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Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
#76

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
I'm lucky if I can spell quantum mechanics so I leave that field to those who think they do know.  

There is also a difference between something which is so complicated that I have not bothered to study it and a supernatural claim which is asinine on its face.

I could, if I desired - and I don't - go back to school and get a degree in astrophysics.  Then perhaps I would understand the nuts and bolts of peer-reviewed papers instead of leaving it to Neil De Grasse Tyson to explain it to me.  I could also go back to school and get a degree in theology.  A degree about an old book of superstitions is unlikely to make me think that William Lane Craig is anything but a con man selling bullshit to gullible fools.
Robert G. Ingersoll : “No man with a sense of humor ever founded a religion.”
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#77

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(10-18-2020, 05:04 AM)Minimalist Wrote: I'm lucky if I can spell quantum mechanics so I leave that field to those who think they do know.  

There is also a difference between something which is so complicated that I have not bothered to study it and a supernatural claim which is asinine on its face.

I could, if I desired - and I don't - go back to school and get a degree in astrophysics.  Then perhaps I would understand the nuts and bolts of peer-reviewed papers instead of leaving it to Neil De Grasse Tyson to explain it to me.  I could also go back to school and get a degree in theology.  A degree about an old book of superstitions is unlikely to make me think that William Lane Craig is anything but a con man selling bullshit to gullible fools.

I think you can probably trust Neil De Grasse Tyson. The day I heard that 'Cosmos' was being redone I said to myself that it had to be Tyson or it wouldn't work.
Atheist born and when I die, still an atheist...
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#78

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
One of the problems with scholars is that they tend to primarily write and speak to other members of their given discipline.  That makes those people who can cross the line and write to the layman very valuable resources.  Tyson is one.  Finkelstein and to a slightly lesser degree, William Dever, in archaeology.
Eric Cline in really ancient history.  Bettany Hughes in Greek history.  Anthony Fauci in epidemiology......

These people are real treasures.
Robert G. Ingersoll : “No man with a sense of humor ever founded a religion.”
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#79

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(10-16-2020, 04:26 PM)Reltzik Wrote: While I'll admit some elements can only be measured subjectivity, there are several objective measures that can be made.

For example, with the Teleological Argument and Intelligent Design, here are some objective measures we can make that bear on the strength of those arguments.

In math, the probability that something is true GIVEN what we observe is described by Bayes' Theorem:  P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B), where P(A|B) means "The probability that A is true in the case where B is true" or, more succinctly, "The probability of A given B".  Applied to the Teleological Argument, this becomes:  P( God | Order ) = P( Order | God ) * P( God ) / P( Order ).  It's not always spelled out mathematically like this, but this formula is the essence of the Argument and helps make its shortcomings a lot clearer.

Tellingly, whenever theists advance this argument, they almost always fail to show any method by which they fill in a number or even ballpark estimate for P(God).  Yet without this value, calculating or estimating P(God | Order) is impossible, since without P(God) nailed down it could have any value.  (P(Order) has similar problems.  And that's before we get into the failure to account for observer bias, and the confirmation bias implicit in the arguments around P(Order | God).

The objective observation to be made here isn't that P(God) is low or high, or knowable or unknowable.  The objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(God) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and theistic apologists don't give a shit.  They keep advancing this argument WITHOUT going through all the steps, believing or pretending that in the absence of an essential ingredient it can increase our understanding of the probabilities at all.  The only value this thing can have is as a game of smoke and mirrors, allowing theists to fill in their already-existing belief that P(God) is high and then walk away believing that this argument somehow confirms that belief, rather than just echoes their existing bias back at them.  It doesn't verify the belief, and examining the logic will show it can't verify the belief, not even on the level of inductive likelihood.  It's another lemon.  And we can also observe that the people who buy the lemon aren't exactly behaving like the brightest bulbs in the box.

I have a comment on this.

The Teleological Argument is not so much the probability of God, it is about the probability of Order.

I do not think Bayesian Inference is the best tool for this. That seems to set things up as a God-of-the-gaps argument.

P1. Order is so improbable
C. Therefore God


This is the formulation I am used to seeing:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

The probability of God is nowhere to be seen and therefore avoids all your criticisms.
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#80

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
Clever but will fool no one.

We all know who you think "designed" it.

And that he designed it with you in mind.

Try again.
Robert G. Ingersoll : “No man with a sense of humor ever founded a religion.”
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#81

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(10-30-2020, 02:36 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(10-16-2020, 04:26 PM)Reltzik Wrote: While I'll admit some elements can only be measured subjectivity, there are several objective measures that can be made.

For example, with the Teleological Argument and Intelligent Design, here are some objective measures we can make that bear on the strength of those arguments.

In math, the probability that something is true GIVEN what we observe is described by Bayes' Theorem:  P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B), where P(A|B) means "The probability that A is true in the case where B is true" or, more succinctly, "The probability of A given B".  Applied to the Teleological Argument, this becomes:  P( God | Order ) = P( Order | God ) * P( God ) / P( Order ).  It's not always spelled out mathematically like this, but this formula is the essence of the Argument and helps make its shortcomings a lot clearer.

Tellingly, whenever theists advance this argument, they almost always fail to show any method by which they fill in a number or even ballpark estimate for P(God).  Yet without this value, calculating or estimating P(God | Order) is impossible, since without P(God) nailed down it could have any value.  (P(Order) has similar problems.  And that's before we get into the failure to account for observer bias, and the confirmation bias implicit in the arguments around P(Order | God).

The objective observation to be made here isn't that P(God) is low or high, or knowable or unknowable.  The objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(God) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and theistic apologists don't give a shit.  They keep advancing this argument WITHOUT going through all the steps, believing or pretending that in the absence of an essential ingredient it can increase our understanding of the probabilities at all.  The only value this thing can have is as a game of smoke and mirrors, allowing theists to fill in their already-existing belief that P(God) is high and then walk away believing that this argument somehow confirms that belief, rather than just echoes their existing bias back at them.  It doesn't verify the belief, and examining the logic will show it can't verify the belief, not even on the level of inductive likelihood.  It's another lemon.  And we can also observe that the people who buy the lemon aren't exactly behaving like the brightest bulbs in the box.

I have a comment on this.

The Teleological Argument is not so much the probability of God, it is about the probability of Order.

I do not think Bayesian Inference is the best tool for this. That seems to set things up as a God-of-the-gaps argument.

P1. Order is so improbable
C. Therefore God


This is the formulation I am used to seeing:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

The probability of God is nowhere to be seen and therefore avoids all your criticisms.

As Minimalist points out, it was perfectly clear this argument was being used to shoehorn in a god as the explanation for that design.

Isn't it?


Maybe I wasn't clear?  Let's check.  This is what I quoted, as an indicator of to whom/what I was replying, in the post you yourself quoted:

Quote: For example, the Teleological Argument for the existence of God seeks to establish
probability based on the obvious order, design, and complexity that we see in the
natural world, in the human body, in the Hubble Deep Field, and for that matter on the
shelves of Walmart and Sam's Club --- all evidence of endless variety of products made
from endless varieties of raw materials. Intelligent Design.

And again, in case someone didn't catch it....

Quote:... the Teleological Argument for the existence of God...

But let's leave that aside.  It was part of a large block quote and an unobservant reader may have missed it.

My central point in that series of posts (again, in case someone didn't catch it) WASN'T to aim any criticisms at God, the way you imply.  (I did touch on the obvious mistakes of a hypothetical god who relied on something like the internal witness of the holy spirit as its best evidence, but that was more a criticism of the belief in the internal witness as a reliable source of evidence than a criticism of God.)  The central point was the abysmal failure of Christian apologists individually and Christian apologetics as a collective field to provide good arguments or evidence for the existence of a god, to show any recognition of what does or doesn't even count as a good argument or as good evidence, and a contemptible failure in the most basic tests of intellectual honesty that reflects poorly on their character as human being.

