Is There a Rational Method for Evaluating Religious Claims?

[Paleophyte]

A few things.

1. Reading the NT (for generic purposes) is not the same thing as reading it to understand a single topic (like the connection to the OT). This is a topic that has filled libraries with all the layers of connection to peel back.

2. related, saying something like "if the NT hadn’t tried to align itself with the OT, it would easily be recognized as a completely separate religion" shows that you don't understand Christianity at all. There is absolutely no Christianity without the OT. It is 100% dependent on it for all of its presuppositions, foundational theology, internal consistency, explanatory scope, historical context, moral system and more. It is inseparable. It is one complete story. You can become a Christian without it--you cannot understand Christianity without it.

3. You have repeated that Christians needed to be "Jewish" to be accepted by Rome as if this explains the connection. I would not repeat that in the era of AI now where it will take 6 seconds to find out that is way off. While the benefit might be true (for a short period of time), it is incidental, and not at all a reason for the connection to the OT.

4. Christianity does change the interpretation going backwards because it is the "New Covenant" that makes sense of and contextualizes all the previous covenants as they each did to the one before it. In other words, it's an unavoidable feature of the new revelation and not an separate step.

0. Christianity just isn't that special. Any deity that's worth it's salt isn't going to go around entrusting vital spiritual knowledge to a Canaanite religion that's past its Sell-By date and a Roman Mystery Cult. You hardwire that shit into the brains of your creations. Christianity's great struggle is explaining why The Truth isn't now and never has been accepted by the majority of God's Creations.

[Dānu]

Finally, why is there an assumption in your list of assumption necessary to evaluate a worldview that flattely reject by fiat one of the necessary assumption of some worldviews? This still isn't an excuse. You don't need to accept the idea that humans can perceive real features moral and aesthetic reality (or even that there is a moral and aesthetic reality to begin with).

It occurred to me early on that, in terms of overall coherence and objective truth, the fewer tenets a worldview poses, the more likely it is to score better than a worldview which does make such assumptions. Thus a worldview which assumes nothing about morals can remain true and coherent regardless of what the objective truth turns out to be. Thus a worldview that posits an objective morality necessarily has a higher chance of being wrong than one which is agnostic on such questions, which, by its agnosticism, cannot be wrong. This might explain why worldviews rooted in naturalism seem to fare better, both practically and probabilistically, than worldviews which drag a truckload of metaphysical presumptions in their wake.

[Cavebear]

Finally, why is there an assumption in your list of assumption necessary to evaluate a worldview that flattely reject by fiat one of the necessary assumption of some worldviews? This still isn't an excuse. You don't need to accept the idea that humans can perceive real features moral and aesthetic reality (or even that there is a moral and aesthetic reality to begin with).

It occurred to me early on that, in terms of overall coherence and objective truth, the fewer tenets a worldview poses, the more likely it is to score better than a worldview which does make such assumptions.  Thus a worldview which assumes nothing about morals can remain true and coherent regardless of what the objective truth turns out to be.  Thus a worldview that posits an objective morality necessarily has a higher chance of being wrong than one which is agnostic on such questions, which, by its agnosticism, cannot be wrong.  This might explain why worldviews rooted in naturalism seem to fare better, both practically and probabilistically, than worldviews which drag a truckload of metaphysical presumptions in their wake.

Yes, a universe created only of chemistry and physics is less complicated than one that involves an unnecessary intelligent (and apparently sometime impulsive irrational) deity.

I sometimes wonder about theists. Did they never have chemistry sets as children? Did they sleep through science classes? Did they never say to a friend "Oh yeah, prove it"?

I had a friend from college. He was Jewish, but actually most of my pre-college friends were too. (it was a very good neighborhood). He had problems with his religion. His Dad was Jewish, his Mom Protestant. So he kind of cycled about being Jewish. There was a time when he would call me on Friday afternoon and remind me he could not answer the phone until Saturday night. And then he would switch around and act all vaguely Christian for a few years. I gave up on him 14 years ago; he just wore me out finally.

I'll never understand theists...

[polymath257]

Danu had a great question in another thread. As I thought about it more and more and my answer got longer and longer, I thought the topic deserved to have it's own thread.

