Consciousness

[Alan V]

However, I think there is a lack of precision in language, which leads to completely ignoring a phenomenological problem, either I'm mistaken in believing such a problem exists, or I haven't been able to communicate the uncanny problem to you. So I try again:

1. High-level processes, be it conscious or unconscious, have top-down causal effects, true.
2. According to the evidence mentioned in post #184 conscious processes have different roles and characteristics compared to unconscious processes, however, there is a considerable overlap
3. Thinking and planning are processes, they indeed process information and are indeed causally effective
4. Consciousness is highly correlated with memory, true

But does it mean phenomenal awareness in itself is causally effective? In my understanding, no, it only says conscious processes are causally effective, it also says, phenomental awareness is correlated with some functions and processes. It doesn't say anything about the effectiveness of phenomenal awareness.

An analogy:

When you throw the bowling ball, if it is a good throw, you carefully watch it until it hits the targets, if it's not a good throw you will not pay attention.

Does it mean your conscious attention is causally effective in what happens after the throw? No.

It merely shows your heightened consciousness is correlated with a good throw.

Similarly, the evidence only suggests consciousness is correlated with certain processes. Whenever there are certain processes in the brain, it happens that the subject is phenomenally aware of those processes. It doesn't show consciousness in itself, plays any role.

How can we possibly provide evidence for the effectiveness of phenomenal awareness? 

The scientists must look at process P in the brain in two different conditions:
1) The subject is not phenomenally aware of P
2) The subject is phenomenally aware of P - the exact same P

If (2) performs differently from (1), it means phenomenal awareness is effective.

That's why I'm saying it sounds magical to me, to say phenomenal awareness in itself is effective, is like saying your heightened attention to follow the ball after making a good throw influences the bowling ball.

I don't think this problem is as hard as you seem to.  You can compare the performance of two groups of people bowling, one group with their eyes open and the other with their eyes shut.  Immediately, you prove that a certain minimum amount of consciousness is essential to good performance.  You also track improvement over time with and without awareness of how the ball moves after letting it go, and compare the two.  Paying attention to how the ball moves after you let it go improves future performance, since people can refine their movements based on the feedback.  Those are both important reasons we pay attention to what we are doing.

Consciousness is always time-delayed compared to instincts, emotions, and physical actions.  It uses more brain circuitry so it's slower.  So we depend on pre-established habits for almost everything we do.  But you have to look at the specific role consciousness plays in making habits to begin with, and refining performance over time, as well as monitoring performance during its execution. 

As for the communication problem, as I see it most all brain functions can be conscious or unconscious in their execution.  That's why the signatures of consciousness are so important.  Scientists can actually tell when consciousness is involved and what affects it has.

It could be that phenomenal states are largely vestigial remains of systems which were much more important earlier in our evolutionary history, per the kluged-brain idea I mentioned.  After all, we spend a lot of our time fighting them to do what we know is better.

[Hussein]

one group with their eyes open and the other with their eyes shut.  Immediately, you prove that a certain minimum amount of consciousness is essential to good performance.

I don't think we can attribute it to consciousness, the visual sensory inputs are received by the brain and lots of processes are invoked, those processes are essential to good performance, that's all that can be said. The fact that a small subset of those processes are conscious does not tell us anything about the effectiveness of consciousness itself. It only tells us consciousness is correlated with those processes, no causal relationship can be inferred.

Paying attention to how the ball moves after you let it go improves future performance since people can refine their movements based on the feedback.

Sure, conscious attention is effective, does it mean "conscious"ness is effective? I don't think so, it says attention is highly correlated with consciousness. 

White pills are effective, does it mean "white"ness is effective? No, it says pills are highly correlated with whiteness.  

