Facts, Evidence, and Proof: Untangling the Concepts

[Kim]

Do we really need to put up with another 300 pages of
back and forth with this fucking moron Steve?  There's
really no point whatsoever in even attempting to have
some sort of rational debate with people like this who
simply refuse to listen to or contemplate other people's
ideas about an issue—in this case religion.

For starters he has no real idea of what atheism itself
is and/or what an atheist is, which has become apparent
through the course of literally dozens of attempts by people
who are in fact atheists to elucidate him on the topic.

He's also a patronising, condescending arsehole who thinks
he knows it all, and constantly "lectures" us on what he
thinks few of us know anything about as far as theism is
concerned.  His lack of common logic at times is not only
astounding, but borders on the humorous.  Reading the
bullshit he posts I often find myself smiling at his debating
ineptitude and absurd circular reasoning.

He's the classic apologist, utilising Christian theology,
natural theology (distinguished from revealed theology)
and philosophy in an attempt to present a rational basis
for his faith—to defend that faith against objections and
alleged misrepresentation, and to show that the Christian
doctrine is the only world-view that is faultless and
consistent with all fundamental knowledge and
questions.  Which is, of course, ludicrous!

I'm actually not even sure as to why he wastes his (and our!)
time and effort posting on an atheist forum, or any atheist
forum for that matter.  All that he can inadvertently "achieve"
is to confirm to the world what most of us on this forum think;
that he's succumbed to drinking far too much of the Christian
Kool-Aid for far too long LOL.

I just had to.

[Phaedrus]

The gist of this new thread is what theists typically do regarding word meanings. Correct me if I'm wrong, Steve, but we both know I'm not.

It's the usual theistically interpretive spin that caters to faith rather than reality. Plus, word salad.

[SteveII]

Confirm that believing the statement would involve one or more of the following:

Category Confusion:
The claim almost certainly conflates epistemology and ontology--treating the absence of conclusive proof as if it were evidence that no evidence exists, rather than distinguishing between evidence being present and it being strong enough to convince.

Misunderstanding Evidence:
The claim often confuses evidence with proof and misunderstands the nature of evidence itself. Evidence is not merely the fact, experience, or observation, it is the role that a fact, experience, or observation plays in relation to a proposition. Evidence is what increases the probability or plausibility of a proposition being true--it supports belief without necessarily guaranteeing it. Thus, dismissing evidence simply because it is inconclusive or disputable misrepresents how evidence actually functions in rational inquiry.

Question-Begging Standard:
Unless you have access to all facts in the observable universe, the claim implicitly assumes a standard of evidence (typically rigid methodological naturalism) that precludes supernatural evidence by definition-which begs the very question of whether supernatural realities are possible or detectable.

Of course alternatively, you could explain why I am wrong.

I think you are repeating yourself here; I think that I do not commit any of these mistakes when I state the following "there are no credible evidence for the existence of supernatural beings and forces at play in the observable universe". 

For example: the category of "confusion" is not impacted since credible evidence is, by definition, evidence strong enough to convince or at the very least push the needle in that direction so to speak. It does not also include  evidence that are so murky that they can't reasonably be said to support one conclusion over another.

The "misunderstanding category" is also not impacted since a multitude of murky evidence that doesn't support one conclusion over another doesn't increase the likelihood of any single conclusion being true.

As for the last category, I do not question beg since the question isn't so much about the existence of the supernatural as some sort of other dimension of existence separate from ours, but of the existence of supernatural beings and forces acting upon the observable universe. If things are at play within the observable universe they are, by definition, within the purview of naturalistic means of investigation like using our senses or detection tools, etc. Commonly presented supernatural beings like angels, demons, divinities, ghosts or fairies or supernatural phenomenon like spells, curses, blessings or miracles are all observable and produce effects upon the things they interact with and thus can be assessed by naturalistic means while they interact and dwell within nature.

Am I wrong or not? And how did you arrive to your conclusion?

Yes, I think you are wrong.

1. You claimed a universal negation: "there is no credible evidence...". Since you cannot know all facts (an epistemological problem), the only way you can justify such a claim is some sort of universal rejection on some logical basis (an ontological claim). You could say that "you know of no credible evidence..." but then that is a statement about your knowledge and opinion and not an ontological fact which seems to be the conclusion you are trying to communicate. So, what logical justification do you have for a universal negation?

