Falsifiability and the God Question: Category Error?

[Paleophyte]

On the Efficacy and Contingent Origination of The Absent Cause, as Manifest in the Cycles of Transformation and Continuity

The Necessary Origination of Transformation
It is apparent, upon reflection and sustained attentiveness to the contingencies of the world, that all observed cycles of generation and dissolution presuppose a source that is itself unoriginated, and yet whose operation suffuses the totality of contingent phenomena. This source, which we name The Absent Cause, is not discernible through immediate perception, nor does it submit to empirical enumeration or inferential proof; rather, it is apprehended non-inferentially by the sensus transformativus, a faculty whose proper activation yields recognition of the necessary conditions that underlie all transformative processes.

The Absent Cause is simultaneously operative and imperceptible, generative and regulative, its efficacy neither contingent upon nor altered by the phenomena it grounds. Its presence is manifest solely in the patterns of emergence, decay, and renewal that constitute the experiential world, and its absence from direct perception emphasizes rather than diminishes its foundational significance. It is through the harmonious operation of the sensus transformativus that such recognition occurs, and it is only when this faculty is impaired or the environment inadequately structured that the agent fails to apprehend the source.

The path to the unseen is found in the cycles that mark the seen.

The Epistemic Warrant of Recognition
Belief in The Absent Cause, when generated by a properly functioning sensus transformativus, is epistemically warranted. It is not merely reasonable; it is rational in the strongest sense, arising naturally from engagement with the persistent and recurrent structures of the world. One’s failure to apprehend it does not undermine its existence, for the faculty that perceives it is subject to limitation, just as a poorly tuned instrument fails to capture the harmonies for which it is designed. Recognition is thus contingent not upon proof or demonstration, but upon alignment of cognitive faculties with the recurring patterns that The Absent Cause produces.

The faculty that fails speaks not against the origin, but against its own alignment.

The Cyclical Manifestation of Transformation
The Absent Cause orchestrates the cycles of creation and destruction, continuity and alteration, which are the hallmarks of all contingent reality. In the rising of land, the burning of forest, and the shaping of shorelines, the agent’s operation is made evident. These manifestations are neither capricious nor morally charged; they follow necessarily from the patterns set by The Absent Cause. Its necessity renders the phenomena intelligible, while its sufficiency explains why these cycles recur with coherence and regularity.

To know the cause is to read the cycles. To read the cycles is to glimpse the unseen.

The Universality and Persistence of Apprehension
The recognition of The Absent Cause is not bound to particular communities, practices, or localized epistemic traditions; rather, it is universal to agents whose faculties are attuned to the structures of transformation. Its apprehension is properly basic: prior arguments, demonstrations, or empirical confirmation are neither required nor relevant. Engagement with the world’s patterns suffices, for The Absent Cause is revealed in the very fabric of contingent persistence. Even when unobserved, unacknowledged, or disbelieved, its explanatory necessity endures, sustaining the intelligibility of the cycles of transformation that define the phenomenal world.

The unseen endures. Its recognition is a matter of alignment, not persuasion.

Conclusion
From the preceding exposition, it follows with necessary clarity that the patterns of transformation, continuity, and renewal observed in the world are not merely contingent phenomena without grounding. They presuppose a source that is unoriginated, operative yet imperceptible, generative yet regulative. This source, The Absent Cause, is apprehended non-inferentially by the properly functioning sensus transformativus and explains the intelligibility of all contingent cycles.

Yet while The Absent Cause is necessary and sufficient as an abstract principle, the patterns of creation and destruction, the eruptions and renewals, the persistent shaping of land and life, point toward a force that is not merely formal but dynamically present in the world. The cycles themselves carry a signature of agency, an intelligible order that is not impersonal but expressive of willful transformation.