But you have to look at the specific role consciousness plays in making habits to begin with

I can't say consciousness plays any roles, conscious processes do, all I can say is those processes are entangled and corrleated with consciousness. They usually attract the attention, but it is not clear for me that consciousness plays any role at all. In fact, my intuition tells me the body doesn't need the consciousness at all, it is fully capable of handling everything unconsciously  , sleepwalking is a good evidence the body is capable of doing all the talking, walking, driving, eating and all that without consciousness. 

as I see it most all brain functions can be conscious or unconscious in their execution

That sounds right to me 

Scientists can actually tell when consciousness is involved and what affects it has.

They can say consciousness is correlated with some processes more than others. Can they infer causality of consciousness? I don't think so.

[DLJ]

@Alan V,

Is this analogy pertinent? 

Would it help to imagine a Board Meeting of the Governing Body of an organisation?

The discussion of the prioritised indicators observed on the Governance Dashboard = consciousness
The Governance Dashboard = perceived (conscious) reality
The decisions made by the board give direction to Management who via incentives and penalties instruct and align Operations in the desired direction.
Operations however, will continue on their own sweet path following their own operational monitoring instruments even while the Governing Body is meeting to discuss priorities.

Which is why you can be thinking (consciously) about that email you have to write tomorrow at work and then suddenly notice that you are standing in the kitchen staring in to the fridge. 

Consciousness (the meeting) is not causal.  The directives emerging from the meeting are indirectly causal.

[Alan V]

I think you both overlook the fact that consciousness plays a more immediate role as well. The delay for conscious processing is only a few seconds at most. That means as long as you have that time, you can reflect on your possible actions and choose whichever seems to fit your circumstances best. Think of a golfer finessing the next shot. He collects information, compares it with stored memories, consults with his caddie, selects the best club, practices the shot, and takes the shot. His consciousness is intensely involved, even if he has a lot of experience, exactly because performance at a high level requires more than mere automatic behaviors.

That's not to say that the pro exercises his consciousness the same way an amateur does, because he has a whole lot more experience and muscle memory to rely on. But he still can't afford to operate entirely on automatic to win at higher levels of competition. Consciousness is all about choosing the most optimal actions for specific perceived circumstances out of the whole repertoire.

I have tried to emphasize several times how conscious and unconscious processes work together as one system. The science I have read upholds that idea. I have no clear notion where the resistance to that idea even comes from. We have subjective experiences because we are bodies with brains and things happen directly to us. Such experiences can be pleasurable or painful, and thus encouraging or discouraging. But subjective states also provide us with the information we need to make pertinent decisions. Consciousness selects out what to emphasize for whatever purposes.

Things are what they seem until proven otherwise. To me that means anyone saying otherwise has the burden of proof, not me.

[DLJ]

...
He collects information, compares it with stored memories, consults with his caddie, selects the best club, practices the shot, and takes the shot. 
...

That doesn't contradict the analogy.  It supports it. 

[Hussein]

Consciousness (the meeting) is not causal.  The directives emerging from the meeting are indirectly causal.

If the directives "emerge" from the meeting, doesn't it mean the meeting is causal?

Meeting is the cause of directives -> Therefore meeting (consciousness) is causal

[DLJ]

Consciousness (the meeting) is not causal.  The directives emerging from the meeting are indirectly causal.

If the directives "emerge" from the meeting, doesn't it mean the meeting is causal?

Meeting is the cause of directives -> Therefore meeting (consciousness) is causal

Dunno.  Is a sieve or a filter causal?

[Hussein]

Dunno.  Is a sieve or a filter causal?

It depends on definitions, but I think your analogy supports a causal interpretation, let's take this typical definition:

An event E causally depends on C if, and only if, (i) if C had occurred, then E would have occurred, and (ii) if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred.

Directives causally depend on meeting if, and only if, (i) if the meeting had occurred then directives would have occurred, and (ii) if the meeting had not occurred, then directives would not have occurred.

I do not believe (ii) is true about consciousness, so I do not believe consciousness is causal.

ETA: Also I do not believe (i) is true, non-intentional consciousness is possible. A state of consciousness without any conscious directives.

[DLJ]

Dunno.  Is a sieve or a filter causal?