The entire argument was about what could be objectively shown in the matter of apologetics.  In no way was I criticizing God by highlighting the shortcomings of the teleological argument, and such criticism would have been both off-topic and, as you point out, neither valid nor cogent on a structural level.  I was instead criticizing the argument itself and the people who make the argument.  An apologist who misconstrued that as a criticism of God either would not be taking it nearly personally enough, or would be thinking overly highly of themself.  The thread was about what role objectivity vs subjectivity had in the debate over the existence of the Christian God, and I made a relevant point about things that could be objectively demonstrated related to that debate.  Part of that set of objectively-demonstrable things was the reprehensible conduct and deep untrustworthiness of Christian apologists.

But let's leave that aside as well.  Let's imagine you were replying to someone who had actually thought and/or said that poking holes in the Telelogical Argument for design in some way criticized the Christian God.  This isn't what actually happened, but you may well have made a valid and deeply valuable point and simply posted it in the wrong place.  I've made that mistake as well, and it's worth looking past superficial errors to see if a post has anything worthwhile at its core.

Your main points were:
  1. I misconstrued the Teleological Argument as being for God, rather than for design.
  2. I intentionally or unintentionally misrepresented the Teleological argument by putting it in a Bayesian form, rather than its normal syllogistic form, which you provide.
  3. My criticisms of God were therefore invalid.
I've addressed (1) and (3) already, so let's turn to (2).

I did explicitly state that putting the argument into Bayesian terms wasn't the typical form of the argument, but that it got to the core of what the argument was saying.  I stand by that.  The major point of contention to be had in the teleological argument is what you present as P2:  "It [fine-tuning or order, take your pick] is not due to physical necessity or chance."  I maintain that an examination from a standpoint of probability is a perfectly valid lens through which to examine whether something is due to chance, or whether the declaration that it can't be due to chance is a reasonable one to make, vis-a-vis the conclusion of design.  If you disagree with this, we'll discuss.  Otherwise...

Let me further substitute the word "Design" in for "God", using Notepad's find-replace function, in order to play along with the idea that I was responding to a teleological argument for design.  Also, to change "theism" and "theistic" and "theist" to "designism", "designistic", and "designist", I shall replace the root of the theism-words, "the", with "design".

.....

OOPSY!  It appears that second substitution wasn't the best of ideas.  Of the three paragraphs I modified, the third (just to pick one to show the problem) looked like this:

Quote:design objective observation to be made here isn't that P(Design) is low or high, or knowable or unknowable.  design objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(Design) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and designistic apologists don't give a shit.  designy keep advancing this argument WITHOUT going through all design steps, believing or pretending that in design absence of an essential ingredient it can increase our understanding of design probabilities at all.  design only value this thing can have is as a game of smoke and mirrors, allowing designists to fill in designir already-existing belief that P(Design) is high and designn walk away believing that this argument somehow confirms that belief, radesignr than just echoes designir existing bias back at designm.  It doesn't verify design belief, and examining design logic will show it can't verify design belief, not even on design level of inductive likelihood.  It's anodesignr lemon.  And we can also observe that design people who buy design lemon aren't exactly behaving like design brightest bulbs in design box.

Speaking of not "behaving like design brightest bulbs in design box"!  That was a poor editorial decision on my part.

I probably shouldn't have included this stupid mistake of mine.  It has no relevance at all to topic of whether the teleological argument is actually about concluding design, or is instead actually about concluding God.  It certainly doesn't echo Minimalist's implication that the one is merely a threadbare and deceptive reskin of the other.  And it in no way reflects upon the honesty, general ethics, or personal characters of those who advocate for design, Christianity, or the Christian God.  But I'll leave it in.  It's amusing, and maybe the historical allusion will be appreciated by cdesign proponentsists.

Anyhow, back on topic.  Here's what I said, only with "God" replaced with "Design" and "theis" replaced with "designis".  I leave out the concluding sentences, which were about tying it in to the trend of poor behavior of Christian apologists, as part of the conceit that we're no longer talking about an apology for Christianity.

Quote:In math, the probability that something is true GIVEN what we observe is described by Bayes' Theorem:  P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B), where P(A|B) means "The probability that A is true in the case where B is true" or, more succinctly, "The probability of A given B".  Applied to the Teleological Argument, this becomes:  P( Design | Order ) = P( Order | Design ) * P( Design ) / P( Order ).  It's not always spelled out mathematically like this, but this formula is the essence of the Argument and helps make its shortcomings a lot clearer.

Tellingly, whenever designists advance this argument, they almost always fail to show any method by which they fill in a number or even ballpark estimate for P(Design).  Yet without this value, calculating or estimating P(Design | Order) is impossible, since without P(Design) nailed down it could have any value.  (P(Order) has similar problems.  And that's before we get into the failure to account for observer bias, and the confirmation bias implicit in the arguments around P(Order | Design).

The objective observation to be made here isn't that P(Design) is low or high, or knowable or unknowable.  The objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(Design) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and designistic apologists don't give a shit.  They keep advancing this argument WITHOUT going through all the steps, believing or pretending that in the absence of an essential ingredient it can increase our understanding of the probabilities at all.  The only value this thing can have is as a game of smoke and mirrors, allowing designists to fill in their already-existing belief that P(Design) is high and then walk away believing that this argument somehow confirms that belief, rather than just echoes their existing bias back at them.  It doesn't verify the belief, and examining the logic will show it can't verify the belief, not even on the level of inductive likelihood.

With this simple exercise in word substitution, the EXACT SAME points with which I was refuting the Teleological Argument for God also refute the Teleological Argument for Design.  That's because the point wasn't the conclusion.  The point was how the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises... or if you insist on your more traditional formulation, the point was how the premise that order it isn't the result of chance is asserted without basis.  The proponents of the argument, whatever we call them, are just dressing up their pre-existing belief as being supported, when in fact it's just being repeated back to them by a sophist echo-chamber.  They are still being dishonest or foolish (or both), and are still not to be trusted.

So.... I think that addresses all your complaints.
"To surrender to ignorance and call it God has always been premature, and it remains premature today." - Isaac Asimov
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#82

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(10-30-2020, 05:50 PM)Reltzik Wrote: Anyhow, back on topic.  Here's what I said, only with "God" replaced with "Design" and "theis" replaced with "designis".  I leave out the concluding sentences, which were about tying it in to the trend of poor behavior of Christian apologists, as part of the conceit that we're no longer talking about an apology for Christianity.

Quote:In math, the probability that something is true GIVEN what we observe is described by Bayes' Theorem:  P(A|B) = P(B|A) * P(A) / P(B), where P(A|B) means "The probability that A is true in the case where B is true" or, more succinctly, "The probability of A given B".  Applied to the Teleological Argument, this becomes:  P( Design | Order ) = P( Order | Design ) * P( Design ) / P( Order ).  It's not always spelled out mathematically like this, but this formula is the essence of the Argument and helps make its shortcomings a lot clearer.

Tellingly, whenever designists advance this argument, they almost always fail to show any method by which they fill in a number or even ballpark estimate for P(Design).  Yet without this value, calculating or estimating P(Design | Order) is impossible, since without P(Design) nailed down it could have any value.  (P(Order) has similar problems.  And that's before we get into the failure to account for observer bias, and the confirmation bias implicit in the arguments around P(Order | Design).