It's said that by their fruits you shall know them.  Unfortunately, this is a flawed method for ascertaining truth, for multiple reasons.  What concerns me today however, setting this question aside, is how one constructs one's epistemological net such that the truth does not escape, but that which we aren't interested in does.  It is commonly argued that science has a method which in its application does a better job of this than the methods commonly applied in other areas such as history or theology.  In particular, theological methods seemed to have coevolved with theology in a form of one hand washing the other way, such that the methods a Christian applies to his claims are well suited to confirming those claims and disconfirming claims from competing worldviews.  Alas, that is a game that the other can equally apply wherein one loads the dice in one's favor by one's selection of methods.  

When Steve first presented his case for Christianity, I alluded to the allegation that multiple religious worldviews apply the same, so-called, method, to arrive at different conclusions and I asked for his response.  He claimed that he thought that he was objective enough in that he applied objective standards in his evaluation of his and other religions.  A few things occur to me.  First, a standard can be objective, in that the standard yields determinate results or the standard itself being well defined, and yet not be capable of picking out that which is objectively true from that which isn't.  The second, as I've commented previously, the Duhem-Quine thesis, otherwise known as underdetermination of theory, suggests that auxiliary assumptions can always be adjusted to "rescue" a theory that has failed a test.  We see this technique liberally applied in pseudoscience such as creationism.  What's not as obvious is that our standards and methods are also a part of this package of auxiliary assumptions which can be selectively chosen to yield the result which one desires.  

This brings me to my question of the day, which is that while naturalism, or more properly methodological naturalism, the guiding assumption of the scientific method, when applied as a part of that method has a high rate of true positives, true negatives, and fewer category I and II errors (false negatives, positives).  My question is, what is or are the methods that religions such as Christianity applies to evidence and facts, and what about them gives us reason to believe that they are, if not equal to, at least in the same ballpark as the scientific method in picking out what is objectively true and what is objectively false.  It seems to me, that while one can whine about the failures of science, one need compare it to the alternative on offer which regularly results in many of the errors previously mentioned, affirming falsehoods, high rates of category I and II errors, and so on.  So my question is essentially what is the method that this or any other religion applies and what is the justification for believing that, through faithful application of that method, one will reliably pick out objective truth?

Great question and thorough background to the issue.

Philosophy of science outlines the underpinnings of the scientific method. These are not themselves facts, they are metaphysical assumptions so that science can get off the ground and creates the framework for methodological naturalism.

METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF SCIENCE
• Uniformity of Nature: The future will resemble the past (induction is valid).
• Reliability of Sense Perception: Our senses give mostly accurate information about the external world.
• Reliability of Reason and Logic: Logic and reason are valid tools for drawing conclusions.
• Our Cognitive Faculties Can Access Truth: Human minds are capable of knowing truth, including abstract or non-empirical truth.
• Existence of Objective Reality: There is a world outside of our minds that behaves in regular ways.
• Mathematical Describability: The natural world can be described and predicted using mathematics.
• Causal Regularity: Events have causes; patterns can be discovered.

I deny that most of these are assumptions. The principle of induction, for example, can be *tested*. We make predictions based on past regularities and see if those predictions are upheld by observation. We never have absolute certainty that the future will be similar to the past, but given success so far, it is a reasonable hypothesis.

The reliability of logic is also testable. And, in fact, alternative logics have been proposed (three-valued, quantum, paraconsistent). So far, logic based on the propositional and predicate calculi has worked well. if it is found otherwise, there are other possibilities.

The same is true for mathematical describability. This is born out by experience and is not a necessary assumption. In fact, in some areas, math has not been able to provide good models. So it is certainly NOT a required assumption as oposed to a happy circumstance we have discovered.

As for abstract truths: these are ultimately rules of language and we are simply testing our ability to use language to understand the universe.

Next, we *know* that our senses give, at best,  very narrow and often inaccurate to 'reality'. From various sensory illusions, to the simple fact that there are aspects of the universe we cannot directly perceive (infrared, ultraotviolet, alpha rays, radio waves, etc), we *know* our senses of often unreliable. But they *do* give some information that can be tested. We can make hypotheses and test them, investigating when our imperfect senses need to be doubted.