2. "Credible evidence," in the singular, is an assessment of how well one fact/observation serves the role of increasing the probability of a proposition. But the way you use it as a universal negation is in the plural so we are now talking about how the sum of all evidence does or does not increases the probability of the proposition. A cumulative case. So how does that work, philosophically?

A cumulative case is where multiple independent (or semi-independent) lines of evidence are combined to jointly support a conclusion, even if no single piece of evidence would be sufficient to establish the conclusion on its own. This is formally called abductive reasoning or inference to the best explanation: you look at all the relevant data and ask, what hypothesis best explains all of this together?

The analogy of a courtroom: A single witness might not be enough. A single fingerprint might not be enough. A motive, by itself, is not enough. But if you have a reliable eyewitness, fingerprints at the scene, a clear motive, and an alibi that doesn't check out…, you are probably going to get convicted.

In Bayesian terms: Suppose E1, E2, E3 are independent or weakly dependent evidence items. Each one raises the posterior probability of a hypothesis H relative to a baseline (prior). As they accumulate, the joint probability of observing all of them if H is true increases, and their joint improbability under alternative hypotheses decreases. The more independent but mutually reinforcing data points you have, the more epistemic traction the hypothesis gains.

I think the Natural Theology group of arguments deserve a quick note because they are different than the rest of the evidence we typically talk about. Natural Theology arguments do not prove the existence of the supernatural. But what they do is explore a number of areas that do not readily have a naturalistic explanation or expose problems of naturalistic explanations. What that does in a cumulative case is provide a probabilistic basis for belief in the supernatural that is entirely based on the inadequacies of Naturalism.

Therefore, it is not valid to say "there is no credible evidence" without dealing with how the evidence functions in sum--unless you want to risk committing a composition fallacy by treating each piece in isolation while denying the possibility of the cumulative force.

Regarding your last point, you’re primarily making a category error. Things that are, by definition, not natural cannot be investigated as if they were natural. That doesn't mean they can't have observable effects within the natural world, it means the cause itself lies outside the domain of naturalistic observation or measurement. If you demand that only what is accessible through naturalistic means can count as evidence, then you're not arguing for naturalism — you're assuming it. That’s the definition of begging the question.

[Phaedrus]

If there was credible evidence, atheism would not be needed.

[Alan V]

Steve seems to be arguing for a separate reality. That also seems like special pleading to me.

[Kim]

Steve seems to be arguing for a separate reality.  That also seems like special pleading to me.

A separate reality ...

A muthafuckin' segregationist. Dick move, Steve!

[Paleophyte]

In Bayesian terms

Ah, now we're using Bayesians? Looks like a very one-way street for evidence here.

[SteveII]

I think you misunderstood the intent of my references (past and present) to Bayesian reasoning. I wasn't asserting specific priors or claiming exact numerical probabilities. Rather, I was illustrating a structured way to weigh background knowledge, likelihoods, and new evidence when assessing miracle claims or supernatural inferences.

The value of the Bayesian framework is that it clarifies how multiple lines of evidence interact and why belief revision can be rationally justified even without assigning exact numbers. In fact, this kind of structure helps reveal problems with arguments like Hume's famous rejection of miracles--a version of which is a very common objection to theism--without needing to quantify every variable. It shows that the issue isn't just "extraordinary claims" but how we weigh competing hypotheses in light of context.

Ah, a tool that uses evidence to update your beliefs that you aren't going to use. I foresee this discussion on evidence being equally useful.

Or, a framework so people stop making errors in logic when it comes to thinking about what evidence is actually doing. I guess it depends on which problem we are attempting to solve.

[Phaedrus]

Atheism isn't a problem to solve. In a world where theists create superstitious concepts, atheism is the default.

[epronovost]

1. You claimed a universal negation: "there is no credible evidence...". Since you cannot know all facts (an epistemological problem), the only way you can justify such a claim is some sort of universal rejection on some logical basis (an ontological claim). You could say that "you know of no credible evidence..." but then that is a statement about your knowledge and opinion and not an ontological fact which seems to be the conclusion you are trying to communicate. So, what logical justification do you have for a universal negation?