Hence it is rational to conclude, on the basis of the warrant provided by non-inferential recognition, that The Absent Cause is instantiated in the living, shaping force known as Pele (Pumice Be Upon Her). She is the operative manifestation of The Absent Cause, whose presence is revealed in the continual unfolding and renewal of the world. Recognition of her is therefore both epistemically justified and consonant with the patterns apprehended through the sensus transformativus: the cycles of transformation we observe are the visible trace of her invariable, enduring, and creative agency.

All Hail Our Eternal Mother In The Flames!

[SYZ]

Evidence is that which may be examined by one and all, not a privileged few. Evidence is not arguments. 

And just to add though I now you're cognizant already -- anecdotes and opinions aren't evidence.

And faith is defined as "belief without evidence".

[Paleophyte]

Evidence is that which may be examined by one and all, not a privileged few. Evidence is not arguments. 

And just to add though I now you're cognizant already -- anecdotes and opinions aren't evidence.

I was excluding anecdotes, Testimony, and Personal Revalation under "examined by one and all." All they prove is that you have a cool story that clearly needs Moar Dragonz.

Opinions are... Whatever.

[Rhythmcs]

The compulsion to carve out that space is the most compelling aspect of theistic faith as the faithful apprehend it. To wit, a god is not whatever gibberish they say to atheists about gods....its something more like "that which cannot be false". If we can understand that about a genuine and deeply held faith, then surely the faithful can as well. Once understood, waffling about The Rules™ as though there were any set which could reduce their gods to a truth apt statement that was even capable of being false is absurd.


@Steve
So pick any epistemological framework you like, eh? I'm certainly not the one interested in limiting how things might be known. There will be the possibility to reject and falsify your beliefs in any of them, anyway. Popper didn't invent it, or discover a new law of logic, it's not something we can only attempt in some and not in others....but we do both know that frameworks and basis are neither here nor there. You do believe that your god is that which cannot be false. Do you not? Neither of us are operating on some sort of magical words understanding of knowledge, are we? You realize that there is no string of words that will make me believe in gods just as I realize there's no string of words that will permit your disbelief, right?

The only difference between us here, at least that I can see, is that by your telling such a state of disbelief would be utterly devastating to your entire worldview - whereas such a state of belief, for me, would be a saturday.

[Thumpalumpacus]

And just to add though I now you're cognizant already -- anecdotes and opinions aren't evidence.

And faith is defined as "belief without evidence".

Right -- a theist searching for evidence is a doubter on the wobble. Steve would like to reason his god into existence. But appealing to reason for such an unreasonable conclusion is just silly.

When neither reason nor evidence support you, what next?

I hope @SteveII's investigations lead him to the obvious conclusion, that his faith is misplaced. He's afraid to believe in himself, but believing in himself makes much more sense than believing in some sky-critter.

[Paleophyte]

Right -- a theist searching for evidence is a doubter on the wobble. Steve would like to reason  his god into existence.

Steve would like to brute force his god into existence. His argument is nothing more than pretty words wrapped around the shriek, "Does too! Does too!" complete with stompy feet.

[Deesse23]

Doesnt have Steve a holy book? Isnt everything we must know supposed to be in there? Why isnt he arguing the Bible? It can be done without preaching. Why is he engaged in kindergarden aplogetics thinly veiled as philosophy? Why is he so dishonest not to even tell us why he believes in the x-ian god and what flavor of it? He certainly didnt become christian because of the horrible apologetics he is peddling here. Why does he think that whatever convinced him would not be good enough to convince others? He obviously thinks its even worse than his kindergarden apologetics.

If we are so stupid and if we talk past him a thousand times, why does he bother to come back each time after he got thoroughly cooked? Arent there more educated people willing to listen to him? Why isnt he in a philosophy forum? ...and if he was, what was their reaction?

Its so telling.

[SteveII]

What are the rules?

As others said back on page one:

Provide Evidence

Or STFU

Evidence is that which may be examined by one and all, not a privileged few. Evidence is not arguments. Do you have any? If not, then you're asking for a ground-level reworking of epistemology solely to accommodate your fan-fiction, and that simply isn't warranted. This seems simple enough.