Causal regularity is an observed phenomenon, not an assumption. We detect patterns and use those patterns to make predictions. Sometimes those predictions fail and other times they succeed. Those that fail, we reject and those that succeed, we investigate further.

Finally, the existence of 'objective reality' is yet another hypothesis to be tested. it has been an incredibly successful hypothesis, to be sure.

What I conclude from this is that you often mistake *conclusions* based on observation with *assumptions* made prior to observation. This is a problem with the way you approach these matters.

While this is sufficient for scientific inquiries, it is not sufficient when we talk about the entire range of possibilities in the reality we find ourselves. But as with any inquiry, we need metaphysical assumptions on which to base them, and because we are talking about a comprehensive set of assumptions, we are talking about a worldview. I used this short definition in the past:  A worldview is a descriptive model of how the world is ordered (ontology). It answers questions of origin, meaning/purpose, foundation of ethics, epistemology, and our ultimate destiny. 

So we are moving away from truth and towards opinions?

The inadequacy of the previous list in evaluating a worldview lies in its restriction of our exploration of reality to those things that could be empirically verified. It seems obvious there is more to reality so we need to identify the relevant metaphysical assumptions that can then serve as a guide for a methodology of evaluation of complete worldviews. 

Interesting. I do not see this as obvious at all. We all have our psychology and the questions about purpose, value, etc. seem to me to be more questions about psychology than questions of fact.

Since religion plays a major part in most people's worldview, we need a list that can accommodate those categories for analysis as well or risk ruling them out a priori simply by not including the necessary assumptions for analysis. 

This is already making a HUGE assumption that such questions have objective answers. This is an assumption that I disagree with and feel needs additional justification.

METAPHYSICAL ASSUMPTIONS FOR EVALUATING WORLDVIEWS (* denotes overlap with pervious )
* Existence of Objective Reality: There is a world external to our minds that behaves in regular ways.
* Reliability of Sense Perception: Our senses give mostly accurate information about the external world.
* Reliability of Reason and Logic: Logic and reason are valid tools for drawing conclusions.
* Our Cognitive Faculties Can Access Truth: Human minds are capable of knowing truth, including abstract or non-empirical truth.
• The World Exhibits Order or Coherence: There is a rational structure to reality, whether impersonal (laws) or personal (intentional design).

Again, something that is testable through observation. So far, we have found orderly laws of physics.

• Language Can Meaningfully Refer: Propositions and statements can correspond to reality. 

This is just a generalization of the similar assumption about mathematical describability and the utility of logic.
Again, this is *testable* by whether we can keep consistent use of language over time.

• Testimony Can Transmit Truth: Knowledge can be passed via trustworthy testimony.

This begs the question of what makes testimony trustworthy. 

• Moral and Aesthetic Perception are Valid: Humans perceive real features of moral or aesthetic reality, not merely projections.

This is NOT an assumption shared by all worldviews. So to prevent question begging, it should be rejected as a basic assumption. If you have some other justification, let's hear it.

• Non-Empirical Knowledge is Possible: Not all truths are derived from sensory experience (e.g. metaphysics, mathematics, ethics).

Again with the question begging. the evidence suggests otherwise. Ethics, for example, is NOT an area of objective knowledge, but rather one of opinion and utility for social species. Math and logic is ultmately based on rules of language and applicability of language to understanding.

• Unique Historical Events Can Convey Truth: One-off events (e.g. a miracle or revelation) can be rationally evaluated using historical inference. 

This strongly depends on what sort of evidence is available for these singular events. Historical records based on anecdotal testimony are certainly NOT enough for knowledge. At best, they are enough to make hypotheses.

As an example, there is a singular possible detection of a magnetic monopole from Canberra. It is NOT accepted as such a detection because of its singularity, even though the available data is quite good.

• Purpose or Teleology May Exist: The universe or human existence may have intrinsic meaning or direction. 