It depends on definitions, but I think your analogy supports a causal interpretation, let's take this typical definition:

An event E causally depends on C if, and only if, (i) if C had occurred, then E would have occurred, and (ii) if C had not occurred, then E would not have occurred.

Directives causally depend on meeting if, and only if, (i) if the meeting had occurred then directives would have occurred, and (ii) if the meeting had not occurred, then directives would not have occurred.

I do not believe (ii) is true about consciousness, so I do not believe consciousness is causal.

ETA: Also I do not believe (i) is true, non-intentional consciousness is possible. A state of consciousness without any conscious directives.

Yup.  I have more of an issue with (i) than I do with (ii)

[Hussein]

Yup.  I have more of an issue with (i) than I do with (ii)

I think (ii) is also problematic, sleepwalking largely supports the negation of (ii) there are all kinds of directives for talking, walking, driving, eating, etc. but no consciousness.

[Hussein]

Yup.  I have more of an issue with (i) than I do with (ii)

I think you can improve your analogy by emphasizing there can be meetings without any purpose to issue directives 

[DLJ]

Yup.  I have more of an issue with (i) than I do with (ii)

I think (ii) is also problematic, sleepwalking largely supports the negation of (ii) there are all kinds of directives for talking, walking, driving, eating, etc. but no consciousness.

Oh right.  In a previous discussion with @Alan V I had posted some of the models I have using for my thesis (for want of a better word).  I was using the word 'directive' in a specific sense as per those models i.e. the one above where it says "Direct".... as a Governance term rather than a Management or Operations term.

In the case of sleepwalking (or even being awake and thinking about other stuff and finding yourself in the kitchen staring at the fridge) the Management and Operational processes are still active.

I'm musing on your point (i) above.  Some meetings produce no directives.  I'm wondering whether "no change" counts as a directive.  

But I'm seeing "meeting" as "being awake" which is not the same as consciousness in that consciousness, to me, is equivalent to what happens in the meeting, a process (the discussion of the prioritised indicators observed on the Governance Dashboard) rather than the meeting itself.  Thus it might equate to the word "Evaluate" and the word "Direct" would equate to "will" (or won't)

[DLJ]

Yup.  I have more of an issue with (i) than I do with (ii)

I think you can improve your analogy by emphasizing there can be meetings without any purpose to issue directives 

Indeed

[Hussein]

Oh right.  In a previous discussion with @Alan V I had posted some of the models I have using for my thesis (for want of a better word).  I was using the word 'directive' in a specific sense as per those models i.e. the one above where it says "Direct".... as a Governance term rather than a Management or Operations term.

In the case of sleepwalking (or even being awake and thinking about other stuff and finding yourself in the kitchen staring at the fridge) the Management and Operational processes are still active.


But I'm seeing "meeting" as "being awake" which is not the same as consciousness in that consciousness, to me, is equivalent to what happens in the meeting, a process (the discussion of the prioritised indicators observed on the Governance Dashboard) rather than the meeting itself.  Thus it might equate to the word "Evaluate" and the word "Direct" would equate to "will" (or won't)

I see, our definitions are a bit different, so if there is a silent meeting, there is wakefulness but no consciousness? right?

I'm musing on your point (i) above.  Some meetings produce no directives.  I'm wondering whether "no change" counts as a directive.  

Hmmm...that's something to ponder upon.

ETA: Some thoughts...I would say the silent meeting is passive, it doesn't enforce a "no change" policy, there is no mechanism to enforce it, so it wouldn't be accurate to say it is a "directive", they simply observe as the Management and Operation teams do their work.

[Hussein]

I have tried to emphasize several times how conscious and unconscious processes work together as one system.  The science I have read upholds that idea.  I have no clear notion where the resistance to that idea even comes from.  We have subjective experiences because we are bodies with brains and things happen directly to us.  Such experiences can be pleasurable or painful, and thus encouraging or discouraging.  But subjective states also provide us with the information we need to make pertinent decisions.  Consciousness selects out what to emphasize for whatever purposes.

