God can Ground Objective Morality

[SteveII]

I also noticed that Steve made a simple error of logic in his syllogism.

P1: Objective morality is based on unchanging, inherent principles that are not dependent on personal opinions or preferences.
P2: God possesses an unchanging, inherent moral nature that is maximally morally good.
C1: Therefore, objective morality is grounded in God's nature and not in His personal opinions or preferences.

Note that P1 provides the "grounding for objective morality" via it's definition. If "Objective morality" is based on unchanging, inherent principles that are not dependent on personal opinions or preferences, said unchanging principles are the grounding of morality. God's nature is not a principle. As mentioned before by polymath this formulation literally makes morality and goodness metaphysically prior to the notion of God and thus God's nature cannot be used to explain or "ground" morality.

You misunderstand what it means for something to "ground" morality. In philosophical terms, grounding morality in God's nature doesn't imply that God's nature is a separate principle from the "unchanging, inherent principles;" rather, it suggests that these principles are expressions or manifestations of God's nature. There isn't a logical error in claiming that the inherent principles constituting objective morality derive from or are identical with God's moral nature.

Like I said to Polymath, there is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

I would also like to note that Steve doesn't really use the term "objective morality" in it's most common usage, but seems to be referring what is most commonly called moral universalism.

Objective morality refers to the idea that moral truths exist independently of opinion and apply universally. Moral universalism is a related but distinct concept that asserts that there are universal moral principles that apply to all people. You are wrong about my confusion, that is not what I am referring to.

[Rhythmcs]

Is something good because it is in conformance with God’s nature

Note the bold. How is this reformulation objectionable to me? This is exactly what I proposed.

The literal definition of moral subjectivism.

[Rhythmcs]

There isn't a logical error in claiming that the inherent principles constituting objective morality derive from or are identical with God's moral nature.

Other than a category error, sure. No number of god facts will establish a moral fact. No number of subjective facts will establish an objective one.

The only way to establish any objective moral content in any matter x (abortion in this case), is by reference to those facts of that matter x, and not other real or alleged facts about some subject y. This is so very simple that it's hard to read fucking it up so badly as anything other than a motivated error. As in a person z does actually know better, but for whatever reason, they wish it were some other way. Whether they wish it were some other way because they wish to argue against a strawman of metaethical objectivity as a logical possibility, or they wish it were some other way because they wish to advocate for some competing metaethical proposition - the result is the same.

In practice, descriptively, it often takes the form of a religious person arguing for possession of the term while rejecting the content believing that the term alone does or should grant their religious beliefs more legal authority - while objectors..themselves intuitive moral realists, argue against their own genuine apprehensions to prevent the religious from capturing the same. In sum and in truth, the entire thing is a legal strategy. An argument between christian dominionism and contemporary post modernism.

[SteveII]

No.  

You've determined that in order for something to be God, it must have your presupposed attributes, which (by virtue of the attributes) would break the dilemma. You don't entertain that such qualities have to be demonstrated to be true in order for them to be accurately ascribed.

The Ontological argument is a crowd favorite of those who refuse to get out of their armchairs.

As the greatest conceivable being, there is no possible world where God is not good.

Dude must believe that Alexender the Great was good. If "greatness" necessitates "goodness" you have to prove it.

God *can* change by the way. Christianity proves it. God became flesh. He changed (by addition, not modification) his nature in the form of Jesus Christ. If God, *always* had a human nature to him, it goes against your claim that his human nature died, leaving God changed again (as he lost his human nature). If his nature can change (something you argue cannot happen), then his morals are subject to change.

If you argue, "Well, morality is grounded in God's Divine nature, rather than simply God, you have to establish that divinity = unchanging. Saying "it is what it is" is the definition of hitting bedrock.

I'm disinclined to participate after you just went out of your way to modify my reputation "Either painfully stupid, or painfully dishonest, and I lean toward dishonest."

I really don't care about the reputation number. But it makes clear that you think there is an asymmetry here that you can be condescending and obnoxiously performative and I have to put up with it as some sort of cost of participation. You are mistaken.

[polymath257]

This presupposes goodness logically prior to the existence of God, so God cannot be the basis of goodness.