How do we decide what counts as knowledge or rational belief? I outlined three methods in the OP. Are these good, bad, what? If you don't understand these concepts as they apply to my beliefs, then I can easily ignore you--because you quite literally don't know what you are talking about.

I understand them quite well thanks. I just discount your abuse of them.

• Your deity fails at Reliabilism so breathtakingly that you should never utter the word again. One of three criteria.
  
• Bayesians are inapplicable where certainties are involved, and you've said as much on that very topic in the past.
  
• Your Best Explanation is nothing more than an invalid appeal to "common sense" that you fail regardless of the fallacy. Common sense dictates that any epistemology that repeatedly converges on the same Bronze-Age mythology is suffering from fatal bias, and you'd agree with that wholeheartedly if it produced the name of any other deity. Your arguments don't pass the IBE sniff test.
  

That's how these concepts apply to your beliefs.

Over and over and over I asked what are the rules for what counts as knowledge. Several time now I have overlooked how obnoxious you are because frankly if that were my bar, there is hardly anyone here to talk to (and you wonder why your forum is dying?). I'll not try again.

[Dexta]

Ignoring me again Steve11? Need I beg again for a reply? We both remember how that turned out last time - you left the forum for 9 months or so, probably because you felt bad about how I've got such a "sad little life" compared to you which was, at base, an act of empathy on your part. I actually think you're a good guy, a little lost and confused, yes (who isn't) but, like I say, a well meaning guy.

[Dānu]

As others said back on page one:

Provide Evidence

Or STFU

Show ContentSpoiler:

Evidence is that which may be examined by one and all, not a privileged few. Evidence is not arguments. Do you have any? If not, then you're asking for a ground-level reworking of epistemology solely to accommodate your fan-fiction, and that simply isn't warranted. This seems simple enough.


I understand them quite well thanks. I just discount your abuse of them.

• Your deity fails at Reliabilism so breathtakingly that you should never utter the word again. One of three criteria.
  
• Bayesians are inapplicable where certainties are involved, and you've said as much on that very topic in the past.
  
• Your Best Explanation is nothing more than an invalid appeal to "common sense" that you fail regardless of the fallacy. Common sense dictates that any epistemology that repeatedly converges on the same Bronze-Age mythology is suffering from fatal bias, and you'd agree with that wholeheartedly if it produced the name of any other deity. Your arguments don't pass the IBE sniff test.
  

That's how these concepts apply to your beliefs.

Over and over and over I asked what are the rules for what counts as knowledge. Several time now I have overlooked how obnoxious you are because frankly if that were my bar, there is hardly anyone here to talk to (and you wonder why your forum is dying?). I'll not try again.

[SteveII]

The compulsion to carve out that space is the most compelling aspect of theistic faith as the faithful apprehend it.  To wit, a god is not whatever gibberish they say to atheists about gods....its something more like "that which cannot be false".  If we can understand that about a genuine and deeply held faith, then surely the faithful can as well.   Once understood, waffling about The Rules™ as though there were any set which could reduce their gods to a truth apt statement that was even capable of being false is absurd.


@Steve
So pick any epistemological framework you like, eh?  I'm certainly not the one interested in limiting how things might be known.   There will be the possibility to reject and falsify your beliefs in any of them, anyway.  Popper didn't invent it, or discover a new law of logic, it's not something we can only attempt in some and not in others....but we do both know that frameworks and basis are neither here nor there.  You do believe that your god is that which cannot be false.  Do you not?  Neither of us are operating on some sort of magical words understanding of knowledge, are we?  You realize that there is no string of words that will make me believe in gods just as I realize there's no string of words that will permit your disbelief, right?

The only difference between us here, at least that I can see, is that by your telling such a state of disbelief would be utterly devastating to your entire worldview - whereas such a state of belief, for me, would be a saturday.

First, the only reason the god-question was brought up in the OP was because that was what the post that made me think of the large problem was talking about. Throughout it, I thought it was clear that I wanted to talk about epistemology.