The resistance comes from this reasoning:

causality of conscious processes => causality of consciousness itself

For me, it's not that easy, all I can see is:

causality of conscious processes => consciousness is correlated with causal processes

Things are what they seem until proven otherwise.  To me that means anyone saying otherwise has the burden of proof, not me.

What it seems is that we are willful and our will is causal, it doesn't seem to me my consciousness is causal, I distinguish willfulness and consciousness, you seem to see those two as one. In fact, the exact opposite is what it seems to me, consciousness is passively watching as I utilize my will.

It must have been annoying for you to repeat your points, but it was a great opportunity for me to learn a bit about the global workspace framework, and I appreciate your time for sharing the insights, I just got an ebook version of Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts, I'll do some reading and will inform you if I had a chance to understand the issue deeper.

[DLJ]

...
so if there is a silent meeting, there is wakefulness but no consciousness? right?
...

Yeah, I think I've been that drunk.

And Operational processes can still function... and that's where babies come from.

[Alan V]

What it seems is that we are willful and our will is causal, it doesn't seem to me my consciousness is causal, I distinguish willfulness and consciousness, you seem to see those two as one. In fact, the exact opposite is what it seems to me, consciousness is passively watching as I utilize my will.

How does will work?  It works by focus, selection, emphasis, obsessiveness -- in other words, awareness.  Yes, consciousness can be passive, but that's not the primary function it was evolved for.  Any pressing need focuses our attention very quickly.

Consider a tiger hunting in the tall grass.  It is focused.  It selects out the target most likely to provide it with a meal.  If it becomes distracted by the movement of the herd, it may lose its target.

Many of us in the modern world, where our needs are largely provided for us, lose track of what the world was like when our specific abilities evolved.  They can therefore seem more puzzling than they really are.

[Alan V]

I think (ii) is also problematic, sleepwalking largely supports the negation of (ii) there are all kinds of directives for talking, walking, driving, eating, etc. but no consciousness.

Some sleepwalkers have eaten cigarette sandwiches or performed other misfiring behaviors.  There was even one case of a sleep murder where the murderer was acquitted because he didn't know what he was doing.  He was aghast at what had happened after he woke up.

Let's say you are sleepwalking, get in your car, and start driving somewhere.  If you come to your senses, you don't continue to your chosen destination.  You turn around, go home, and go back to bed.  This underscores the monitoring role of consciousness.

[Dānu]

I think you both overlook the fact that consciousness plays a more immediate role as well.  The delay for conscious processing is only a few seconds at most.  That means as long as you have that time, you can reflect on your possible actions and choose whichever seems to fit your circumstances best.  Think of a golfer finessing the next shot.  He collects information, compares it with stored memories, consults with his caddie, selects the best club, practices the shot, and takes the shot.  His consciousness is intensely involved, even if he has a lot of experience, exactly because performance at a high level requires more than mere automatic behaviors.

I'm not sure that gets around the problem of causality, at least if I'm reading this correctly. The problem is how does mental phenomenon exert a causal influence in the immediate present. Saying that it connects the immediate present up and then exerts a causal effect later simply replaces one particular now with a different now, the first in which the alternatives that one might effect are immediately presented in perception or phenomenal awareness, the second in which the alternatives that one might affect are immediately presented in awareness of memories of prior events. Either way, if consciousness and mental events aren't epihenomenal, there must be some evidence of immediate causality, as inserting a delay doesn't escape that problem.

As long as I'm posting, I'll mention a couple of things that occur to me. The first is that we can't categorically state that unconscious processes are different from conscious processes in lacking phenomenal awareness because the evidence of phenomenal awareness depends upon that system being able to interact with the world through memory, speech, action, and so on. A relevant example is the case in which split-brain subjects have one hemisphere that is able to respond by pointing, but not through speech, as that hemisphere does not contain the necessary speech centers. How do we determine or conclude that such a hemisphere does or does not possess phenomenal awareness based upon its ability to point? How would we determine it lacks phenomenal awareness? It may be possible that all causally effective mentitions, whether "conscious" or "unconscious" possess a similar structure in terms of what they are, and how they do it, but merely be unaware of that similarity because certain of those causal mentitions are mute and unable to contribute interactions with the environment which give evidence that they are similar.