The objective observation to be made here isn't that P(Design) is low or high, or knowable or unknowable.  The objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(Design) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and designistic apologists don't give a shit.  They keep advancing this argument WITHOUT going through all the steps, believing or pretending that in the absence of an essential ingredient it can increase our understanding of the probabilities at all.  The only value this thing can have is as a game of smoke and mirrors, allowing designists to fill in their already-existing belief that P(Design) is high and then walk away believing that this argument somehow confirms that belief, rather than just echoes their existing bias back at them.  It doesn't verify the belief, and examining the logic will show it can't verify the belief, not even on the level of inductive likelihood.

With this simple exercise in word substitution, the EXACT SAME points with which I was refuting the Teleological Argument for God also refute the Teleological Argument for Design.  That's because the point wasn't the conclusion.  The point was how the conclusion doesn't follow from the premises... or if you insist on your more traditional formulation, the point was how the premise that order it isn't the result of chance is asserted without basis.  The proponents of the argument, whatever we call them, are just dressing up their pre-existing belief as being supported, when in fact it's just being repeated back to them by a sophist echo-chamber.  They are still being dishonest or foolish (or both), and are still not to be trusted.

So.... I think that addresses all your complaints.

I was more interested in what appears to be logic errors with your formation and conclusion than addressing your general complaints about apologists.

For reference, an abductive, or an inference to the best explanation (IBE) formulation of the Teleological Argument:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

Substituting 'design' corrects one mistake. But it kind of guts your conclusion.

"The objective observation to be made here is that some knowledge of P(Design) is required for this argument to be at all useful... and designistic apologists don't give a shit"

because we infer design hundreds of times every single day in much the same way the syllogism does: the assessment of the probability of design comes from the failure of the other alternatives to satisfy. Unless of course you can show that design is not possible--then that would be a worth looking at.
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#83

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
Total bullshit, Stevie.
Order arises spontaneously in this universe. The gods have nothing to do with it. and they are unnecessary.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory

A real deity could make life happen, no matter the conditions. Design is an argument against the gods and their power.
In fact there is no "narrow range" in which life happens.
https://depts.washington.edu/astrobio/wo...ironments/

The teleological argument is crap.
Faith does not arise from argumentation.
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#84

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
Can I show that design is impossible?  No.  I can't show that and I don't even believe that.  But that's not the only basis on which I can reach that objective conclusion.

How to put this?

Suppose (hypothetically) I could show that P(Design) was about 10-20 and P(Order) was around 10-10.  In other words, order was far more likely than design, even if both were very unlikely in the abstract.  P(Design)|Order) would vary with how independent these values were, but would at its maximum be around 10-10 in this hypothetical.  That's with a perfect designer that wanted design and would produce order every time rather than goof it all up, and that's as dependent as the probabilities can get.  If the probabilities were independent, then P(Design|Order) would be 10-20.  Either way, that would show that design was very UNLIKELY given order, and that assuming design on the basis of order was a very bad reasoning process.  The explanation of chance or physical necessity would then be nearly 100%, and would be a far more satisfactory explanation than design.  (Or, at least, it would satisfy in a rational sense.  Emotionally or intuitively it might not, but emotion and intuition aren't great guides to discovering abstract truths.)

Can I show that the probabilities (or, more vaguely, likelihoods) of design and order are such that even with order witnessed, the probability of design is extremely low?  No.  But can the person presenting this argument show that these probabilities are not so?  Can they at least show that P(Design | Order) is high?  That is what is required to support the second premise, in your formulation.

More to the point of whether or not presenters of the teleological argument can show it, they DON'T show it.  Some will put a lot of effort into trying to calculate (through very questionable maths) P(Order|No-Design)... without addressing anything else.  That still leaves at least one degree of freedom.  They can show that P(Order) is as low as they like, and the second premise is still unsupported unless they do something to resolve the possibility that P(Design) is even lower.  That strikes me as either someone failing to notice that the question is even relevant (never a good sign for their grasp of the material) or knowing it is and desperately hoping to not get called out on it.

So P(Design) is important, even in the hypothetical case that it's not 0.  Maybe you could instead focus on a different value (like P(Order | Design)), but without restricting at least one more degree of freedom the argument can't even get off the ground.  It's not enough to show that order is unlikely without design.

(Also, As Bucky referenced, there are plenty of reasons to think that P(Order | ~Design) might be high, and P(Design | Particular-Order-We-See) is low... or, at least, the probability of a design perfectly advancing the goals that Christianity typically ascribes to the Christian God would be low.  Both argue against the central inference.)
"To surrender to ignorance and call it God has always been premature, and it remains premature today." - Isaac Asimov
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#85

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-02-2020, 08:55 PM)SteveII Wrote: I was more interested in what appears to be logic errors with your formation and conclusion than addressing your general complaints about apologists.

For reference, an abductive, or an inference to the best explanation (IBE) formulation of the Teleological Argument:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

Not this debunked fallacy again. Facepalm 

That is a fatally flawed syllogism, as it begs the question in P2.  This has been repeatedly pointed out to you. Deadpan Coffee Drinker
[Image: Logo%20free%20sm.jpg]
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#86

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-02-2020, 11:41 PM)Reltzik Wrote: Can I show that design is impossible?  No.  I can't show that and I don't even believe that.  But that's not the only basis on which I can reach that objective conclusion.

How to put this?

Suppose (hypothetically) I could show that P(Design) was about 10-20 and P(Order) was around 10-10.  In other words, order was far more likely than design, even if both were very unlikely in the abstract.  P(Design)|Order) would vary with how independent these values were, but would at its maximum be around 10-10 in this hypothetical.  That's with a perfect designer that wanted design and would produce order every time rather than goof it all up, and that's as dependent as the probabilities can get.  If the probabilities were independent, then P(Design|Order) would be 10-20.  Either way, that would show that design was very UNLIKELY given order, and that assuming design on the basis of order was a very bad reasoning process.  The explanation of chance or physical necessity would then be nearly 100%, and would be a far more satisfactory explanation than design.  (Or, at least, it would satisfy in a rational sense.  Emotionally or intuitively it might not, but emotion and intuition aren't great guides to discovering abstract truths.)

Can I show that the probabilities (or, more vaguely, likelihoods) of design and order are such that even with order witnessed, the probability of design is extremely low?  No.  But can the person presenting this argument show that these probabilities are not so?  Can they at least show that P(Design | Order) is high?  That is what is required to support the second premise, in your formulation.

More to the point of whether or not presenters of the teleological argument can show it, they DON'T show it.  Some will put a lot of effort into trying to calculate (through very questionable maths) P(Order|No-Design)... without addressing anything else.  That still leaves at least one degree of freedom.  They can show that P(Order) is as low as they like, and the second premise is still unsupported unless they do something to resolve the possibility that P(Design) is even lower.  That strikes me as either someone failing to notice that the question is even relevant (never a good sign for their grasp of the material) or knowing it is and desperately hoping to not get called out on it.

So P(Design) is important, even in the hypothetical case that it's not 0.  Maybe you could instead focus on a different value (like P(Order | Design)), but without restricting at least one more degree of freedom the argument can't even get off the ground.  It's not enough to show that order is unlikely without design.

(Also, As Bucky referenced, there are plenty of reasons to think that P(Order | ~Design) might be high, and P(Design | Particular-Order-We-See) is low... or, at least, the probability of a design perfectly advancing the goals that Christianity typically ascribes to the Christian God would be low.  Both argue against the central inference.)

