Is Morality Objective?

[EvieTheAvocado]

Measurability for example, it works regardless of adopting a realist or idealists point of view.

It's also irrelevant.

Idealism is a very different framework, one needs to revise the definitions of many concepts when drastically different metaphysical assumptions are being made.

I disagree because all the actual knowledge we have is entirely dependent on our subjective experience, anyway.

Whether idealism is true or false it's true that we can make epistemically objective statements about ontologically subjective reality. Rationality Rules points this out in the second video.

This is why it should be "Independent of opinion as opposed to fact" rather than "Independent of mind".

Since inspecting the values of humans as a whole is practically impossible, the propositions about values of humans as a whole cannot be possibly verified or falsified.

Humans don't have to share the same values for those values to be objective. Objectivity =/= universality.

Therefore the propositions about values of humans as a whole cannot be an objective basis for morality.

The propositions and values doing have to be shared overall. But, as it happens, we do all share innate intrinsic values that all our other non-innate and extrinsic values are based upon.

No, goals are defined in terms of actions and efforts. Which are objectively observable.

If you say so. But this is not necessarily the case at all.

A goal can also be an internalized motive for behavior: i.e. an aspiration.

Values are not defined in terms of anything observable.

Values are more observable than objective reality is! It's precisely because they're (ontologically) subjective that it makes them so directly observable.

They have clearly different definitions. What is relevant in this discussion is that values and goals are clearly distinct. In that goals are defined in terms of actions and efforts.

Not necessarily.

Furthermore, if we are ultimately driven to our goals because of the values/preferences we hold then it's the values/preferences that are the ultimate basis. The fact that they are ontologically subjective does not make them epistemically subjective ... that would be an equivocation.

Which are observable. Values are not defined in terms of (publicly) observables.

Actually, it's ultimately the other way around. The objective world is not directly observable, and it is instead presumed to be extremely likely to exist. Values however, being subjective, are directly observable to each individual who holds them.

Observable in this context means publicly observable,

Public observability is irrelevant to objective morality when it comes to the metaphysics and principle of the matter.

We're not yet discussing how we can know particular objectively moral truths ... we're starting with the metaphysics of "What is an objective moral value?"

Universality/public observability/consensus doesn't matter when it comes to deciding the metaphysics of the matter.

that object x can possibly be observed by any observer.

My values are directly observable to me ... your values are directly observable to you. We can't directly observe each other's values, but we both share the same, at least two, innate intrinsic values.

The fact that these values within us are ontologially subjective doesn't make it episemically subjective. You're wanting to move onto the knowledge of the matter ... but it's important to point out first that just because the metaphysics is subjective it doesn't make the epistemic matter subjective. Furthermore, I did enjoy pointing out that even metaphysical subjectivity is ultimately metaphysically objective (subjects are a kind of object. They're just objects that have subjectivity. Living things are a kind of thing. They're just things that are living. Etc).

How can I possibly know your values through observation?

You don't have to. 

By the way, you said in a previous post that there are values regardless of someone being aware of them or not, so according to this statement sometimes values are not directly observable to the person, right?

What I meant there was that despite the fact that people ARE aware of many of their values they may not realize that all their values are ultimately driven by innate values such as a drive towards pleasure and pain. But even if it's not a fact that all their values are ultimately driven by pleasure and pain ... even if psychological Hedonism is false ... they're still able to observe their instrumental values that come out of those innate drives/values. And it is also possible for them to become aware of those innate drives if those indeed their innate drives. Furthermore, if psychological Hedonism is false and people are not driven by pleasure and pain ... then many of the values/desires that they observe may instead be innate.

You can also think about our drive to survive. This is a very good example used in the second video. Another example is our drive to reproduce. I personally think that the way nature goes about motivating us to seek food and sex and avoid getting ourselves killed is through the mechanisms of pain and pleasure. Food tastes good and sex feels good to encourage us to eat and have sex. Pain hurts to avoid us damaging our bodies or getting killed. So there you go.

I already said that I'm following your definition of being 'independent of opinion', so if some proposition holds regardless of what people think about it, it would be an objective fact. We agree on this.

Great! Sorry, it wasn't clear to me that you were going to use "independent of opinion" rather than mind-independent now.

By the way, it's important that "opinion" refers to "opinion as opposed to fact". It's fine to have a fact that is dependent on opinion if that opinion also corresponds to a fact.

Again, I emphasize that goals are defined in terms of actions and efforts which are observable, this feature is not shared by values.

You seem to be referring to what the goal is pointing to, the target. Which is indeed one sense of the word "goal". I think the confusing part is that "goal" can refer to both the target of a goal and also the motive that drives the goal, yes?

1. value: that which someone regards as worthy and important. When you say 'moral values' this meaning is implied.

Yes.