Should you not assume that when I say "there is no credible evidence..." that I am speaking of my knowledge and appreciation of the situation? I, of course, cannot know everything and the simplest way to counter my "there is no credible evidence..." is to simply show that I'm wrong by presenting an evidence that you would find credible and then see if you can shift my position on it in some way (if I was even aware of said evidence).

2. "Credible evidence," in the singular, is an assessment of how well one fact/observation serves the role of increasing the probability of a proposition. But the way you use it as a universal negation is in the plural so we are now talking about how the sum of all evidence does or does not increases the probability of the proposition. A cumulative case. So how does that work, philosophically?

Very simply because murky evidences cannot be added. Only evidence that shows a "clear preference" for one explanation over another can be added to gain strength. One evidence that can equally support A or B or a thousand evidence that can equally support A or B doesn't change our ability to determine wether A or B is correct. One evidence that seems to support A more than B, but for which B can still account is indeed not enough to establish conclusion A. A thousand evidence that support A more than B places A in a much greater position of strength, albeit not in a absolute way. 

A cumulative case is where multiple independent (or semi-independent) lines of evidence are combined to jointly support a conclusion, even if no single piece of evidence would be sufficient to establish the conclusion on its own. This is formally called abductive reasoning or inference to the best explanation: you look at all the relevant data and ask, what hypothesis best explains all of this together?

That's exactly what I did. Don't you think my lines of evidence cannot be combined to jointly support my conclusion? Don't you think this is also how I proceeded to reach my conclusion? Don't you think this isn't how everybody thinks? This is a fairly intuitive form of cognition.

Regarding your last point, you’re primarily making a category error. Things that are, by definition, not natural cannot be investigated as if they were natural.

How so? How can something that happens in nature, can be observed and produces effect within nature not be investigated by natural means like observation, experimentation, analysis, recording, etc. It stand to reason that even if the supernatural beings or forces themselves are impossible to observe directly using natural means, we could still be able to locate and "observe" them while they interact with the natural world by looking at their effect upon it; it would be akin to looking at a negative imprint or similar to how we analyzed and discovered black holes. Thus we could know when supernatural forces are at play when they leave said negative imprint that natural forces do not.

Moreover, if what I state above is not possible for some reason, how would you, philosophically and practically, make the difference between a supernatural being or force or an unknown and as of yet undected natural force/being if supernatural beings and forces cannot be investigated by natural means? Are we not natural?

[Paleophyte]

Ah, a tool that uses evidence to update your beliefs that you aren't going to use. I foresee this discussion on evidence being equally useful.

Or, a framework so people stop making errors in logic when it comes to thinking about what evidence is actually doing. I guess it depends on which problem we are attempting to solve.

Oh good! I'm so very glad to hear that it's a framework that we're applying unidirectionally. That makes all the difference. I think that the problem we need to solve is demonstrating that you think that evidence, tools, or frameworks are anything other than that which supports your biases. Right now I'm seeing little else.

[Rhythmcs]

@SteveII Under what conditions are you willing to accept that your god doesn't exist?

When you prove Naturalism is true.

..because naturalism being evident isn't enough.  Handily dispensing with the fiction that this was ever or would ever be about what evidence is.

Have you ever considered that naturalism could be true and gods could exist? Or that naturalism could be false and gods still did not? That people set themselves up to sound dumber than they are because they failed to grasp the full field of possibilities that allowed for their wildest fantasies, and no other reason? Not because, for example, their fantasies, your fantasy..of gods, is actually at odds with naturalism. With what is evidently true. Think about it, your god would be in a real pinch if it's existence hinged on your misperception here.

[SYZ]

Do we really need to put up with another 300 pages
of this back and forth with this fucking moron Steve?

Does it not breach one of the forum's rules?

  2) No spam.  Repeatedly posting the same material may also be regarded as engaging in spamming the forum.

Will the admin/mods lock this thread as a result?

[1Sam15]

Do we really need to put up with another 300 pages
of this back and forth with this fucking moron Steve?

Does it not breach one of the forum's rules?

  2) No spam.  Repeatedly posting the same material may also be regarded as engaging in spamming the forum.

Will the admin/mods lock this thread as a result?

Thank you

[Free]

That is false.