You missed my point and you are not addressing the logic of the argument. The probability of Design on its own is irrelevant. At question is probability of the other two alternatives: Chance and Necessity. When these fail to give an account for what we see, Design is INFERRED because those are the only three possible alternatives. It is the same logic if you happen upon a perfect 1m polished glass sphere in the woods. You do not consider the actual probability of of such an object (presence of silica sand, sodium oxide, etc., sufficient heat, geological history, polishing agent, some theory on what could have governed the size, etc. etc.). You consider the probability of Chance. When that does not satisfy, you walk away wondering who put it there.

The way to defeat the argument is to make Chance or Necessity more probable or Design impossible.

Bucky could never make the argument he claims. He thinks insults and links are his best route to proving a point he rarely understands.
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#87

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-09-2020, 05:55 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(11-02-2020, 11:41 PM)Reltzik Wrote: Can I show that design is impossible?  No.  I can't show that and I don't even believe that.  But that's not the only basis on which I can reach that objective conclusion.

How to put this?

Suppose (hypothetically) I could show that P(Design) was about 10-20 and P(Order) was around 10-10.  In other words, order was far more likely than design, even if both were very unlikely in the abstract.  P(Design)|Order) would vary with how independent these values were, but would at its maximum be around 10-10 in this hypothetical.  That's with a perfect designer that wanted design and would produce order every time rather than goof it all up, and that's as dependent as the probabilities can get.  If the probabilities were independent, then P(Design|Order) would be 10-20.  Either way, that would show that design was very UNLIKELY given order, and that assuming design on the basis of order was a very bad reasoning process.  The explanation of chance or physical necessity would then be nearly 100%, and would be a far more satisfactory explanation than design.  (Or, at least, it would satisfy in a rational sense.  Emotionally or intuitively it might not, but emotion and intuition aren't great guides to discovering abstract truths.)

Can I show that the probabilities (or, more vaguely, likelihoods) of design and order are such that even with order witnessed, the probability of design is extremely low?  No.  But can the person presenting this argument show that these probabilities are not so?  Can they at least show that P(Design | Order) is high?  That is what is required to support the second premise, in your formulation.

More to the point of whether or not presenters of the teleological argument can show it, they DON'T show it.  Some will put a lot of effort into trying to calculate (through very questionable maths) P(Order|No-Design)... without addressing anything else.  That still leaves at least one degree of freedom.  They can show that P(Order) is as low as they like, and the second premise is still unsupported unless they do something to resolve the possibility that P(Design) is even lower.  That strikes me as either someone failing to notice that the question is even relevant (never a good sign for their grasp of the material) or knowing it is and desperately hoping to not get called out on it.

So P(Design) is important, even in the hypothetical case that it's not 0.  Maybe you could instead focus on a different value (like P(Order | Design)), but without restricting at least one more degree of freedom the argument can't even get off the ground.  It's not enough to show that order is unlikely without design.

(Also, As Bucky referenced, there are plenty of reasons to think that P(Order | ~Design) might be high, and P(Design | Particular-Order-We-See) is low... or, at least, the probability of a design perfectly advancing the goals that Christianity typically ascribes to the Christian God would be low.  Both argue against the central inference.)

You missed my point and you are not addressing the logic of the argument. The probability of Design on its own is irrelevant. At question is probability of the other two alternatives: Chance and Necessity. When these fail to give an account for what we see, Design is INFERRED because those are the only three possible alternatives. It is the same logic if you happen upon a perfect 1m polished glass sphere in the woods. You do not consider the actual probability of of such an object (presence of silica sand, sodium oxide, etc., sufficient heat, geological history, polishing agent, some theory on what could have governed the size, etc. etc.). You consider the probability of Chance. When that does not satisfy, you walk away wondering who put it there.

The way to defeat the argument is to make Chance or Necessity more probable or Design impossible.

Bucky could never make the argument he claims. He thinks insults and links are his best route to proving a point he rarely understands.

Bullshit ... YOU never answered my argument. You gave up. 

It's so hilarious the religionists have learned their formulaic way of doing their Jebus-arguments, and they insist others "defeat" their nonsense using their same false arguments.
Stevie's way to defeat the argument is false. Totally wrong. Chance (which he doesn't demonstrate and in fact is a meaningless term, in this argument is not an argument at all. No one says it is or can be one). Events have probabilities. They are never "chance". No one has ever demonstrated what the probabilities actually are in the context of this argument, and neither has Stevie. Using the word "chance" proves he doesn't know what he's even talking about.

ANY argument is only as good as it's premises. ANYTHING wrong with the premises, and there is no strength to ANY argument, in any system of logic, (which Stevie FAILED to name).
Your limited premises are false, and incorrect. There is another choice. Of course you are not aware of, and likely many others you know nothing about, as Fundy theists know nothing of it.
It's not limited to the same old tired Fundy bullshit of chance or necessity (which is NEVER demonstrated), and a deity, ( ... which one is also never deomonstrated). 
It's all a god of the gaps pile of rubbish. No one has presented the probability numbers, nor have they demonstrated any "necessity". In fact they have no command of even the rudiments of this weak rotten argument.

Order arises in this universe spontaneosly. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory
Stevie also has never demonstrated that he has sufficient knowledge of this or any extra-universal system to be able to make any generalizations about it. 95 % of this universe is unknown, and he has absolutlely NO knowledge of any extra-universe systems, (including the environment the gods find themselves in).  It's all a desperate pile of crap to justify a faith by "logic' which is not justified or demonstrated, and in fact is contradicted by Christian Theology, AS WAS SHOWN HERE. No one can support or justify any of the premises presented or assumed, thus the conclusion (inference) is laughable.
Reply
#88

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-09-2020, 05:55 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(11-02-2020, 11:41 PM)Reltzik Wrote: Can I show that design is impossible?  No.  I can't show that and I don't even believe that.  But that's not the only basis on which I can reach that objective conclusion.

How to put this?

Suppose (hypothetically) I could show that P(Design) was about 10-20 and P(Order) was around 10-10.  In other words, order was far more likely than design, even if both were very unlikely in the abstract.  P(Design)|Order) would vary with how independent these values were, but would at its maximum be around 10-10 in this hypothetical.  That's with a perfect designer that wanted design and would produce order every time rather than goof it all up, and that's as dependent as the probabilities can get.  If the probabilities were independent, then P(Design|Order) would be 10-20.  Either way, that would show that design was very UNLIKELY given order, and that assuming design on the basis of order was a very bad reasoning process.  The explanation of chance or physical necessity would then be nearly 100%, and would be a far more satisfactory explanation than design.  (Or, at least, it would satisfy in a rational sense.  Emotionally or intuitively it might not, but emotion and intuition aren't great guides to discovering abstract truths.)

Can I show that the probabilities (or, more vaguely, likelihoods) of design and order are such that even with order witnessed, the probability of design is extremely low?  No.  But can the person presenting this argument show that these probabilities are not so?  Can they at least show that P(Design | Order) is high?  That is what is required to support the second premise, in your formulation.

More to the point of whether or not presenters of the teleological argument can show it, they DON'T show it.  Some will put a lot of effort into trying to calculate (through very questionable maths) P(Order|No-Design)... without addressing anything else.  That still leaves at least one degree of freedom.  They can show that P(Order) is as low as they like, and the second premise is still unsupported unless they do something to resolve the possibility that P(Design) is even lower.  That strikes me as either someone failing to notice that the question is even relevant (never a good sign for their grasp of the material) or knowing it is and desperately hoping to not get called out on it.

So P(Design) is important, even in the hypothetical case that it's not 0.  Maybe you could instead focus on a different value (like P(Order | Design)), but without restricting at least one more degree of freedom the argument can't even get off the ground.  It's not enough to show that order is unlikely without design.