The other is a point that concerns me in general in these discussions and that is the whole question of whether phenomenal awareness is even a thing. I know that in dreaming, my consciousness is presented with qualities and such which likely cannot exist, yet my consciousness "believes" that these qualities are real because there is no check on what it believes -- consciousness of these unreal qualities is not contradicted or doubted as there's nothing independent of the consciousness experiencing them to voice an objection. So I think that it's possible that phenomenal awareness is a model of an event or phenomenon, like the unreal qualities, that phenomenal awareness may simply exist as a construct which brain processes have created and "believe" when in fact the brain that is actually processing this model or construct does not actually have any of the qualities or traits assigned to this construct. Thus I think it's possible that, like impossible states in dreaming, phenomenal awareness may be nothing more than an imaginary construct which our brain processes have assigned a degree of ontological validity or accepted existence to, but which doesn't reflect an actual "thing" in the brain any more than my memory of the taste of an apple means that there is an apple in my brain. Consciousness might simply be a useful hallucination, a model, made of nothing but data, which solves some computational problem in the brain. (Synesthesia is a useful example here. Some synesthetes experience numbers as having qualities like sound or color or warmth, yet numbers themselves obviously don't possess these qualities. The brain of the synesthete is associating these qualities with the number, experiencing them as real, even though it's unlikely that there is an actual phenomenon that corresponds to these qualities. In my example, phenomenal awareness and the other qualities we associate with consciousness may be like the blueness of the number 7 which a synesthete experiences -- something the synesthete's brain tells it is real and exists but which actually is purely an imaginary construct of the synesthete's brain.)

[Mark]

I'm not sure that gets around the problem of causality, at least if I'm reading this correctly.  The problem is how does mental phenomenon exert a causal influence in the immediate present.

Why should mental phenomenon be needed to exert causal influence?  Even at the level of single celled creatures there is purposeful action.  At first it might seem that chemical or physical states simply trigger the action with nothing corresponding to mental phenomena intervening.  But another level of description is that the organism has learned to recognize (chemically or physically) certain patterns which prompt a response.  Evolution will reward the creature best able to recognize the most salient patterns and to spend energy in response only to those.  So the capacity for causal action comes first and refining the capacity for recognizing significant patterns of stimuli and learning to inhibit impulsive responses accordingly come after.  Our intellectual capacity is an outgrowth of the need for recognizing significant pattern of stimuli.  It doesn't directly cause action.  Rather our mental capacity has evolved to inhibit or prompt our innate responsiveness, as one link in our pre-existing creaturely capacity for action.  Our intellect has broadened the scope of its concerns but it has never been the sole source for significant stimuli recognition.  There are inbuilt redundancies built up over the eons of evolution which shape what we do as organisms.

[Alan V]

I'm not sure that gets around the problem of causality, at least if I'm reading this correctly.  The problem is how does mental phenomenon exert a causal influence in the immediate present.  Saying that it connects the immediate present up and then exerts a causal effect later simply replaces one particular now with a different now, the first in which the alternatives that one might effect are immediately presented in perception or phenomenal awareness, the second in which the alternatives that one might affect are immediately presented in awareness of memories of prior events.  Either way, if consciousness and mental events aren't epihenomenal, there must be some evidence of immediate causality, as inserting a delay doesn't escape that problem.

That consciousness operates on a bit of a delay isn't a real problem if what we are doing is slow enough to allow for such slower reaction times.  Situations will not have changed so fast that our delayed reactions are no longer relevant.  But if we are playing ping pong, we are likely depending entirely on our habitual reflexes.  So I guess I'm saying I don't understand your problem with conscious causality.