2. value: the end towards which innate drives are directed, such as pleasure. They exist even if we are not aware of them. When you say 'innate values that drive all our preferences' this meaning is implied, which is very different from (1).

Pleasure is an internal value in the sense of (1). It is both the aim and something that we value. This is because pleasure is an intrinsic value. Pleasure is not something we point at externally ... pleasure is purely intrinsic. A sports car is not pleasure. The intrinsically good feeling/experience we get from driving a sports car is pleasure.

If I regards pleasure as worthless,

It's not possible for you to even do that, though. It's possible for you to think you're doing that ... but provided you're not so depressed that you only care about avoiding dangers and minimizing pain ... provided you have any sort of POSITIVE goals at all... you're ultimately aiming at pleasure. You may not directly be aiming at pleasure, and hence you may not realize it, but all your other POSITIVE goals are purely instrumental/extrinsic ways of getting at intrinsic pleasure.

That is, provided that I am right about psychological Hedonism being true. And it does seem to be the most plausible and most parsimonious view.

 pleasure is still a value for me in sense (2) regardless.

Actually it can't be a value for you in sense (2) because sense (2) is extrinsic/external ... and pleasure is always ultimately intrinsic/internal. And if I'm right about psychological Hedonism being true ... then pleasure must ultimately, even if only indirectly because you're unaware of it, be the ultimate one and only positive value for you in sense (1).

 But if I regard pleasure as worthless,

If.

pleasure is no longer a value for me in senes (1).

If that's possible. It's NOT even POSSIBLE in sense (2) though. And I would argue that it MUST be ACTUAL in sense (1), for everyone who ever desires anything positive. Whether it's a desire for others or themselves to be happy (it's usually both). 

It is possible that you have meant (2) throughout your discussion, in which case you should simply use 'drives' to avoid ambiguity and confusion.

Well I would suggest that you are being equally ambiguous by using 'goal' when it can refer to both (1) and (2).

And pleasure is indeed only intrinsic.

But other values aren't. And other values also exist in our brains ... as instrumental desires in the sense of (2). They're ultimately entirely internal but they are less internal and deep than the intrinsic values and desires from which they stem from.

 

Value is not used in sense (2) as much as I'm aware of.

Well if you are referring to what we want in the objective world then I think it's irrelevant to the discussion because we don't even need to assume that the objective world exists to have objective morality (the objective world obviously does exist, but we don't have to go that far, and valid arguments for objective morality are equally true under Idealism. This is why worrying about ontological subjectivity is a red herring. Because it matters not that values and desires are ontologically subjective ... because that still doesn't make them epistemically subjective ... and when it comes to the metaphysics of the matter ontological subjectivity is ultimately no less "real" than ontological objectivity. Subjectivity, in the ontological/metaphysical sense merely refers to objects that have consciousness).

If you are referring to drives throughout your discussion, I would agree with you, since drives can be objectively known through observing actions and behaviors.

Objective reality obviously exists ... but it's not needed to be assumed in order to have objective moral values ... which is why you can be an Idealist and still argue validly for objective morality ... and it's also why the fact that something is ontologically or metaphysically subjective is no threat for objective moral values. We can still have knowledge of the subjective world just as much as the objective world.

... in fact ... the subjective world is ultimately the only world we can know ... despite the fact that it is obviously perfectly reasonable to extrapolate the existence of the objective world as being extremely probable to exist. 

When you say 'values/goals/ambitions/aspirations/preferences/desires all appear to be the same sort of thing' it indicates you are not very picky about what words exactly mean.

LOL. This gave me a laugh. I'm the most pedantic and picky person that I think I or any of my friends have ever known :laugh:

That's why my favorite fallacy to correct is the equivocation fallacy.

It's perfectly fine to use a vague word when I know which sense I'm using it in. The important thing is to not equivocate.

This can be an issue when you want to convey your thoughts.

I know what I mean. Yeah, I'm not so good at conveying my thoughts to others, (not having empathy doesn't help ...) but conveying them to myself is very easy indeed ... and making sure that they're logically consistent is one of my greatest skills ...

... if you're not sure which sense I'm using a word in, then please ask.

You may wish me to simply use more specific words... but, hell dude, dictionaries and thesauruses will really change matters for you if you ever read them as much as I have. Whatever words you think will be more specific also have other specific senses ... the only way to ultimately avoid equivocation is to know which sense of the word you're using. It is indeed to specify from the start which sense of important words that you're using ... but you can't do that with every word or it would take forever. The word 'goal' is not quite as specific as you think. It's not really any better than 'value'.

Why? Because if a goal is the object of the person's ambition ... and the objective of the person's ambition is their own subjective pleasure ... which is also an intrinsic value ... then 'goal' suddenly doesn't refer to something as external as you would like to think. Especially if all goals ultimately refer to such intrinsic values. Goals seem to be putting the cart before the horse.