(Also, As Bucky referenced, there are plenty of reasons to think that P(Order | ~Design) might be high, and P(Design | Particular-Order-We-See) is low... or, at least, the probability of a design perfectly advancing the goals that Christianity typically ascribes to the Christian God would be low.  Both argue against the central inference.)

You missed my point and you are not addressing the logic of the argument. The probability of Design on its own is irrelevant. At question is probability of the other two alternatives: Chance and Necessity. When these fail to give an account for what we see, Design is INFERRED because those are the only three possible alternatives. It is the same logic if you happen upon a perfect 1m polished glass sphere in the woods. You do not consider the actual probability of of such an object (presence of silica sand, sodium oxide, etc., sufficient heat, geological history, polishing agent, some theory on what could have governed the size, etc. etc.). You consider the probability of Chance. When that does not satisfy, you walk away wondering who put it there.

The way to defeat the argument is to make Chance or Necessity more probable or Design impossible.

Bucky could never make the argument he claims. He thinks insults and links are his best route to proving a point he rarely understands.

Yes, that is EXACTLY the logic of the argument: inferring that it must be design on the grounds that the other two are unlikely, and making that inference WITHOUT actually establishing ANYTHING about how probable design is in comparison to the other two, because when have Christian apologists ever possessed a shred of the integrity required to hold their favorite answer to the same standard as the alternatives?  I am addressing the logic of the argument by showing it's missing a piece needed to be cogent, and you're saying I'm not addressing the logic of the argument on the grounds that I'm not skipping the same step that it does.  WTF?

And the glass sphere metaphor (or watch, or message in sand, both common variations of that example) is a horrifically faulty analogy.  We have proofs of concept for glass manufacturing, we know that glass products are artificially produced all the time, we see them at stores everywhere with brand names and trademarks of the manufacturers printed on them, we can take classes to learn how to make them ourselves, and I'm sure if I go online it would just take me a few minutes to find just such a product for sale accompanied by a blurb about who they are and maybe even some pictures of them making the product.  I would draw the conclusion that people likely produced the glass sphere because, yes, I know it's not likely to happen just by chance, but ALSO because I actually have preexisting knowledge that people manufacture glass products.  This knowledge that manufactured glass spheres are more common than naturally-occurring glass spheres is an essential element for making this a strong inference, and that knowledge is exactly what we do not possess about the universe.

(Google quickly found me 1m glass spheres for sale.  Being marketed as decorative objects for hotels.)

To emphasize the discrepancy between examining both possibilities and leaving one unexamined, suppose astronomers discover a sphere of glass 10,000,000 meters across floating in interstellar space somewhere.  Would we infer that this was designed? Well, that's planet-sized.  We don't have experience with manufacturing on that scale, or with putting those into interstellar space.  So far we've put exactly TWO object into interstellar space, and both are considerably smaller and less massive.  That's beyond our capabilities.  Why would we go to the effort of making it and putting it there?  It doesn't seem to serve any purpose larger than itself.  We certainly didn't make it. Aliens, perhaps?  Well, maybe, but we've been looking into the void for a while now and have yet to see any signs of an interstellar civilization, and most of the arguments why we might not have seen one don't mesh with them possessing the motivation, manufacturing capacity, and reach to produce glass planets in interstellar space.  So could it be the result of chance?  Well the present scientific understanding of how planets form involves them coalescing due to gravity from dust and gas, turning molten from the heat of the initial collisions, and settling into spherical shapes under their own weight.  Glass is made of silicon and oxygen, both in the top ten most common elements in the universe, so that has a certain plausibility to it.  So for that sphere, I would infer chance natural processes.  Now maybe you could argue the other way, pointing out some explanation for unseen aliens that would involve them producing glass planets, or pointing out some implausibilities in my idea of how a glass planet might have formed like asking why it wasn't an oblate spheroid instead of a perfect sphere.  But that just proves my larger point.  We'd be weighing the likelihoods and unlikelihoods of BOTH possibilities against each other, and doing so on the basis of a preexisting understanding of what each would entail.  Examining the probability of each is required.  We don't just get to single one out and default to it, unexamined, just because the others seem unlikely.

(And yes, I'm conflating "chance" and "physical necessity", since necessity is just chance with a probability of 1 and it's a bit of a mouthful listing both of them every single time.)

So if you want a found-in-the-woods analogy that actually is analogous to the universe, please pick an item for which we have zero established proofs-of-concept of being designed, no proposed methods by which a design might be implemented, and no apparent purpose for designing and producing it in the first place.  You know, like the universe.
"To surrender to ignorance and call it God has always been premature, and it remains premature today." - Isaac Asimov
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#89

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
And please account for all the flaws in the design.
If it were designed, then one could assume there was a *best* (most efficient *design*) way to actually do something.
There is no evidence for any "best" anything, and in fact, we know that evolution used many flawed systems, and made them work, somewhat.
One could also assume that certain evils would be avoided, (like infants getting cancer).
There is no evidence for any design. Also the argument that the universe was designed for life, or us, is false. Black Holes will be around FAR FAR FAR longer than any species, so ... apparently the universe was designed for them. Life does not exist in the small range creationists claim. Life exists in very harsh environments, (in hydro-thermal vents), .... design is a very poor argument, anyway. A real god could make life happen, no matter the environment.
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#90

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-09-2020, 07:02 PM)Reltzik Wrote:
(11-09-2020, 05:55 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(11-02-2020, 11:41 PM)Reltzik Wrote: Can I show that design is impossible?  No.  I can't show that and I don't even believe that.  But that's not the only basis on which I can reach that objective conclusion.

How to put this?

Suppose (hypothetically) I could show that P(Design) was about 10-20 and P(Order) was around 10-10.  In other words, order was far more likely than design, even if both were very unlikely in the abstract.  P(Design)|Order) would vary with how independent these values were, but would at its maximum be around 10-10 in this hypothetical.  That's with a perfect designer that wanted design and would produce order every time rather than goof it all up, and that's as dependent as the probabilities can get.  If the probabilities were independent, then P(Design|Order) would be 10-20.  Either way, that would show that design was very UNLIKELY given order, and that assuming design on the basis of order was a very bad reasoning process.  The explanation of chance or physical necessity would then be nearly 100%, and would be a far more satisfactory explanation than design.  (Or, at least, it would satisfy in a rational sense.  Emotionally or intuitively it might not, but emotion and intuition aren't great guides to discovering abstract truths.)

Can I show that the probabilities (or, more vaguely, likelihoods) of design and order are such that even with order witnessed, the probability of design is extremely low?  No.  But can the person presenting this argument show that these probabilities are not so?  Can they at least show that P(Design | Order) is high?  That is what is required to support the second premise, in your formulation.

More to the point of whether or not presenters of the teleological argument can show it, they DON'T show it.  Some will put a lot of effort into trying to calculate (through very questionable maths) P(Order|No-Design)... without addressing anything else.  That still leaves at least one degree of freedom.  They can show that P(Order) is as low as they like, and the second premise is still unsupported unless they do something to resolve the possibility that P(Design) is even lower.  That strikes me as either someone failing to notice that the question is even relevant (never a good sign for their grasp of the material) or knowing it is and desperately hoping to not get called out on it.

So P(Design) is important, even in the hypothetical case that it's not 0.  Maybe you could instead focus on a different value (like P(Order | Design)), but without restricting at least one more degree of freedom the argument can't even get off the ground.  It's not enough to show that order is unlikely without design.

(Also, As Bucky referenced, there are plenty of reasons to think that P(Order | ~Design) might be high, and P(Design | Particular-Order-We-See) is low... or, at least, the probability of a design perfectly advancing the goals that Christianity typically ascribes to the Christian God would be low.  Both argue against the central inference.)