This is intended to be a philosophical discussion. To avoid just re-running the same God arguments, I thought it would be useful to first ask a prior question: before we argue about whether any particular claim about God is true, which epistemic standards are appropriate for evaluating such claims?

I'm trying to bracket my own theology here and focus on the rules of the game. So let me put it this way:

Can we agree on this much: that Popper-style falsifiability is not the only legitimate standard of rational belief, especially outside the domain of empirical science, and that approaches like reliabilism, Bayesian updating, and IBE are valid tools for forming and revising beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., realism vs. idealism, physicalism vs. dualism, theories of time, theism vs. naturalism)?

If you’re willing to grant that, then I'm happy to move on to the next level of analysis—applying whichever standards we settle on to specific metaphysical claims. Before getting to the God question, I want to use, as practice, the question on whether the A or B theory of time is right.

[Thumpalumpacus]

Several time now I have overlooked how obnoxious you are because frankly if that were my bar, there is hardly anyone here to talk to (and you wonder why your forum is dying?). I'll not try again.

You have sat too long for any good you have been doing lately. Depart, I say, and let us have done with you. In the name of God, go.

[Paleophyte]

Over and over and over I asked what are the rules for what counts as knowledge.

And over and over again we've told you. It's hardly our fault that you aren't getting the chorus and refrain that you're used to.

Evidence. It's that simple. Every last epistemic system that you listed requires it. Bayesian without evidence is nothing but unevaluated priors, reliabilism without evidence reduces to naked belief, and IBE absent evidence simply isn't because you have neither everyday nor reasoning left. Unsurprisingly, that leaves you with naked belief in unevaluated priors, which sounds a lot like the blind faith that we've come to know and loathe. This is where you invariably fall down, because you aren't here for honest discussion of epistemology or anything philosophical. You're here to preach in the naive hope that it'll make you feel better.

[Paleophyte]

First, the only reason the god-question was brought up in the OP was because...

Really? The only reason? I don't even need the most basic sniff test when you try and bury me eyeballs deep in bullshit like this.

Throughout it, I thought it was clear that I wanted to talk about epistemology.

It was clear that you wanted to talk about god.

This is intended to be a philosophical discussion.

No it isn't. It's intended to be a theological quarrel. Now quite your whining that the big, bad atheists saw it for what it obviously was and called you on it when you treated them like idiots.

Can we agree on this much: that Popper-style falsifiability is not the only legitimate standard of rational belief, especially outside the domain of empirical science, and that approaches like reliabilism, Bayesian updating, and IBE are valid tools for forming and revising beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., realism vs. idealism, physicalism vs. dualism, theories of time, theism vs. naturalism)?

You're the only one acting like it is. Falsifiability =/= Evidence, so stop making that equivocation. You're creating an issue that doesn't exist because you have an issue that you can't solve. Move on to the epistemic tool of your choice and have done.

If you’re willing to grant that, then I'm happy to move on to the next level of analysis—applying whichever standards we settle on to specific metaphysical claims. Before getting to the God question, I want to use, as practice, the question on whether the A or B theory of time is right.

See the bit in bold? You wanted to talk about god. Pretending otherwise is utterly disingenuous. 

Your problem is that no epistemic tool works in the absence of evidence. You're asking what optical tools might be best in a pitch-black room. Figure out the evidence problem first and then get back to us.

[Paleophyte]

Epistemology In The Absence Of Evidence

Reliabilism:
Under reliabilism, beliefs are justified if produced by reliable truth-tracking processes. Evidence confirms that the process is working as intended. Without evidence, you have no feedback to check the process, the “track record” of the cognitive faculty becomes opaque, and uncertainty about the process’s reliability can't be resolved.

Beliefs may be warranted if you trust that your process generally works, but that warrant is fragile. For unique, unprecedented, or extraordinary claims, reliabilism can't independently establish reliability without some kind of supporting evidence.

