact)!?  Why and how could someone like Stalin be so wrong? Abaris makes some good points, but to me they dont fully explain Stalin seemingly being so comletely in denial of the obvious. Is it so simple that we are all human and all fail at some point, and Stalin just failed once, at the worst time about the most important issue?
And even if the red army was prepared. Would the result maybe have been even worse? An army ready to fight (but in no shape to fight the Wehermacht in 1941) that would have lost even more armies in even bigger encirclements?

Also: As the Wehrmacht assembled over 140 divisions (including 17 panzer divisions), the Africa Corps had like one panzer division and one motorized. Rommel just besieged Tobruk. In a previous episode they said that Rommel had exactly TWELVE FLAK36 88mm to stop the Mathildas, while 3.5mio german soldiers were preparing to invade Russia. Did it escape the OKW that taking away Suez by giving Rommel another panzer division and maybe another mechanized one could have severe global strategic implications? Were they so obsessed with "Lebensraum im Osten" that they didnt see that chance? Without Suez the british position in the Med would have been untenable imo. Crete jsut fell. Malta, Gibraltar...? Hell most countries in the near east were rather anti-british and anti-french. The brits just invaded what is now Iraq in order to remove a government that was supported by Germany and Italy.
If Suez could have been taken, and if the main thrust of barbarossa was towards the Caucasus, a giant encirclement could have made the complete medierranean axis territory exclusively, and the Levant could have been a launching stage for further operations, with Ukraine and Caucasus oil fields secured.
But i guess the ideology of blood and soil was in the way, and everyone was focused on Russia alone, because Adolf wanted to. The original plan and order for Rommel was to be purely defensive anyway. He should have never taken Tobruk or threatened Suez in the first place.

Little fun fact: When Rommel went offensive towards Tobruk, against orders from OKW, they sent a high ranking staff officer to monitor and gather info about Rommels plans. His name was Friedrich Paulus.

I concur though (fortunately) Adolf (like a lot of continental leaders) didn't understand the sea.
Taking Suez wouldn't just make the British position in the Med untenable, it threatens Britain's position in the Indian Ocean, being one of 3 choke points. The Japanese took another at Singapore so the Desert Campaign was rather more serious than the Germans figured.

[Mr Greene]

Should (or could) the Germans have knocked Britain out in 1940?

Impossible, since there was neither air nor sea superiority. They occupied the channel isles, and that's about it.

As impossible as invading Russia?
Adolf would have put the whole Kriegsmarine on the bottom of the North Sea without blinking.

[Gawdzilla Sama]

The fall of England/Wales/Scotland would not have ended the British Empire's war against Germany.

[Mr Greene]

Damn sight tougher from Newfoundland.