You missed my point and you are not addressing the logic of the argument. The probability of Design on its own is irrelevant. At question is probability of the other two alternatives: Chance and Necessity. When these fail to give an account for what we see, Design is INFERRED because those are the only three possible alternatives. It is the same logic if you happen upon a perfect 1m polished glass sphere in the woods. You do not consider the actual probability of of such an object (presence of silica sand, sodium oxide, etc., sufficient heat, geological history, polishing agent, some theory on what could have governed the size, etc. etc.). You consider the probability of Chance. When that does not satisfy, you walk away wondering who put it there.

The way to defeat the argument is to make Chance or Necessity more probable or Design impossible.

Bucky could never make the argument he claims. He thinks insults and links are his best route to proving a point he rarely understands.

Yes, that is EXACTLY the logic of the argument: inferring that it must be design on the grounds that the other two are unlikely, and making that inference WITHOUT actually establishing ANYTHING about how probable design is in comparison to the other two, because when have Christian apologists ever possessed a shred of the integrity required to hold their favorite answer to the same standard as the alternatives?  I am addressing the logic of the argument by showing it's missing a piece needed to be cogent, and you're saying I'm not addressing the logic of the argument on the grounds that I'm not skipping the same step that it does.  WTF?

Does the over-the-top rhetoric do something for you?

For reference:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

P2 does not conclude "unlikely" as your argument needs. It concludes not plausibly due to chance or necessity. If two of three options are implausible, the third becomes more plausible as a result of the failures of the other two. But you are not arguing the probabilities of chance and cosmological constants. You are arguing:

P1'. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either Chance or Design.
P2'. Design is not probable
C'. Therefore Chance.

Your error is that design is a property that is always inferred from two things: a) the presence of specified complexity (mentioned in P1') --not just complexity and 2) eliminating other possible causes. Your (C') does not follow from the from the premises because you failed to account for design being an inferred property. How do you know that design is not probable without analyzing chance? For P2' to be true, C' would be already assumed. You are question-begging.

Another analogy to show how the property of design is inferred: A large scrabble tile bag with large equal quantities of letters. Your friend said he drew in order the following:

WEHOLDTHESETRUTHSTOBESELFEVIDENTTHATALLMENARECREATEDEQUAL

Are we to believe him? No, we would not. Why? Because of a design inference due to the specified complexity and the very low probability of chance. How about if he said he drew these?

XERTYHJKIOSYUIODPHOPOQIJNIBQLDKIJXMFLEKDNEVQKBZVSNWYKERLA

It is equally improbable to have drawn this specific string of letters. But, we would believe him. Why? There is no specified complexity and therefore no inference to design.

Quote:And the glass sphere metaphor (or watch, or message in sand, both common variations of that example) is a horrifically faulty analogy.  We have proofs of concept for glass manufacturing, we know that glass products are artificially produced all the time, we see them at stores everywhere with brand names and trademarks of the manufacturers printed on them, we can take classes to learn how to make them ourselves, and I'm sure if I go online it would just take me a few minutes to find just such a product for sale accompanied by a blurb about who they are and maybe even some pictures of them making the product.  I would draw the conclusion that people likely produced the glass sphere because, yes, I know it's not likely to happen just by chance, but ALSO because I actually have preexisting knowledge that people manufacture glass products.  This knowledge that manufactured glass spheres are more common than naturally-occurring glass spheres is an essential element for making this a strong inference, and that knowledge is exactly what we do not possess about the universe.

(Google quickly found me 1m glass spheres for sale.  Being marketed as decorative objects for hotels.)

To emphasize the discrepancy between examining both possibilities and leaving one unexamined, suppose astronomers discover a sphere of glass 10,000,000 meters across floating in interstellar space somewhere.  Would we infer that this was designed? Well, that's planet-sized.  We don't have experience with manufacturing on that scale, or with putting those into interstellar space.  So far we've put exactly TWO object into interstellar space, and both are considerably smaller and less massive.  That's beyond our capabilities.  Why would we go to the effort of making it and putting it there?  It doesn't seem to serve any purpose larger than itself.  We certainly didn't make it.  Aliens, perhaps?  Well, maybe, but we've been looking into the void for a while now and have yet to see any signs of an interstellar civilization, and most of the arguments why we might not have seen one don't mesh with them possessing the motivation, manufacturing capacity, and reach to produce glass planets in interstellar space.  So could it be the result of chance?  Well the present scientific understanding of how planets form involves them coalescing due to gravity from dust and gas, turning molten from the heat of the initial collisions, and settling into spherical shapes under their own weight.  Glass is made of silicon and oxygen, both in the top ten most common elements in the universe, so that has a certain plausibility to it.  So for that sphere, I would infer chance natural processes.  Now maybe you could argue the other way, pointing out some explanation for unseen aliens that would involve them producing glass planets, or pointing out some implausibilities in my idea of how a glass planet might have formed like asking why it wasn't an oblate spheroid instead of a perfect sphere.  But that just proves my larger point.  We'd be weighing the likelihoods and unlikelihoods of BOTH possibilities against each other, and doing so on the basis of a preexisting understanding of what each would entail.  Examining the probability of each is required.  We don't just get to single one out and default to it, unexamined, just because the others seem unlikely.

(And yes, I'm conflating "chance" and "physical necessity", since necessity is just chance with a probability of 1 and it's a bit of a mouthful listing both of them every single time.)

So if you want a found-in-the-woods analogy that actually is analogous to the universe, please pick an item for which we have zero established proofs-of-concept of being designed, no proposed methods by which a design might be implemented, and no apparent purpose for designing and producing it in the first place.  You know, like the universe.

Your counter analogy with a glass planet is useful. Such a planet is plausibly due to chance BECAUSE of the existence of undercutting defeaters you articulated against the idea of design. That is why I asked you earlier if you had reasons to think Design was not possible. But, as you increased the specified complexity of your planet-sized glass sphere, chance would be less plausible and design more likely (i.e. unknown groups of repeating letters scribed around the equator).
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#91

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-09-2020, 09:38 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(11-09-2020, 07:02 PM)Reltzik Wrote:
(11-09-2020, 05:55 PM)SteveII Wrote: You missed my point and you are not addressing the logic of the argument. The probability of Design on its own is irrelevant. At question is probability of the other two alternatives: Chance and Necessity. When these fail to give an account for what we see, Design is INFERRED because those are the only three possible alternatives. It is the same logic if you happen upon a perfect 1m polished glass sphere in the woods. You do not consider the actual probability of of such an object (presence of silica sand, sodium oxide, etc., sufficient heat, geological history, polishing agent, some theory on what could have governed the size, etc. etc.). You consider the probability of Chance. When that does not satisfy, you walk away wondering who put it there.

The way to defeat the argument is to make Chance or Necessity more probable or Design impossible.

Bucky could never make the argument he claims. He thinks insults and links are his best route to proving a point he rarely understands.

Yes, that is EXACTLY the logic of the argument: inferring that it must be design on the grounds that the other two are unlikely, and making that inference WITHOUT actually establishing ANYTHING about how probable design is in comparison to the other two, because when have Christian apologists ever possessed a shred of the integrity required to hold their favorite answer to the same standard as the alternatives?  I am addressing the logic of the argument by showing it's missing a piece needed to be cogent, and you're saying I'm not addressing the logic of the argument on the grounds that I'm not skipping the same step that it does.  WTF?

Does the over-the-top rhetoric do something for you?

For reference:
P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

P2 does not conclude "unlikely" as your argument needs. It concludes not plausibly due to chance or necessity. If two of three options are implausible, the third becomes more plausible as a result of the failures of the other two. But you are not arguing the probabilities of chance and cosmological constants. You are arguing:

P1'. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either Chance or Design.
P2'. Design is not probable
C'. Therefore Chance.