As long as I'm posting, I'll mention a couple of things that occur to me.  The first is that we can't categorically state that unconscious processes are different from conscious processes in lacking phenomenal awareness because the evidence of phenomenal awareness depends upon that system being able to interact with the world through memory, speech, action, and so on.  A relevant example is the case in which split-brain subjects have one hemisphere that is able to respond by pointing, but not through speech, as that hemisphere does not contain the necessary speech centers.  How do we determine or conclude that such a hemisphere does or does not possess phenomenal awareness based upon its ability to point?  How would we determine it lacks phenomenal awareness?  It may be possible that all causally effective mentitions, whether "conscious" or "unconscious" possess a similar structure in terms of what they are, and how they do it, but merely be unaware of that similarity because certain of those causal mentitions are mute and unable to contribute interactions with the environment which give evidence that they are similar.

Research has shown that people register and react to subliminal information to a certain extent, proving that even unconscious processes experience subjective states (post #184).  Really, scientists define consciousness by what people say they are conscious of, not by what their brains react to.  That's just the definition they are using. It's just that such subjective reports correlate with specific brain activities, grounding them objectively.

The other is a point that concerns me in general in these discussions and that is the whole question of whether phenomenal awareness is even a thing.  I know that in dreaming, my consciousness is presented with qualities and such which likely cannot exist, yet my consciousness "believes" that these qualities are real because there is no check on what it believes -- consciousness of these unreal qualities is not contradicted or doubted as there's nothing independent of the consciousness experiencing them to voice an objection.  So I think that it's possible that phenomenal awareness is a model of an event or phenomenon, like the unreal qualities, that phenomenal awareness may simply exist as a construct which brain processes have created and "believe" when in fact the brain that is actually processing this model or construct does not actually have any of the qualities or traits assigned to this construct.  Thus I think it's possible that, like impossible states in dreaming, phenomenal awareness may be nothing more than an imaginary construct which our brain processes have assigned a degree of ontological validity or accepted existence to, but which doesn't reflect an actual "thing" in the brain any more than my memory of the taste of an apple means that there is an apple in my brain.  Consciousness might simply be a useful hallucination, a model, made of nothing but data, which solves some computational problem in the brain.  (Synesthesia is a useful example here.  Some synesthetes experience numbers as having qualities like sound or color or warmth, yet numbers themselves obviously don't possess these qualities.  The brain of the synesthete is associating these qualities with the number, experiencing them as real, even though it's unlikely that there is an actual phenomenon that corresponds to these qualities.  In my example, phenomenal awareness and the other qualities we associate with consciousness may be like the blueness of the number 7 which a synesthete experiences -- something the synesthete's brain tells it is real and exists but which actually is purely an imaginary construct of the synesthete's brain.)

I think the research has clearly shown that we respond to what is in our head rather than directly to what is "out there."  Our brain creates a virtual reality simulation for its own purposes, which has certain information pre-selected and emphasized.  Our emotional responses are like the musical soundtracks in movies, cuing us on how to interpret what we are experiencing.  Of course, the argument is that unless those models are accurate to whatever extent, they are not adaptive.  So evolution should have selected for both accuracy and salience.

Our dreaming shows that virtual reality simulation process spinning its stories minus the grounding of waking awareness and a working memory.

[Alan V]

I'm not sure that gets around the problem of causality, at least if I'm reading this correctly.  The problem is how does mental phenomenon exert a causal influence in the immediate present.

Why should mental phenomenon be needed to exert causal influence?  Even at the level of single celled creatures there is purposeful action.  At first it might seem that chemical or physical states simply trigger the action with nothing corresponding to mental phenomena intervening.  But another level of description is that the organism has learned to recognize (chemically or physically) certain patterns which prompt a response.  Evolution will reward the creature best able to recognize the most salient patterns and to spend energy in response only to those.  So the capacity for causal action comes first and refining the capacity for recognizing significant patterns of stimuli and learning to inhibit impulsive responses accordingly come after.  Our intellectual capacity is an outgrowth of the need for recognizing significant pattern of stimuli.  It doesn't directly cause action.  Rather our mental capacity has evolved to inhibit or prompt our innate responsiveness, as one link in our pre-existing creaturely capacity for action.  Our intellect has broadened the scope of its concerns but it has never been the sole source for significant stimuli recognition.  There are inbuilt redundancies built up over the eons of evolution which shape what we do as organisms.