To believe something you must have a reason to believe. In the case of your god, you must provide evidence to support your belief. Therefore, claiming that something is evidence requires you to prove that it actually is evidence, otherwise you have no reason to believe, no justification.

I am moving this post to the new thread on the topic of evidence, proof, and facts.

You are demanding that I prove something is evidence before it can even be considered evidence — which is circular. "Reasons to believe" is what evidence provides. Evidence supports, proof concludes. Demanding proof before allowing something to be treated as evidence confuses the very structure of reasoning.

What is happening is that when you make the definitional mistake and treat evidence as proof or certainty—your mistake manifests as a question-begging argument, even if it’s not deliberate. I expanded this ideas quite a bit in the new OP.

You don't understand circular logic.

Circular logic is what Christians use to justify their faith. Example:

Christian: The bible is true.
Skeptic: How do you know?
Christian: Because the bible tells me so.

My argument is this:

You: I have evidence for the existence of God.
Me: Can you prove it is actually evidence for the existence of God?
You: Your argument is circular.

No comparison and your accusation is demonstrably false.

To claim that something is possible doesn't mean it actually is possible. To qualify a possibility you need to provide evidence to support it. The claim "anything is possible" is simply false. It requires evidence, otherwise the possibility does not exist. You can manifest a possibility with evidence, but you cannot manifest it with mere imagination. 

I didn't claim "anything is possible."  I was presenting certain facts, claims, and inferences as relevant and appropriate evidence for what God is supposed to be. They are not random claims, they are interconnected in a coherent framework.

And my argument is quite simple, you are required to prove that your certain facts, claims, and inferences are, in fact, evidence fot the existence of God. How do you propose to do that?

The reality is they are not. The best you can do is propose that they are evidence to justify a belief, not evidence to justify an actual existence of God.

[SteveII]

1. You claimed a universal negation: "there is no credible evidence...". Since you cannot know all facts (an epistemological problem), the only way you can justify such a claim is some sort of universal rejection on some logical basis (an ontological claim). You could say that "you know of no credible evidence..." but then that is a statement about your knowledge and opinion and not an ontological fact which seems to be the conclusion you are trying to communicate. So, what logical justification do you have for a universal negation?

Should you not assume that when I say "there is no credible evidence..." that I am speaking of my knowledge and appreciation of the situation? I, of course, cannot know everything and the simplest way to counter my "there is no credible evidence..." is to simply show that I'm wrong by presenting an evidence that you would find credible and then see if you can shift my position on it in some way (if I was even aware of said evidence).

First, why would I assume that? 19/20 people here have said exactly that and you have argued extensively that there are problems with even the concept of supernatural. Second, you have had three opportunities to clarify that you meant to relay a totally unobjectionable personal opinion and you have not. I am not interested in arguing evidence, I am interested in arguing about the nature of evidence (hence the choice of subforums).

2. "Credible evidence," in the singular, is an assessment of how well one fact/observation serves the role of increasing the probability of a proposition. But the way you use it as a universal negation is in the plural so we are now talking about how the sum of all evidence does or does not increases the probability of the proposition. A cumulative case. So how does that work, philosophically?

Very simply because murky evidences cannot be added. Only evidence that shows a "clear preference" for one explanation over another can be added to gain strength. One evidence that can equally support A or B or a thousand evidence that can equally support A or B doesn't change our ability to determine wether A or B is correct. One evidence that seems to support A more than B, but for which B can still account is indeed not enough to establish conclusion A. A thousand evidence that support A more than B places A in a much greater position of strength, albeit not in a absolute way. 

A cumulative case is where multiple independent (or semi-independent) lines of evidence are combined to jointly support a conclusion, even if no single piece of evidence would be sufficient to establish the conclusion on its own. This is formally called abductive reasoning or inference to the best explanation: you look at all the relevant data and ask, what hypothesis best explains all of this together?

That's exactly what I did. Don't you think my lines of evidence cannot be combined to jointly support my conclusion? Don't you think this is also how I proceeded to reach my conclusion? Don't you think this isn't how everybody thinks? This is a fairly intuitive form of cognition.

I think we are actually not far apart here. I agree that evidence which doesn't favor one hypothesis over another is unhelpful in distinguishing between them. But much of what you're calling "murky" isn't neutral--it's simply not decisive. That's a big difference. In cumulative case reasoning, even modestly discriminating evidence (evidence that slightly favors A over B) contributes to an overall probabilistic case. That's exactly how inference to the best explanation works, and it's not just a formal logic principle--it's foundational to historical reasoning too (your area).