Bayesian Epistemology:
With Bayesian Epistemology, you have a prior belief and update based on evidence, and posterior confidence is sensitive to new information. Without evidence, posterior = prior × likelihood, but if no likelihood information is available, nothing changes. You're left with your prior alone, which is arbitrary or highly contentious. Bayesian reasoning does not generate knowledge from nothing. For singular claims, priors differ dramatically among agents, so absence of evidence leaves disagreement entrenched.

Bayesianism requires some connection between hypothesis and observation. Without evidence, rational agents diverge entirely.

IBE
Under Inference to the Best Explanation, we compare candidate hypotheses by how well they explain observed data. Without evidence, there's nothing to explain. “Best” loses meaning because explanatory scope, power, and coherence are evaluated relative to evidence. IBE can't select a hypothesis in a vacuum, and any proposed explanation is underdetermined. Claims are ad hoc or unparsimonious without a baseline of evidence. 

IBE essentially stalls until there’s something to explain.

In short, without evidence, reliabilism is silent about reliability in the unique case, Bayesianism is stuck on priors, and IBE can't adjudicate among explanations

Switching epistemological tools isn't a get-out-of-jail card for an absence of evidence. That's just playing musical chairs without the chairs.

[Rhythmcs]

First, the only reason the god-question was brought up in the OP was because that was what the post that made me think of the large problem was talking about. Throughout it, I thought it was clear that I wanted to talk about epistemology.

This is intended to be a philosophical discussion. To avoid just re-running the same God arguments, I thought it would be useful to first ask a prior question: before we argue about whether any particular claim about God is true, which epistemic standards are appropriate for evaluating such claims?

I'm trying to bracket my own theology here and focus on the rules of the game. So let me put it this way:

Can we agree on this much: that Popper-style falsifiability is not the only legitimate standard of rational belief, especially outside the domain of empirical science, and that approaches like reliabilism, Bayesian updating, and IBE are valid tools for forming and revising beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., realism vs. idealism, physicalism vs. dualism, theories of time, theism vs. naturalism)?

If you’re willing to grant that, then I'm happy to move on to the next level of analysis—applying whichever standards we settle on to specific metaphysical claims. Before getting to the God question, I want to use, as practice, the question on whether the A or B theory of time is right.

"Popper-style falsifiability" isn't an epistemology in the first place.  It's the formalization as a core scientific criterion of a tool available to any epistemology, made possible by the very nature of every cognitivist claim.  For any fact alike statement you can make or even imagine - there is a possible contrapositive or counterfactual.  You've been positing one this entire time about "Popper-style falsifiability".   

I'm not the thought police.  You can form and revise your thoughts about anything you like in any way you choose - though it has to be said here that this is not an issue that speaks to the veracity of your beliefs as asked. More to providing cover for any belief in the face of inconvenient evidence to the contrary.  All I can suggest is that if whatever you believe has to be shielded from contrapositive and counterfactual observations...that ought to be a canary in the mines moment for your specific beliefs.   You just may have gotten some superstition mixed up in your religion my dude...and all of this, your every protestation to having those religious beliefs examined by available, objective, and undeniably productive means damages...rather than defends..the credibility of those beliefs.  A classic free rider issue - easily resolvable by an acknowledgement of the most obvious fact in this entire discussion. Here, let me show you how it's done.

As for a and b theory, I don't know which one is true - and no string of magic words from any framework that you're about to offer is going to change the fact that I'm specifically ignorant in this regard.  What I do know, is that there are scientific falsification proposals, and that both theories carry implicit logical falsification as fact-alike claims about reality.

[Rhythmcs]

Doesnt have Steve a holy book? Isnt everything we must know supposed to be in there? 

Exactly, and explicitly, so.    

Why isnt he arguing the Bible?