The more complex the creature and the wider its repertoire of potential reactions is, the more developed its awareness will be because awareness is all about fitting responses to circumstances.  That matching of responses to circumstances, based on the awareness of circumstances, has causal consequences.

[Mark]

I'm not sure that gets around the problem of causality, at least if I'm reading this correctly.  The problem is how does mental phenomenon exert a causal influence in the immediate present.

Why should mental phenomenon be needed to exert causal influence?  Even at the level of single celled creatures there is purposeful action.  At first it might seem that chemical or physical states simply trigger the action with nothing corresponding to mental phenomena intervening.  But another level of description is that the organism has learned to recognize (chemically or physically) certain patterns which prompt a response.  Evolution will reward the creature best able to recognize the most salient patterns and to spend energy in response only to those.  So the capacity for causal action comes first and refining the capacity for recognizing significant patterns of stimuli and learning to inhibit impulsive responses accordingly come after.  Our intellectual capacity is an outgrowth of the need for recognizing significant pattern of stimuli.  It doesn't directly cause action.  Rather our mental capacity has evolved to inhibit or prompt our innate responsiveness, as one link in our pre-existing creaturely capacity for action.  Our intellect has broadened the scope of its concerns but it has never been the sole source for significant stimuli recognition.  There are inbuilt redundancies built up over the eons of evolution which shape what we do as organisms.

The more complex the creature and the wider its repertoire of potential reactions is, the more developed its awareness will be because awareness is all about fitting responses to circumstances.  That matching of responses to circumstances, based on the awareness of circumstances, has causal consequences.

It is kind of humorous to see this mind which has arisen as part of the sensory processing capacity of the organism develop so much independence that it can wonder how it is able to move the body around - forgetting that motility isn't and never was its department.

[Alan V]

It is kind of humorous to see this mind which has arisen as part of the sensory processing capacity of the organism develop so much independence that it can wonder how it is able to move the body around - forgetting that motility isn't and never was its department.

Not all parts of the brain communicate well with each other, and some kinds of skills, especially motor functions, confound verbal analysis anyway.  I can say I know I'm doing it, but can't explain how exactly.  Perhaps scientists will reduce it all to their own language someday, just by describing the relay of information, processing, and impulses through various specialized locations in the brain.

[Mark]

It is kind of humorous to see this mind which has arisen as part of the sensory processing capacity of the organism develop so much independence that it can wonder how it is able to move the body around - forgetting that motility isn't and never was its department.

Not all parts of the brain communicate well with each other, and some kinds of skills, especially motor functions, confound verbal analysis anyway.

When doing things like defusing a bomb, which require simple discrete actions.  Inhibiting all other actions is a fine approach.  But for athletics, one does better to visualize the intended ski run or whatever and then get the analytic mind out of the way.  Make it an observer rather than a determiner.  Same for dancing and music.

I can say I know I'm doing it, but can't explain how exactly.rocessing, and impulses through various specialized locations in the brain.

Speaking on behalf of the organism whose sensory experience you process, of course "you" do it.  But do you also beat your heart somehow and raise and lower your blood pressure as required or carefully monitor your balance at all times?  In your capacity as chief sensory monitor, you are part of the linkage which results in the movement of your limbs.  You recognize the desirability of the move in response to a pattern you've detected and you aren't inhibiting the movement for some over riding reason which you also recognize, so the limb moves.  But no direct control is required.  The organism for which you speak stands ready to respond to its environment by way of your interpretation of threats and opportunities.  I doubt if there is really much more to it than that.  I know you don't imagine any kind of homunculus pulling levers and steering wheels between your ears any more than I do.