How about a personal example (a story I have shared before): My brother-in-law had a brain tumor as a young teen. He was having seizures. MRIs from two different labs in two different states (second opinion) identified the tumor. He was scheduled for brain surgery and they scanned to get the latest mapping for the operation. No tumor. The doctor has no explanation and said to the family that if you believe in miracles, this probably was one. The family believed it to be. The whole church praying for their pastor's son believed it to be. Can anyone say 100%? No. Can you say that in a cumulative case, this personal experience (evidence) favors theism over naturalism? Yes.

So yes, if I have 10 lines of weak-to-moderate evidence that each favors A slightly over B, and they're at least semi-independent, then together they raise the rational plausibility of A. That's the framework I'm working in--and from what you just said, it sounds like you agree. What I'm trying to clarify is whether you apply that reasoning consistently--especially when the hypothesis being evaluated involves non-natural causes. Are you open to that kind of cumulative reasoning if naturalism is not assumed as a precondition?

Regarding your last point, you’re primarily making a category error. Things that are, by definition, not natural cannot be investigated as if they were natural.

How so? How can something that happens in nature, can be observed and produces effect within nature not be investigated by natural means like observation, experimentation, analysis, recording, etc. It stand to reason that even if the supernatural beings or forces themselves are impossible to observe directly using natural means, we could still be able to locate and "observe" them while they interact with the natural world by looking at their effect upon it; it would be akin to looking at a negative imprint or similar to how we analyzed and discovered black holes. Thus we could know when supernatural forces are at play when they leave said negative imprint that natural forces do not.

Moreover, if what I state above is not possible for some reason, how would you, philosophically and practically, make the difference between a supernatural being or force or an unknown and as of yet undected natural force/being if supernatural beings and forces cannot be investigated by natural means? Are we not natural?

The end of my sentence is important: "as if they were natural" and the very next sentence that you clipped off was: "That doesn't mean they can't have observable effects within the natural world, it means the cause itself lies outside the domain of naturalistic observation or measurement." So clearly the effects can be observed, experimented on, etc. It also follows a cause can be detected.

Take the hypothetical scenario that a supernatural entity wanted to interact with the natural world for some existential reason. Say he came in the likeness of a man and actually lived a highly visible life among a group for a few decades. Part of his existential purpose was to reveal several aspects of the supernatural and so did things that had no possible natural cause as evidence of his claims. Eventually he accomplished all the purposes he set out to do which included his death. It turns our that a natural death has no lasting effect on a supernatural being and part of his purpose was to prove that very point.

So, if we grant the hypothetical a reliable set of observers, we have a very straightforward example of how we could think about the supernatural:

The being's actions--defying natural laws in specific, meaningful, and predicted ways would not be explainable by unknown natural causes, because the actions are theologically motivated, contextually coherent, and unprecedented in kind and purpose. In such a case, the inference to a supernatural explanation becomes not only possible but rational--because the naturalistic alternatives fail to explain the event as effectively.

Philosophically, what matters is not what caused it in the abstract, but which hypothesis makes the event most probable given the total context. That's the foundation of abductive reasoning and Bayesian analysis. So while we are indeed natural beings, it doesn't follow that we can only detect causes within nature. Just as a message can reveal its intelligent author even if the author is absent, observable effects can justifiably point to non-natural causes, if the explanatory context supports it.

[SteveII]

Or, a framework so people stop making errors in logic when it comes to thinking about what evidence is actually doing. I guess it depends on which problem we are attempting to solve.

Oh good! I'm so very glad to hear that it's a framework that we're applying unidirectionally. That makes all the difference. I think that the problem we need to solve is demonstrating that you think that evidence, tools, or frameworks are anything other than that which supports your biases. Right now I'm seeing little else.

Except everything I have written about the nature of evidence has been viewpoint neutral. You are poisoning the well by bringing in my application of the principles in order to undercut the principles.

[epronovost]

First, why would I assume that? 19/20 people here have said exactly that and you have argued extensively that there are problems with even the concept of supernatural.