Sounds like a proposed hypothesis and not an assumption (once again, you are not making clear the difference between an assumption and a conclusion). if this is to be taken seriously, I would ask in what way we can determine if it is a *false* hypothesis.

• Revelation is a Possible Epistemic Source: Truth could be disclosed to humans through means beyond natural observation.

This is begging the question of whether there are means beyond the natural. Since there are worldviews that do not share this assumption, it should be rejected until further justification is found.

• Consciousness and Subjectivity are Real and Significant: First-person experience is not reducible to material processes and must be included in our epistemology. 

Again this is question begging. personal experience may of may not be reducible way. Make a testable hypothesis, including ways to determine if it is false, and we will see what transpires. Since there are worldviews that reject this position, it should be rejected until there is further justification.

• Metaphysical Causation is Possible: Causes may include personal, immaterial, or supernatural agents, not just efficient physical causes. 

And again, more question begging. This is a hypothesis to be tested and not an assumption to be granted.

PRINCIPLE OF EPISTEMIC OPENNESS
For many here, one of the first reactions to this list is going to be to reject the supernatural categories it allows as "unproven." But if we’re going to fairly evaluate a worldview that makes metaphysical claims, we have to begin by granting--at least in principle--the possibility that such realities exist. Otherwise, we're not analyzing the claims; we're dismissing them by methodological design. That's not critical thinking--it's circularity.

Absolutely. Make a testable hypothesis (one where we know conditions when it would be determined false) and we can proceed.

THE DUHEM-QUINE THESIS AND THE EVALUATION OF WORLDVIEWS
The Duhem-Quine thesis points out that no hypothesis is tested in isolation. Any apparent falsification of a theory could be due to incorrect auxiliary assumptions, not the core hypothesis itself. In science, this explains how theories can survive contrary data by adjusting assumptions around them—sometimes reasonably, other times problematically.

This thesis is just as relevant when evaluating worldviews. A worldview is a network of interrelated beliefs, values, and assumptions. When part of it is challenged, the adherent may adjust another part to preserve the overall coherence. This is not necessarily irrational; it is structurally inevitable.

What the Duhem-Quine thesis reveals is that:
• No worldview is evaluated from a neutral standpoint; all evaluations are made from within some set of background beliefs.
• The flexibility to adapt in light of challenges is not unique to religion--it is found in scientific paradigms as well (e.g. evolutionary biology).
• Therefore, dismissing religious worldviews because they adjust explanatory components in response to counterexamples is inconsistent if we accept similar moves in science.

Good so far. But we see that the scientific methods has specific safeguards against confirmation bias. What safeguards are proposed for the investigation of a supernatural?

What matters, then, is not whether a worldview adjusts, but whether those adjustments:
• Maintain internal coherence,
• Preserve or increase explanatory power,
• Remain consistent with observed or reported reality.

This gives us a reasonable standard by which to evaluate religious worldviews without falling into either uncritical acceptance or methodological bias.

Internal coherence is a minimal requirement. Consistency with observations is absolutely essential. So we are left with 'explanatory power'. How is this determined? How is it tested?

HOW TO EVALUATE RELIGIOUS WORLDVIEWS
Once we recognize that worldview evaluation requires a broader set of assumptions than scientific inquiry alone and grant the epistemic openness, we can propose criteria for how religious worldviews may be evaluated--not just to one religion in isolation, but comparatively across multiple traditions. When comparing religious worldviews, we should ask of each:

Internal Coherence
Does the religion contain internal contradictions (e.g., regarding the nature of God, salvation, or moral law)? Are its key doctrines logically consistent?

Explanatory Scope and Power
Which religion best accounts for the broadest range of features of reality—such as:
• The origin and fine-tuning of the universe
• The universality of moral intuitions
• The human longing for meaning and transcendence
• The phenomenon of religious experience
• The historical development of religious traditions

This is also begging multiple questions. For example, that the 'human longing for meaning and transcendence' is a reasonable goal. Not all worldviews take this as something requiring a cosmic explanation as opposed to a local, individual and societal one.

Historical Grounding
Does the religion make historical claims? If so, how credible are they when tested by standard historical methods? Are there eyewitnesses, documentary sources, or archaeological support.