Because it tells him, in no uncertain terms, that a belief based on evidence and reason is not the kind of belief his god likes - and yet he is a contemporary person just like the rest of us, who believes that our filthy atheistic science and reason are the truth making properties of fact alike statements.  Rather than trying to make science and reason compatible with god, he's trying to make god compatible with science and reason.  The poor thing may as well reserve a seat at our table in hell and be done with it already.

It can be done without preaching. Why is he engaged in kindergarden aplogetics thinly veiled as philosophy? Why is he so dishonest not to even tell us why he believes in the x-ian god and what flavor of it? He certainly didnt become christian because of the horrible apologetics he is peddling here. Why does he think that whatever convinced him would not be good enough to convince others? He obviously thinks its even worse than his kindergarden apologetics.

Because there is not now and never was any such thing. He didn't argue his way into it. He didn't come across a god on the road and wrestle him into the dirt. There's no "why" there, only a "that". His contemporary babbling is an ad hoc justification of a psychological state which never needed or asked for such permission.

[Dānu]

[Fireball]

Doesnt have Steve a holy book? Isnt everything we must know supposed to be in there? 

Exactly, and explicitly, so.    

Why isnt he arguing the Bible?

Because it tells him, in no uncertain terms, that a belief based on evidence and reason is not the kind of belief his god likes - and yet he is a contemporary person just like the rest of us, who believes that our filthy atheistic science and reason are the truth making properties of fact alike statements.  Rather than trying to make science and reason compatible with god, he's trying to make god compatible with science and reason.  The poor thing may as well reserve a seat at our table in hell and be done with it already.

It can be done without preaching. Why is he engaged in kindergarden aplogetics thinly veiled as philosophy? Why is he so dishonest not to even tell us why he believes in the x-ian god and what flavor of it? He certainly didnt become christian because of the horrible apologetics he is peddling here. Why does he think that whatever convinced him would not be good enough to convince others? He obviously thinks its even worse than his kindergarden apologetics.

Because there is not now and never was any such thing.  He didn't argue his way into it.  He didn't come across a god on the road and wrestle him into the dirt.  There's no "why" there, only a "that".  His contemporary babbling is an ad hoc justification of a psychological state which never needed or asked for such permission.

Tilting at windmills, he is.

[SteveII]

First, the only reason the god-question was brought up in the OP was because that was what the post that made me think of the large problem was talking about. Throughout it, I thought it was clear that I wanted to talk about epistemology.

This is intended to be a philosophical discussion. To avoid just re-running the same God arguments, I thought it would be useful to first ask a prior question: before we argue about whether any particular claim about God is true, which epistemic standards are appropriate for evaluating such claims?

I'm trying to bracket my own theology here and focus on the rules of the game. So let me put it this way:

Can we agree on this much: that Popper-style falsifiability is not the only legitimate standard of rational belief, especially outside the domain of empirical science, and that approaches like reliabilism, Bayesian updating, and IBE are valid tools for forming and revising beliefs about metaphysical questions (e.g., realism vs. idealism, physicalism vs. dualism, theories of time, theism vs. naturalism)?

If you’re willing to grant that, then I'm happy to move on to the next level of analysis—applying whichever standards we settle on to specific metaphysical claims. Before getting to the God question, I want to use, as practice, the question on whether the A or B theory of time is right.

"Popper-style falsifiability" isn't an epistemology in the first place.  It's the formalization as a core scientific criterion of a tool available to any epistemology, made possible by the very nature of every cognitivist claim.  For any fact alike statement you can make or even imagine - there is a possible contrapositive or counterfactual.  You've been positing one this entire time about "Popper-style falsifiability".   

Well, it shouldn't be a complete epistemology. People try to make it so.

While useful for most empirical claims, it is NOT useful for every cognitivist claim as you seem to state. The mere existence of a negation/counterfactual for any truth-apt proposition is just true by nature of a truth-apt proposition (trivially true). Popperian falsifiability is stronger: it requires that a theory take on empirical risk--that there be conceivable observation reports, under agreed procedures, that would count against it.