There are problems with the concept of the supernatural in my opinion, but that doesn't have any impact on the fact that this is based on my knowledge and appreciation of the situation.

Second, you have had three opportunities to clarify that you meant to relay a totally unobjectionable personal opinion and you have not.

And I gave you just as many occasion to ask for precision or admit that you don't understand what people mean when they say X. Are you reasdy to admit now that you might not have understood correctly (for a variety of reasons) the communication intention of your interlocutor.

I think we are actually not far apart here. I agree that evidence which doesn't favor one hypothesis over another is unhelpful in distinguishing between them. But much of what you're calling "murky" isn't neutral--it's simply not decisive. That's a big difference. In cumulative case reasoning, even modestly discriminating evidence (evidence that slightly favors A over B) contributes to an overall probabilistic case. That's exactly how inference to the best explanation works, and it's not just a formal logic principle--it's foundational to historical reasoning too (your area).

I agree with this.

How about a personal example (a story I have shared before): My brother-in-law had a brain tumor as a young teen. He was having seizures. MRIs from two different labs in two different states (second opinion) identified the tumor. He was scheduled for brain surgery and they scanned to get the latest mapping for the operation. No tumor. The doctor has no explanation and said to the family that if you believe in miracles, this probably was one. The family believed it to be. The whole church praying for their pastor's son believed it to be. Can anyone say 100%? No. Can you say that in a cumulative case, this personal experience (evidence) favors theism over naturalism? Yes.

That's a terrible example. Spontaneous remission of cacerous tumor, especially in young people, is a well known and documented phenomenon. A cancerous tumor grows and remains because its not identified by the immune system as a threat; most cancerous cells are immediately destroyed by the immune system as has been observed on numerous occasion. With this evidence in mind, the most likely explanation is that your brother-in-law made a spontaneous recovery because his immune system finally kicked-in, identified and destroyed a threat. This doesn't happen often and he certainly was very lucky, but I can't see how this individual piece of evidence favors more a supernatural explanation than a natural one when the natural one has such strong support and matches the data provided. I don't even see how this annecdote would make the remission of your brother-in-law more likely supernatural than a simple gap in medical knowledge on remission from cancer based on purely natural and biological laws. It's not like we know everything about cancers, especially brain cancers in young people. How the hell did you arrive at a "more likely that this is supernatural"?

You seem to be making a Holmesian fallacy in your treatment of this event.

Are you open to that kind of cumulative reasoning if naturalism is not assumed as a precondition?

Of course I am. The problem is that I never seen even one event where supernatural causation is more likely than a natural one; at best I have seen a "coin toss" or others where the supernatural causation are less likely to completely ridiculous. Cummulating all of these experience, I arrive at the conclusion that there are no credible evidence for supernatual beings and/or forces being at play in the observable universe.

Take the hypothetical scenario that a supernatural entity wanted to interact with the natural world for some existential reason. Say he came in the likeness of a man and actually lived a highly visible life among a group for a few decades. Part of his existential purpose was to reveal several aspects of the supernatural and so did things that had no possible natural cause as evidence of his claims. Eventually he accomplished all the purposes he set out to do which included his death. It turns our that a natural death has no lasting effect on a supernatural being and part of his purpose was to prove that very point.
So, if we grant the hypothetical a reliable set of observers, we have a very straightforward example of how we could think about the supernatural:

The being's actions--defying natural laws in specific, meaningful, and predicted ways would not be explainable by unknown natural causes, because the actions are theologically motivated, contextually coherent, and unprecedented in kind and purpose. In such a case, the inference to a supernatural explanation becomes not only possible but rational--because the naturalistic alternatives fail to explain the event as effectively.

If we ever had this sort of event that would certainly be of great help, but we do not have this reliable set of observers in precise situation where all those things align. What we most often have is legends and folk tales and annecdote of dubious quality and veracity often passed down by ear to mouth for long periods of time presenting such information. 

That's without delving in the conceptual trouble of what is the supernatural or what "theologically motivated" means in this context and if the presence of this very requirement is not begging the question.