Can we at least agree that historical methods are very weak in the face of minimal evidence in many cases? At best, they are ambiguous. They become less so when backed up by *physical* evidence, such as coins, battlefield remains, etc.

I'm sure you understand that eyewitness reports are among the *least* reliable evidence, right?

Existential Plausibility
Does the worldview ring true to human nature? Does it dignify the human person while acknowledging human frailty? Can it be lived with integrity?

Ring true to who? A believer? A skeptic?

Transformative Efficacy
Has this religion produced moral, spiritual, or intellectual transformation that is credible and sustainable? Does it have a record of individual or societal flourishing that aligns with its own values?

Does the fact that people change, even sustainably, mean the reason for their change is true? The evidence says otherwise. In other words, this is a very unreliable standard.

Universality vs. Particularity
Does the religion make sense of diverse human cultures while maintaining a coherent core, or is it bound to a particular place or people in a way that undermines its universality?

Bound to a particular place like, say, the Earth?

Metaphysical Fit
Does the metaphysical structure it proposes (e.g., monotheism, dualism, pantheism) provide a more coherent and satisfying account of the world than alternatives?

Satisfying to whom? Believers? Skeptics? Those of other worldviews? This sounds like confirmation bias to me.

These categories allow for comparative analysis that avoids both scientistic reduction and fideistic assertion. It invites thoughtful individuals to weigh religious claims as they would any serious hypothesis about reality: by how well they explain the world, how consistently they hang together, and how compelling they are when lived out.

CONCLUSION: THE METHOD AND ITS JUSTIFICATION
To answer the question directly: the method that religions--particularly theistic traditions--apply is not a rival to the scientific method, but a broader epistemological framework grounded in the full set of metaphysical assumptions necessary for evaluating worldviews. It includes the use of reason, historical inquiry, testimony, moral intuition, existential resonance, and the possibility of divine revelation.

This method is justified not because it always yields certainty (neither does science), but because it is appropriately matched to the kinds of questions religious worldviews ask--questions about origin, meaning, morality, purpose, and destiny. Just as microscopes are the right tools for biology but inadequate for judging ethics, so too the method of worldview evaluation is tailored to metaphysical, moral, and existential dimensions of reality.

Faithful application of this method--one grounded in the metaphysical assumptions listed above--can reliably pick out objective truth because it seeks coherence across the full range of human experience, not just the material or measurable. It respects historical evidence, tests internal consistency, weighs explanatory scope, and submits existential claims to lived reality.

The justification is in the method's capacity to engage all of reality--not just what fits into a test tube. A religion can be rationally affirmed when it best explains the nature of the world and the human condition in a coherent, comprehensive, and life-affirming way. In this way, the method is not merely a means of personal justification, but a principled way of tracking truth across the full spectrum of reality--material and immaterial, observable and lived.

NOTE FOR RESPONSES: I am not interested in defending Christianity line by line. This thread is about epistemology and appropriate methods of understanding reality. If you have general objections or questions about Christianity in the context of this post, in paragraph form, I will endeavor to respond.

It sounds to me like these standard beg multiple questions while also not guarding against things like confirmation bias. That makes them very unreliable as a way to detect truth.

[Cavebear]

Any post involving Steve gets way too complex and weird. I read the discussions sometimes, but I like reality better.

[SYZ]

Any post involving Steve gets way too complex and weird.  I read the discussions sometimes, but I like reality better.

I can only agree mate!  It's ultimately pointless even
attempting to debate Steve at any rational level.  And,
like you, I simply can't be bothered reading the flood
of virtual copy-pasta he posts nearly every day.  He's
obviously a religious fanatic.

I like Wikipedia's definition of fanaticism:

Philosopher George Santayana defined fanaticism as "redoubling
your effort when you have forgotten your aim". The fanatic displays
very strict standards and little tolerance for contrary ideas or opinions.
Tõnu Lehtsaar has defined the term fanaticism as the pursuit or defence
of something in an extreme and passionate way that goes beyond
normality. Religious fanaticism is defined by blind faith, the persecution
of dissidents and the absence of reality.

    —Fits Steve to a "T".