There is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

Which means that claiming goodness is just a part of God's nature means absolutely nothing.  If it were God's nature to promote genocide, then genocide would be 'good'. Simply having God as a 'necessary being' says nothing at all about morality.

And, of course, if nothing is logically prior to the existence of God, then the existence of God cannot be proved.

[Rhythmcs]

The religious moralizers perpetual handicap. They could, maybe, eliminate any concerns about their competency or honesty - but it's unlikely that they'll be able to convince a person they aren't an asshole - especially after putting in all the work.

To wit, a christian moralizer could simply accept that regardless of whether or not they can identify any objective moral defect in x (abortion in this case) they can identify a subjective moral defect..and since the proper moral system™ is a subjective moral system - this is the relevant form of moral defect and they have made their case.

[polymath257]

Like I said to Polymath, there is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

Of course there are things logically prior to God: all of logic, for example. No assumption of the existence of God is required to do propositional or predicate logic. No part of math requires the existence of a deity. In fact, to even ask the question of God's existence requires those concepts. So, yes, those are logically prior.

[Dānu]

[epronovost]

You misunderstand what it means for something to "ground" morality. In philosophical terms, grounding morality in God's nature doesn't imply that God's nature is a separate principle from the "unchanging, inherent principles;" rather, it suggests that these principles are expressions or manifestations of God's nature. There isn't a logical error in claiming that the inherent principles constituting objective morality derive from or are identical with God's moral nature.

Like I said to Polymath, there is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

I don't think you understand the critique that was levied against your argument.

If God's nature can be described as just, good, fair, etc. it means God's nature can be reduced to principles and thus isn't logically prior to said principles. If a metaphysical concept can be reduced to one or more component then it isn't logically prior to one of said component. God's nature, by your definition and usage of it, is reducible thus it cannot be logically prior to it. You would need to rework your syllogism and your argument to solve this issue, but then you risk making God's moral nature completely senseless.   

Objective morality refers to the idea that moral truths exist independently of opinion and apply universally. .

This is actually two separate things in moral philosophy: moral realism (the idea that moral facts exists independently of the subject assessing them) and moral universalism (the idea that such facts are applicable universally). You can be a moral realist, but not a moral universalist and vice versa. Most forms of moral realism tend towards some form of moral universalism though. The issue though is that moral the existence of moral truths and their universalism are two separate issues.

[Atothetheist]

No.  

You've determined that in order for something to be God, it must have your presupposed attributes, which (by virtue of the attributes) would break the dilemma. You don't entertain that such qualities have to be demonstrated to be true in order for them to be accurately ascribed.

The Ontological argument is a crowd favorite of those who refuse to get out of their armchairs.


Dude must believe that Alexender the Great was good. If "greatness" necessitates "goodness" you have to prove it.

God *can* change by the way. Christianity proves it. God became flesh. He changed (by addition, not modification) his nature in the form of Jesus Christ. If God, *always* had a human nature to him, it goes against your claim that his human nature died, leaving God changed again (as he lost his human nature). If his nature can change (something you argue cannot happen), then his morals are subject to change.

If you argue, "Well, morality is grounded in God's Divine nature, rather than simply God, you have to establish that divinity = unchanging. Saying "it is what it is" is the definition of hitting bedrock.

I'm disinclined to participate after you just went out of your way to modify my reputation "Either painfully stupid, or painfully dishonest, and I lean toward dishonest."

I really don't care about the reputation number. But it makes clear that you think there is an asymmetry here that you can be condescending and obnoxiously performative and I have to put up with it as some sort of cost of participation. You are mistaken.

Not a great loss. 

I am under no illusion that you aren’t forced to intetact with me. However, you keep hitting the reply button.

[Dānu]

I'm disinclined to participate after you just went out of your way to modify my reputation "Either painfully stupid, or painfully dishonest, and I lean toward dishonest."

I really don't care about the reputation number. But it makes clear that you think there is an asymmetry here that you can be condescending and obnoxiously performative and I have to put up with it as some sort of cost of participation. You are mistaken.

Not a great loss.