Your error is that design is a property that is always inferred from two things: a) the presence of specified complexity (mentioned in P1') --not just complexity and 2) eliminating other possible causes. Your (C') does not follow from the from the premises because you failed to account for design being an inferred property. How do you know that design is not probable without analyzing chance? For P2' to be true, C' would be already assumed. You are question-begging.

Another analogy to show how the property of design is inferred: A large scrabble tile bag with large equal quantities of letters. Your friend said he drew in order the following:

WEHOLDTHESETRUTHSTOBESELFEVIDENTTHATALLMENARECREATEDEQUAL

Are we to believe him? No, we would not. Why? Because of a design inference due to the specified complexity and the very low probability of chance.  How about if he said he drew these?

XERTYHJKIOSYUIODPHOPOQIJNIBQLDKIJXMFLEKDNEVQKBZVSNWYKERLA

It is equally improbable to have drawn this specific string of letters. But, we would believe him. Why? There is no specified complexity and therefore no inference to design.

Quote:And the glass sphere metaphor (or watch, or message in sand, both common variations of that example) is a horrifically faulty analogy.  We have proofs of concept for glass manufacturing, we know that glass products are artificially produced all the time, we see them at stores everywhere with brand names and trademarks of the manufacturers printed on them, we can take classes to learn how to make them ourselves, and I'm sure if I go online it would just take me a few minutes to find just such a product for sale accompanied by a blurb about who they are and maybe even some pictures of them making the product.  I would draw the conclusion that people likely produced the glass sphere because, yes, I know it's not likely to happen just by chance, but ALSO because I actually have preexisting knowledge that people manufacture glass products.  This knowledge that manufactured glass spheres are more common than naturally-occurring glass spheres is an essential element for making this a strong inference, and that knowledge is exactly what we do not possess about the universe.

(Google quickly found me 1m glass spheres for sale.  Being marketed as decorative objects for hotels.)

To emphasize the discrepancy between examining both possibilities and leaving one unexamined, suppose astronomers discover a sphere of glass 10,000,000 meters across floating in interstellar space somewhere.  Would we infer that this was designed? Well, that's planet-sized.  We don't have experience with manufacturing on that scale, or with putting those into interstellar space.  So far we've put exactly TWO object into interstellar space, and both are considerably smaller and less massive.  That's beyond our capabilities.  Why would we go to the effort of making it and putting it there?  It doesn't seem to serve any purpose larger than itself.  We certainly didn't make it.  Aliens, perhaps?  Well, maybe, but we've been looking into the void for a while now and have yet to see any signs of an interstellar civilization, and most of the arguments why we might not have seen one don't mesh with them possessing the motivation, manufacturing capacity, and reach to produce glass planets in interstellar space.  So could it be the result of chance?  Well the present scientific understanding of how planets form involves them coalescing due to gravity from dust and gas, turning molten from the heat of the initial collisions, and settling into spherical shapes under their own weight.  Glass is made of silicon and oxygen, both in the top ten most common elements in the universe, so that has a certain plausibility to it.  So for that sphere, I would infer chance natural processes.  Now maybe you could argue the other way, pointing out some explanation for unseen aliens that would involve them producing glass planets, or pointing out some implausibilities in my idea of how a glass planet might have formed like asking why it wasn't an oblate spheroid instead of a perfect sphere.  But that just proves my larger point.  We'd be weighing the likelihoods and unlikelihoods of BOTH possibilities against each other, and doing so on the basis of a preexisting understanding of what each would entail.  Examining the probability of each is required.  We don't just get to single one out and default to it, unexamined, just because the others seem unlikely.

(And yes, I'm conflating "chance" and "physical necessity", since necessity is just chance with a probability of 1 and it's a bit of a mouthful listing both of them every single time.)

So if you want a found-in-the-woods analogy that actually is analogous to the universe, please pick an item for which we have zero established proofs-of-concept of being designed, no proposed methods by which a design might be implemented, and no apparent purpose for designing and producing it in the first place.  You know, like the universe.

Your counter analogy with a glass planet is useful. Such a planet is plausibly due to chance BECAUSE of the existence of undercutting defeaters you articulated against the idea of design. That is why I asked you earlier if you had reasons to think Design was not possible. But, as you increased the specified complexity of your planet-sized glass sphere, chance would be less plausible and design more likely (i.e. unknown groups of repeating letters scribed around the equator).

There is no such thing as "chance". 
Your argument is at least 50 years old.
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#92

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-09-2020, 09:38 PM)SteveII Wrote: For reference:

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

I haven't been following this thread, so I'm unsure as to what you mean by the term "for reference".

Anyway...

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.  —No.  Presupposition. There may be a 4th cause.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance. —Unknown.  Another presupposition.
C. Therefore, it is due to design. —Not necessarily, although possible.  But not supported by P1 and/or P2.

Argument fails.

(In the branch of linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition is
an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to
an utterance whose truth is taken for granted in discourse.)
I'm a creationist;   I believe that man created God.
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#93

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-10-2020, 07:16 PM)SYZ Wrote:
(11-09-2020, 09:38 PM)SteveII Wrote: For reference:

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

I haven't been following this thread, so I'm unsure as to what you mean by the term "for reference".

Anyway...

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.  —No.  Presupposition. There may be a 4th cause.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance. —Unknown.  Another presupposition.
C. Therefore, it is due to design. —Not necessarily, although possible.  But not supported by P1 and/or P2.

Argument fails.

(In the branch of linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition is
an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to
an utterance whose truth is taken for granted in discourse.)

You know, any premise in any syllogism, by definition, is a summary statement. Each premise may take up to an entire book to support. Answering "presupposition...presupposition...argument fails" only illustrates you don't have a firm grasp on what you feel inclined to comment on.

Regarding "there may be a 4th cause". No, those three cover all the options.
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#94

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
Quote:P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.


Says who, Stevie?  You?

That doesn't count for anything.
Robert G. Ingersoll : “No man with a sense of humor ever founded a religion.”
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#95

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-10-2020, 07:16 PM)SYZ Wrote:
(11-09-2020, 09:38 PM)SteveII Wrote: For reference:

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
C. Therefore, it is due to design.

I haven't been following this thread, so I'm unsure as to what you mean by the term "for reference".

Anyway...

P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.  —No.  Presupposition. There may be a 4th cause.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance. —Unknown.  Another presupposition.
C. Therefore, it is due to design. —Not necessarily, although possible.  But not supported by P1 and/or P2.

Argument fails.

(In the branch of linguistics known as pragmatics, a presupposition is
an implicit assumption about the world or background belief relating to
an utterance whose truth is taken for granted in discourse.)

There may also be a 5th, 6th, and 7th cause, etc. 
The fact is we know that order arises spontaneously. 
What we don't know is why the order we detect (so far) arises in the way it does. Ultimate reality in what is observed so far, (the Quantum level) does not appear designed.
There are also significant "misses" observed from what would expect to see in a "designed" universe. They argue against any design. Design is not a good theory. It does not fit with what is observed.
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#96

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-10-2020, 08:33 PM)SteveII Wrote:
(11-10-2020, 07:16 PM)SYZ Wrote: P1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.  —No.  Presupposition. There may be a 4th cause.
P2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance. —Unknown.  Another presupposition.
C. Therefore, it is due to design. —Not necessarily, although possible.  But not supported by P1 and/or P2.

Argument fails.

You know, any premise in any syllogism, by definition, is a summary statement. Each premise may take up to an entire book to support. Answering "presupposition...presupposition...argument fails" only illustrates you don't have a firm grasp on what you feel inclined to comment on.