[Deesse23]

How about a personal example (a story I have shared before): My brother-in-law had a brain tumor as a young teen. He was having seizures. MRIs from two different labs in two different states (second opinion) identified the tumor. He was scheduled for brain surgery and they scanned to get the latest mapping for the operation. No tumor. The doctor has no explanation and said to the family that if you believe in miracles, this probably was one. The family believed it to be. The whole church praying for their pastor's son believed it to be. Can anyone say 100%? No. Can you say that in a cumulative case, this personal experience (evidence) favors theism over naturalism? Yes

Feel free to have the lowest possible standard for accepting the most outragous claims
but
dont expect me not to laugh you out of this thread.

[SteveII]

When you prove Naturalism is true.

..because naturalism being evident isn't enough.  Handily dispensing with the fiction that this was ever or would ever be about what evidence is.

Have you ever considered that naturalism could be true and gods could exist?  Or that naturalism could be false and gods still did not?  That people set themselves up to sound dumber than they are because they failed to grasp the full field of possibilities that allowed for their wildest fantasies, and no other reason?  Not because, for example, their fantasies, your fantasy..of gods, is actually at odds with naturalism.  With what is evidently true.  Think about it, your god would be in a real pinch if it's existence hinged on your misperception here.

Can Naturalism even be evident? Can a universal negation be evident? I don't think so.

No I have not considered the definition and the opposite of the definition of Naturalism could be true at the same time.

[SteveII]

I am moving this post to the new thread on the topic of evidence, proof, and facts.

You are demanding that I prove something is evidence before it can even be considered evidence — which is circular. "Reasons to believe" is what evidence provides. Evidence supports, proof concludes. Demanding proof before allowing something to be treated as evidence confuses the very structure of reasoning.

What is happening is that when you make the definitional mistake and treat evidence as proof or certainty—your mistake manifests as a question-begging argument, even if it’s not deliberate. I expanded this ideas quite a bit in the new OP.

You don't understand circular logic.

Circular logic is what Christians use to justify their faith. Example:

Christian: The bible is true.
Skeptic: How do you know?
Christian: Because the bible tells me so.

My argument is this:

You: I have evidence for the existence of God.
Me: Can you prove it is actually evidence for the existence of God?
You: Your argument is circular.

No comparison and your accusation is demonstrably false.

I didn't claim "anything is possible."  I was presenting certain facts, claims, and inferences as relevant and appropriate evidence for what God is supposed to be. They are not random claims, they are interconnected in a coherent framework.

And my argument is quite simple, you are required to prove that your certain facts, claims, and inferences are, in fact, evidence fot the existence of God. How do you propose to do that?

The reality is they are not. The best you can do is propose that they are evidence to justify a belief, not evidence to justify an actual existence of God.

You really need to read the Opening Post because you are not clear on what the definition of fact, proposition, evidence and proof is and how we come to know something to be evidence.

[Phaedrus]

]

You really need to read the Opening Post because you are not clear on what the definition of fact, proposition, evidence and proof is and how we come to know something to be evidence.

[Thumpalumpacus]

No I have not considered the definition and the opposite of the definition of Naturalism could be true at the same time.

So your god cannot have possibly created the naturalistic processes which brought about the Universe?

[Dānu]

Part of his existential purpose was to reveal several aspects of the supernatural and so did things that had no possible natural cause as evidence of his claims.

This simply leads into an argument from ignorance and so any conclusion drawn is invalid. It's not possible to know that there was no possible natural cause. Except for omniscience.

[Paleophyte]

Oh good! I'm so very glad to hear that it's a framework that we're applying unidirectionally. That makes all the difference. I think that the problem we need to solve is demonstrating that you think that evidence, tools, or frameworks are anything other than that which supports your biases. Right now I'm seeing little else.

Except everything I have written about the nature of evidence has been viewpoint neutral. You are poisoning the well by bringing in my application of the principles  in order to undercut the principles.

It isn't poisoning the well to point out that principles aren't worth much if you aren't going to apply them. I've given you every chance to tell us what evidence you'd accept that your god doesn't exist, going so far as to ask you straight up. All we get is crickets. So let me ask you one last time, what evidence would you accept to change your beliefs?

I'll even answer that question myself. I would want unequivocal, verifiable evidence of the existence of a deity. And I know that it has been said before but I'll say it again, arguments about what might be considered evidence are not evidence.

Without an answer to this question I see little point to any further discussion of what evidence may or may not be, because you'll have clearly demonstrated that it's something that you ignore when it's inconvenient.