Average number of positive things said about him: 50%

[Atothetheist]

Not a great loss.

Average number of positive things said about him: 50%

That’s 50% more positive than some of the thoughts I’m sure he has about me. 


I’m sure SteveII is a lovely person to be around, but philosophical discussions in which you have to grant more than I think you do in order to participate (granting the key item for discussion implicitly), strikes me as a hustler’s game.

[Rhythmcs]

This is actually two separate things in moral philosophy: moral realism (the idea that moral facts exists independently of the subject assessing them) and moral universalism (the idea that such facts are applicable universally). You can be a moral realist, but not a moral universalist and vice versa. Most forms of moral realism tend towards some form of moral universalism though. The issue though is that moral the existence of moral truths and their universalism are two separate issues.

Well put, and I'd add that the problem with moral universalism in a specifically christian subjectivists position is that the normative elements of magic book provide a situational ethics rather than any universal one.  I suspect that if we peeled back the onion we'd find that this is just another empty profession of gods authority, not the universal nature of the moral proclamations in and of themselves.

[Alan V]

There is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

The problem is that the universe doesn't necessarily follow rules which seem logical to us from our limited perspectives within the universe, especially where quantum physics is involved.

So for instance, a fair number of cosmologists are considering the possibility that the quantum void itself always has certain properties and was the origin of the big bang.  Essentially, an extra space dimension suddenly became the time dimension at the origin of time because of a quantum fluctuation.  Another feature of this perspective is that the laws of the universe were emergent, or self-organized very quickly at the beginning of time.  I can't pretend to understand this possibility myself, since it depends on some rather obscure math among other theoretical discoveries, but it is detailed in the book On the Origin of Time: Stephen Hawking's Final Theory written by one of his collaborator's, Thomas Hertog.  You would have to read the book, and probably quite a few others, to understand this.

Elegant explanations for complex occurrences do not have to be easily understood as such.

[SteveII]

There is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

Which means that claiming goodness is just a part of God's nature means absolutely nothing.  If it were God's nature to promote genocide, then genocide would be 'good'. Simply having God as a 'necessary being' says nothing at all about morality.

It says a lot about morality. If God is a necessary being and has an unchanging moral nature, that is certainly grounding for objective morality. Your 'genocide' point can be addressed by understanding why a Christian would conceive of God as maximally good. Besides moral standards and ethical guidance, we have:

Trust: Belief in God's maximal goodness is essential for trust. If God were anything less than maximally good, there would be reason to doubt His intentions and promises. Trust in God's goodness underpins faith and provides believers with the assurance that, despite the complexities and challenges of life, God's ultimate purpose is benevolent.

Worship: God's maximal goodness is a fundamental reason for worship. The worship of God is not only due to His power and knowledge but also because His nature is supremely good. Worship is a response to the recognition of God's goodness in creation, providence, redemption, and final restoration.

Addressing Evil: The concept of God being maximally good is crucial in theological discussions about the problem of evil and suffering. It challenges believers to reconcile the existence of evil with the belief in a good and powerful God. The affirmation of God's maximal goodness is essential for maintaining faith in God's ultimate sovereignty and benevolence amidst suffering and injustice.

Hope and Redemption: Belief in God's maximal goodness provides hope that evil and suffering have a limit and purpose, even if not fully comprehensible to humans. It assures believers that God is working towards a good end, where justice will prevail, and suffering will be redeemed.

Salvation: The concept of salvation is deeply tied to God's goodness. God's desire to save humanity from sin and its consequences is a manifestation of His good nature.

Grace: Grace is unmerited favor bestowed by a good God. Understanding God as maximally good deepens the appreciation of grace, emphasizing that it is freely given, not because of human merit, but because of God's inherently good nature.

Creator's Intent: Belief in a maximally good God shapes the understanding of creation's purpose. It posits that the universe and human life have inherent value and meaning, created by a good God for good purposes.

Stewardship and Care for Creation: Recognizing God's goodness inspires a sense of responsibility and stewardship towards creation. It motivates ethical treatment of the environment, other people, and all living beings as reflections of God's good creation.

So, the theological importance of affirming that God is maximally good lies at the heart of understanding God's nature, character, and the relationship between God and creation. It's a package deal.