Regarding "there may be a 4th cause". No, those three cover all the options.

Not so.  You have no supporting evidence in order to make that claim.  

And your choice of the presupposed "design" option is simply another iteration of favouring
the "God" argument, or the ever-handy deus ex machina if you like.    "Design" indeed, LOL.

Your argument fails a second time.    Sorry.
I'm a creationist;   I believe that man created God.
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#97

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-10-2020, 08:33 PM)SteveII Wrote: Regarding "there may be a 4th cause". No, those three cover all the options.

No, they don't.
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#98

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-10-2020, 08:33 PM)SteveII Wrote: Regarding "there may be a 4th cause". No, those three cover all the options.

Wrong again. Not because you say so. This thread is about good arguments, not about unsupported assertions, which apparently you think the premises of arguments can be.
Turns out, I guess, you really know nothing about making logical arguments.
However long or complex, you have to be prepared to support your premises. You didn't even try. If you can't, they are nothing more than unsupported assertions. 
You're also wrong in your attempt to reject the objections to your presuppositionalism. In this case, it's simply pointing out the unspoken assumptions which make your premises invalid and incomplete in the first place. 

Random mutations arise which can give rise to new traits, but evolution does not depend on these to create organisms, proteins or other natural changes, you claim are "designed". In fact it is natural selection, which is the the principal mechanism of evolution, which uses nonrandom change by preserving adaptive changes and eliminating nonadaptive ones. That is not "chance", far from it, --- random occurances do happen, which over time, can be assigned a probability. If the forces of selection stay the same, natural selection can push evolution in one direction and produce sophisticated structures in surprisingly short times. The Design argument, and assigning one possiblility as "chance" is false, is ignorant of change and evolution, and deliberately uses the word "chance" to dumb down and purposely dishonestly misrepresent the actual process which leads to change, and complex systems, ... al totally without any design or deities. Your presises are incomplete, and thus your argument is completely flawed and incomplete.
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#99

Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-11-2020, 03:45 AM)Bucky Ball Wrote:
(11-10-2020, 08:33 PM)SteveII Wrote: Regarding "there may be a 4th cause". No, those three cover all the options.

Wrong again. Not because you say so. This thread is about good arguments, not about unsupported assertions, which apparently you think the premises of arguments can be.
Turns out, I guess, you really know nothing about making logical arguments.
However long or complex, you have to be prepared to support your premises. You didn't even try. If you can't, they are nothing more than unsupported assertions. 
You're also wrong in your attempt to reject the objections to your presuppositionalism. In this case, it's simply pointing out the unspoken assumptions which make your premises invalid and incomplete in the first place. 

Random mutations arise which can give rise to new traits, but evolution does not depend on these to create organisms, proteins or other natural changes, you claim are "designed". In fact it is natural selection, which is the the principal mechanism of evolution, which uses nonrandom change by preserving adaptive changes and eliminating nonadaptive ones. That is not "chance", far from it,  --- random occurances do happen, which over time, can be assigned a probability. If the forces of selection stay the same, natural selection can push evolution in one direction and produce sophisticated structures in surprisingly short times. The Design argument, and assigning one possiblility as "chance" is false, is ignorant of change and evolution, and deliberately uses the word "chance" to dumb down and purposely dishonestly misrepresent the actual process which leads to change, and complex systems, ... al totally without any design or deities. Your presises are incomplete, and thus your argument is completely flawed and incomplete.

I was discussing the logical construction of the argument with Reltzik --not actually making the argument the OP brought up and Reltzik was criticizing. The fact that you cannot tell the difference makes your criticism "you really know nothing about making logical arguments" suspect.

Regarding the evolution tangent--I have no clue how you think that provides a fourth option for the initial conditions of the universe. In addition, I'm confused by your disjointed and contradictory points. Two posts ago you say "there is no such thing as chance" and then you bring up how natural selection (a key component of evolutionary theory) acts on chance mutations as the primary source of evolutionary change. This is even more confusing because you often cite Sean Carroll as a source. Have you read his paper "Chance and Necessity: the evolution of morphological complexity and diversity"? It is more than a little humorous that he characterized natural selection as a 'necessary' process--so actually mentions two of the three possibilities of my premise as the core concepts of your example that YOU bring up to prove me wrong!

Seems to me the Fine-Tuning argument has survived your assault just fine.
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Good Arguments (Certainty vs. Probability)
(11-11-2020, 10:00 PM)SteveII Wrote: I was discussing the logical construction of the argument with Reltzik --not actually making the argument the OP brought up and Reltzik was criticizing. The fact that you cannot tell the difference makes your criticism "you really know nothing about making logical arguments" suspect. 

Nice try at evasion. YOU SAID that you don't have to defend your premises because they might be too lengthy. (LOL) 
THAT IS about "the logical construction of the argument". 

Quote: The fact that you cannot tell the difference makes your criticism "you really know nothing about making logical arguments" suspect.
 

Your response proves my point. 

Quote:Regarding the evolution tangent--I have no clue how you think that provides a fourth option for the initial conditions of the universe.  
 

It doesn't. It INVALIDATES your "chance" premise. 

Quote: In addition, I'm confused by your disjointed and contradictory points. Two posts ago you say "there is no such thing as chance" and then you bring up how natural selection (a key component of evolutionary theory) acts on chance mutations ...

Actually I said "random mutations", and I also said every event has a probability .... the meaning of which obviously went over your head. 
I said natural election was the primary source of evolutionary change. 

Quote:This is even more confusing because you often cite Sean Carroll as a source. Have you read his paper "Chance and Necessity: the evolution of morphological complexity and diversity"? It is more than a little humorous that he characterized natural selection as a 'necessary' process--so actually mentions two of the three possibilities of my premise as the core concepts of your example that YOU bring up to prove me wrong!

It's not at all confusing, Stevie. And he doesn't, and you know it. 
The ONLY thing I cited Carroll about was the fact that he pointed out to WLC that using logic without naming which one ... in light of the fact there are many, and some,  while being used perfectly internally consistently, do not obtain in reality. You must demonstrate your logic applies to the subject of the discussion. Carroll agrees with what I JUST said, and that which you attempted to twist. For evolution to work the way we understand it, natural selection IS necessary ... but it's not the necessity you named, and you know it ... you also never defined here yet again in this argument, you terms. You never defined "necessity", or "chance" or "design". You probeably should take a beginning Logic class, and learn how to construct an argument. The "fine tuning" argument fails again, as it always has and always will. In order for a "design" argument to work, you FIRST must establish that there is a possible designer, otherwise it's not a valid inference, just a made up pile of rubbish that come from religious presupposition, and is no more valid than saying a 4th possibility is the Pink Sparkly Unicorn.

You also have failed to address the main problem today with the Fine Tuning argument. (You also failed here AGAIN, in failing to say what you even mean by "fine tuning". You also didn't say what this supposed "fine tuning' is fine-tuned for. Was it "fine-tuned" for all the 99 % of all species that ever existed that are now extinct ?
We know order arises spontaneously in this universe, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chaos_theory thus there actually no reason to even make a fine tuning argument. You have the answer to the question already, ... or at least one who is educated about how order arises spontaneously, does.

The argument is also unnecessary, theologically. Faith (or at least Christian faith) according to their theology, does not arise from "arguments". It's a gift of their god. If one is a Christian, there is not need or reason for this (supposed) argument. 

It's obvious why you claim the argument survives. You really have no knowledge base to work with in examining it.
It's LONG been established in Biochemistry, that the basics of life and complex organisms can and do assemble themselves, under perfectly natural conditions, as the Nobel winner and his Harvard team have (among others) established.

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