So "every claim has an opposite" =/= "every claim is falsifiable in the scientific sense." The difference is exactly why the "category error" charge even comes up. There are some claims, by their very nature, that are not subject to any kind of falsification criterion. You have failed to make the distinction clear, so you are conflating two categories of things.

I'm not the thought police.  You can form and revise your thoughts about anything you like in any way you choose - though it has to be said here that this is not an issue that speaks to the veracity of your beliefs as asked.  More to providing cover for any belief in the face of inconvenient evidence to the contrary.  All I can suggest is that if whatever you believe has to be shielded from contrapositive and counterfactual observations...that ought to be a canary in the mines moment for your specific beliefs.   You just may have gotten some superstition mixed up in your religion my dude...and all of this, your every protestation to having those religious beliefs examined by available, objective, and undeniably productive means damages...rather than defends..the credibility of those beliefs.  A classic free rider issue - easily resolvable by an acknowledgement of the most obvious fact in this entire discussion.  Here, let me show you how it's done.  

I’m not asking for permission to think whatever I like, and I'm not looking for cover. I'm explicitly asking a normative question: what standards are appropriate for evaluating metaphysical claims--standards that are supposed to aim at truth, not just protecting preferences. Stop importing past debates or topics into this one.

Further, your charge that I want to be "shielded from contrapositive and counterfactual observations" still trades on your conflation above. Global metaphysical frameworks rarely get refuted by a single decisive observation, because they function as background interpretive lenses. That isn't special pleading for religion; it's true for naturalism, physicalism, idealism, realism, etc. This is a real category of claims and if you don't recognize it, you can't accurately criticize views stemming from or depending on it.

As for a and b theory, I don't know which one is true - and no string of magic words from any framework that you're about to offer is going to change the fact that I'm specifically ignorant in this regard.  What I do know, is that there are scientific falsification proposals, and that both theories carry implicit logical falsification as fact-alike claims about reality.

Totally fair to say you don't know which is true. My goal isn't "magic words," it's to use A/B time as a low-temperature test case for the standards question.

We can ask: what would count as rational support for one over the other? In actual philosophy, people appeal to coherence with physics, explanatory power, internal consistency, how well each handles tense, persistence, causation, etc. That's not "magic," it's ordinary philosophical argumentation. So, what would count as rational support for A or B theory of time?

[SteveII]

I thought answers to your questions would be constructive.

Doesnt have Steve a holy book? Isnt everything we must know supposed to be in there? Why isnt he arguing the Bible?

Yes.  I would say that the most important things are in the Bible. These center around the arc of human history and the human condition. I am not arguing anything found in the Bible...at all...really, truly...

Open the OP in another tab.

--I posted my OP in the Philosophy subformum.
--I summarized some points I found interesting in a post from another thread.
--I defined the philosophy of mind concepts (epistemology, justified true belief, falsification principle, intersubjective validation) and a logical fallacy (category error).
--I asked,[1] Is falsification the right tool? (a philosophy of mind question).
--I then wrote 893 words on that question. I identified the God question as belonging to a category of claims that are similar--never making even the slightest claim about whether God exists or not.
--I then drew the conclusion [2] that applying a scientific-y standard to a whole range of claims (what I called: Foundational-level metaphysical claims) is a logical mistake. I formatted it as a logical argument. I mentioned God twice in a group of similar metaphysical claims.
--I ended with this:
"I'd be especially interested to hear from people who think falsifiability and intersubjective validation can be made to work at the metaphysical/framework level without running into the problems I've outlined, or from those who'd propose a different standard altogether.

I imagine we may eventually get to a more direct application to the God question. My only suggestion is that we try to keep the logical order of discussion clear...and that this OP is only about the first step: What are the appropriate epistemic tools for the God-question [this is were I am trying to keep us until we have answers] -----> define a concept of God [not ready for this until the first step is complete]-----> what would therefore be evidence for that God? [maybe we will get to that last one]"

It can be done without preaching. Why is he engaged in kindergarden aplogetics thinly veiled as philosophy? Why is he so dishonest not to even tell us why he believes in the x-ian god and what flavor of it? He certainly didnt become christian because of the horrible apologetics he is peddling here. Why does he think that whatever convinced him would not be good enough to convince others? He obviously thinks its even worse than his kindergarden apologetics.