And, of course, if nothing is logically prior to the existence of God, then the existence of God cannot be proved.

No, if nothing is logically prior to the existence of God, all that means is God is equal to ultimate reality (a point I have made before). Even within a system where God is the ultimate foundation, reasoned arguments can be made to support this foundational belief based on its explanatory scope and power (Natural Theology). Additionally, and appropriate for this week, you might say observing someone being crucified and then walking around three days later appearing and disappearing and then ascending into the clouds 40 days later seems like proof (Personal Experience).

[SteveII]

You misunderstand what it means for something to "ground" morality. In philosophical terms, grounding morality in God's nature doesn't imply that God's nature is a separate principle from the "unchanging, inherent principles;" rather, it suggests that these principles are expressions or manifestations of God's nature. There isn't a logical error in claiming that the inherent principles constituting objective morality derive from or are identical with God's moral nature.

Like I said to Polymath, there is nothing logically prior to the existence of God. This is core to very concept of God.

I don't think you understand the critique that was levied against your argument.

If God's nature can be described as just, good, fair, etc. it means God's nature can be reduced to principles and thus isn't logically prior to said principles. If a metaphysical concept can be reduced to one or more component then it isn't logically prior to one of said component. God's nature, by your definition and usage of it, is reducible thus it cannot be logically prior to it. You would need to rework your syllogism and your argument to solve this issue, but then you risk making God's moral nature completely senseless.   

That's why I focused on maximal goodness all through the argument and support. You are confusing the nature of maximal goodness with how that works out when there are other specific persons about. Think about describing God before creation: His nature certainly could not be described as a piecemeal ethical framework geared to humans. What other beings deserved respect for life? Who was around to be fair to? Who would benefit from his justice?

Instead, these descriptions you are referring to are human attempts to comprehend and articulate the character of God's inherently perfect nature in action in this context. The typical list of moral principles we have in mind are not components that constitute God but are derived from the holistic understanding of God's nature (maximal goodness in this case).

[Dānu]

Wow. Look at all that sauce.

[epronovost]

I don't think you understand the critique that was levied against your argument.

If God's nature can be described as just, good, fair, etc. it means God's nature can be reduced to principles and thus isn't logically prior to said principles. If a metaphysical concept can be reduced to one or more component then it isn't logically prior to one of said component. God's nature, by your definition and usage of it, is reducible thus it cannot be logically prior to it. You would need to rework your syllogism and your argument to solve this issue, but then you risk making God's moral nature completely senseless.   

That's why I focused on maximal goodness all through the argument and support. You are confusing the nature of maximal goodness with how that works out when there are other specific persons about. Think about describing God before creation: His nature certainly could not be described as a piecemeal ethical framework geared to humans. What other beings deserved respect for life? Who was around to be fair to? Who would benefit from his justice?

Instead, these descriptions you are referring to are human attempts to comprehend and articulate the character of God's inherently perfect nature in action in this context. The typical list of moral principles we have in mind are not components that constitute God but are derived from the holistic understanding of God's nature (maximal goodness in this case).

That doesn't change the critique at all. Maximal goodness is in fact even worst since it brings the concept that not is goodness reducible, but also quantifiable (to a certain degree). In all cases, God's nature is reducible to components and moral principles. God before creation would be fair, just, respectful of life (since your deity is "alive" philosophically speaking) and you even directly appeal to this nature to explain and justify God's creative act and the moral worth of his creation. In all cases, by your framing you are making goodness logically prior to God's existence since you define God as moral.

Even worst of all, it seems to me that your post 40 is one huge attempt at retro-fitting the moral principles that you believe are actually foundational to morality unto your ideal of God and the precise mythology you subscribe to and then credit your God for such a state in a clear case of selection bias and ad hoc reasoning instead of your knowledge of God allowing your derive such principle. It's not your knowledge of God's nature that makes your think justice is a good moral principle; it's the dogmatic belief that God is good that makes you believe he is maximally just. The only challenge of course is to explain how can God be just if there is injustice, but there are several rather unconvincing a thin excuses that can be built to preserve that dogma.

[Atothetheist]

If God can’t be objectively immoral. Is there a being that is maximally evil? Would this being ground objective immorality in the same way that God does morality? 

Is immorality merely the absence of God, in which case that makes all of us immoral?

[Dānu]

Additionally, and appropriate for this week, you might say observing someone being crucified and then walking around three days later appearing and disappearing and then ascending into the clouds 40 days later seems like proof (Personal Experience).

Obi-Wan Kenobi?

[TheGentlemanBastard]

Additionally, and appropriate for this week, you might say observing someone being crucified and then walking around three days later appearing and disappearing and then ascending into the clouds 40 days later seems like proof (Personal Experience).

Holy fuck. Are you still trotting out hearsay as evidence, claiming the accounts in your buy-bull are factual, eye-witness accounts? Aren't the "eye-witness testimony is as good as physical evidence" arguments, and the spankings you received therein, what shamed you off AF.com?!?

Give it a rest, Stevie.

[Rhythmcs]

If God is a necessary being and has an unchanging moral nature, that is certainly grounding for objective morality.
-Irrelevant even if true. The existence of any particular subject or any particular disposition of that subjects nature, and any circumstance of it's malleability is not and cannot be the grounds for an objective morality by definition.

a Christian would conceive of God as maximally good.
-Irrelevant even if true. A christian may conceive of god as maximally good, a god may even be maximally good, but a god may still be subjectively and relatively maximally good, and...fundamentally...as above, the objective goodness of a given subject is not a grounds of objective morality, it can only be determined by some objective morality. Goodness in this case being logically prior to godness, and godness not being identical to, though conforming with, said goodness.

In the best of metaethical cases, a god would be a less compromised and more knowledgeable moral agent whose primary value to us is as a communicator - and I guess we'd have to return to magic book to see if we're dealing with a god like that.....

...ofc..I suspect the actual content steve or any other nut is trying to communicate with any of these exhortations is that, god like..made all the stuff and shit. Not a metaethical disagreement at all. So I can see why it makes sense to them, for novel values of sense that intelligent people are unaccustomed to.

[brewerb]

Additionally, and appropriate for this week, you might say observing someone being crucified and then walking around three days later appearing and disappearing and then ascending into the clouds 40 days later seems like proof (Personal Experience).

Obi-Wan Kenobi?

Must have lived in tornado alley.

[Alan V]

Even if God existed and offered humanity an objective morality, humans themselves would always distort it by their own subjectivities, including in any reporting of it in so-called inspired holy books.

You just can't get there from here, as any reading of human psychology will tell you.

That's why we have scholarship, sciences, democracies, laws, and trials with juries, to reduce the distortions of subjective individuals over time in our own behaviors. That's also why any authoritarian system will become abusive over time. You just can't reduce the distortions of subjective perceptions so easily.

The problem with far too many theists is that they are intellectually lazy. They want simple answers to complex questions.

[TheGentlemanBastard]

If God is a necessary being and has an unchanging moral nature, that is certainly grounding for objective morality.
-Irrelevant even if true.  The existence of any particular subject or any particular disposition of that subjects nature, and any circumstance of it's malleability is not and cannot be the grounds for an objective morality by definition.

a Christian would conceive of God as maximally good.
-Irrelevant even if true.  A christian may conceive of god as maximally good, a god may even be maximally good, but a god may still be subjectively and relatively maximally good, and...fundamentally...as above, the objective goodness of a given subject is not a grounds of objective morality, it can only be determined by some objective morality.  Goodness in this case being logically prior to godness, and godness not being identical to, though conforming with, said goodness.

In the best of metaethical cases, a god would be a less compromised and more knowledgeable moral agent whose primary value to us is as a communicator - and I guess we'd have to return to magic book to see if we're dealing with a god like that.....

...ofc..I suspect the actual content steve or any other nut is trying to communicate with any of these exhortations is that, god like..made all the stuff and shit.  Not a metaethical disagreement at all.  So I can see why it makes sense to them, for novel values of sense that intelligent people are unaccustomed to.

Your points are soaring so far over Stevie's head he can't even hear the whistle of their passing.