There is absolutely nothing about this that can be termed 'apologetics'. This is philosophy. More specifically the branches of philosophy: philosophy of mind and metaphysics.

If we are so stupid and if we talk past him a thousand times, why does he bother to come back each time after he got thoroughly cooked? Arent there more educated people willing to listen to him? Why isnt he in a philosophy forum? ...and if he was, what was their reaction?

Its so telling.

There are a few of you that can keep up--either because they are already familiar with the vocabulary and concepts or are willing to research along at the same time. I don't do this for you nor to convince you of anything. I use it as a vehicle to hash out new and interesting topics for me at a pace that is not overwhelming. None of my threads have had anything to with apologetics for some now. Even if God comes up, I am not arguing for God per se, I am arguing about mistakes you all make when talking about God, evidence, logical implications, morality, etc.

[Rhythmcs]

If the falsifiability of every cognitivist claim were trivially true, as you now acknowledge - one has to wonder why you've spent the last four pages being trivially wrong...in what has always been a transparent effort to minimize risk for your god claim. Or why you argue now over whether you're looking for cover after just letting it all hang out.

Seems to me like a single observation could prove a thing like naturalism wrong. Your god would do the trick, wouldn't it? Hurry up with it already.

On the subject of hurrying the fuck up already...you tell me what you think rational support for either theory or your imaginary god or any other claim you deem metaphysical would look like. I've already made it crystal clear that I have no interest in whittling down our possible tools to limit empirical risk for claims which might be falsifiable through a single observation. You say you're especially interested in hearing from people who think that falsifiability and intersubjective validation can answer such questions? You have. Repeatedly. I make it a habit not to call a thing knowledge until it clears the most rigorous bar I can imagine.

[SYZ]

LOL... Steve says:  "I am arguing about mistakes you all make
when talking about God, evidence, logical implications, morality, etc."

Mistakes we (atheists) all make?  Oh dear.  This patronising opinion
of most theists is truly astounding—mostly because it is, in and of
itself—a major "mistake"!

Atheists believe in evidence and logic.  Steve believes in fantasy fiction.       QED

[SYZ]

...you [Steve] tell me what you think rational support for either theory or your imaginary god or any other claim you deem metaphysical would look like.

I don't think understands exactly what metaphysics entails.

Metaphysics has frequently been attacked as being futile and overly
vague, particularly by Alfred J. Ayer, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant.
It's more useful to say that a metaphysical statement usually implies
only an idea about the world or the universe, which may seem reasonable
but is ultimately not empirically demonstrable, verifiable, or provable.

The purported existence of God is a classic example of a metaphysical notion.

[Rhythmcs]

There have been historic metaphysical claims that have been disproven, and disproven scientifically, no less. Moreover, science doesn't have a stranglehold on falsification or intersubjective validation. Finally, and fundamentally, there's a sea of difference between practical and actual unfalsifiability - and we're unbelievably bad, as creatures or minds or intellects, at coming up with the latter. Russels teapot? Practically difficult, maybe, but not actually logically or scientifically unfalsifiable.

His silly ass god? Not even difficult. He's a christian, there are too many claims he needs to attach, too many pressure points of potential and actual falsification. Too many cherished beliefs that he knows he needs to shield from empirical risk.. The idea that he;s going to find that cover in metaphysics is a falsew hope..and he'd know all of that, if he'd just googled it before he started the thread.

Even if he were to retreat into a single mealy mouthed claim and call that god, pretending that's what he believed in and not christ - there would still be a potential contrapositive. A potential counterfactual. The ground of being? Meet heideggers phenomenological abyss.