Does free will exist?

[Dom]

From my perspective, arguing in favor of free will is difficult enough without resorting to such speculations.

I am still of the opinion that it's not a question of whether or not. It's a question of how much. But this goes against most positions in this thread.

I find it all very interesting though, albeit I have a much different perspective. I don't think it is possible to separate other animals from human ones in this aspect, because evolution plays a huge part in all of this.

[Alan V]

I am still of the opinion that it's not a question of whether or not. It's a question of how much. But this goes against most positions in this thread.

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

[Dānu]

I am still of the opinion that it's not a question of whether or not. It's a question of how much. But this goes against most positions in this thread.

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

Weren't you leaving?

[Dom]

I am still of the opinion that it's not a question of whether or not. It's a question of how much. But this goes against most positions in this thread.

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

Haha, that's the problem with long, old threads and old brains. I am hard up to remember what all everyone said.

[Dom]

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

Weren't you leaving?

We keep revolving doors here. 

[emjay]

I am still of the opinion that it's not a question of whether or not. It's a question of how much. But this goes against most positions in this thread.

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

This seems to be very illustrative of what I was meaning by us all operating from different perspectives and even definitions of free will it would seem. So what you guys are talking about right now, is one such perspective/definition, ie contrasting the experience of choice, conscious reasoning, planning etc with animals that are assumed not to have it, or have it to differing degrees... so that's one use of the word 'free' in a definition of free will ie freedom in contrast to instinctual or automatic (from a first person perspective) processes. That's generally not what I'm talking about when I'm talking about free will, but rather the altogether much more reductionistic, freedom/or not of that process itself, in terms of being reducable to scientific laws, and thus deterministic.

So I understand if you don't find my perspective on this relatable, and are not interested in discussing it, but if you are, I think your answer to one question would really help me understand not only your position but also your perspective, and that is, as an emergentist (and I'm reserving any judgement on that until I've read this book, which will be a long way off, and probably require several passes as well, as it is very technical and complicated), do you consider the emergent phenomenal consciousness to be a process/system? Ie reducible to some set of laws, even if they are emergent laws 'supplemental' to physical laws. Or do you consider it... ie what emerges... to be in some sense 'acausal'? Ie to me the theistic concept of a spirit or soul responsible for our choices, is what I would call 'acausal' in this sense, in contrast to the self and the machinery of consciousness, whether following physical or emergent laws, viewed as a system/process, and therefore determined, in that sense.

[Rhythmcs]

From my perspective, arguing in favor of free will is difficult enough without resorting to such speculations.

Speculations?  That other animals are also sentient?  That they plan, that they dream?  I think that it's far more difficult to argue for free will when we peel it back everytime it's pointed out that something other than a human being does the x we refer to as free willing. Is the problem that an animal is doing it, or that we actually don't think the thing x is free willing after all? At some point you just have to throw up your hands and realize that this sort of inconsistency is lethal to the proposition of free will. That we're not talking about free willing at all. That it really is just a term being used to denote "things we think we do that make us special when we do it". Which is fine, obvs,, there's alot we do that makes us special, just like everything else. We just don't think anything else is special when it does what we do. We would think like that, though, right? Thinking ape thinks thinking ape is great and everything else is pants!

I long to find a person who posits that we have free will and that it's x..who actually believes it when they posit that. Honestly, even if that free will is accomplished by some ghostly mechanism or process, because that, at least, represents an earnest belief in the genuine article. Your concerns here, as odd as they are to me, on their own grounds assert that when other things exhibit said x's.... they are still bio-automata. How do human beings evade this categorization? How could this be an argument for free will, rather than against it?

[Rhythmcs]

Here's a fun one, while we're on the subject of human stuff and ranges of freedom - and because everyone seems to want it to have something to do with cool stuff like thoughts and dreams...but why?

We can pee without pooping. The muscles in the pelvic floor allow for this. Interestingly enough, and alot to do with our upright stance, they also set up a situation where it's extremely difficult to pee while pooping. The mechanism of our free peeing necesarrily constrains our ability to freely pee while pooping, so how do we assess the balance between freedom and constraint in this? Is it a wash, or do we call free peeing a demonstration of free willing and ignore the other half of the setup? If some other animal can freely pee while pooping is it more endowed with free will than we are, or is it out of consideration for freedom on the grounds that it doesn't take specifically human shits?

[Dānu]

They've demonstrated that elephants have an awareness of self by putting paint on their foreheads and then presenting them with a mirror. Upon seeing themselves, they inevitably try to get the paint off their foreheads. As Rhythm alludes to, if we're going to posit free will and consciousness we need to be willing to postulate what we think it is. Failing to do so is just an admission that we don't know. A common description of consciousness is that of "awareness." Well it seems that elephants are both aware and aware in a special way that in the past was thought the exclusive province of humans, namely self-awarenes. Surely free will, at minimum requires consciousness and some form of self awareness for our choices to be about our selves. So the question becomes, what is the "special sauce" that humans have which when added to the consciousness of an elephant results in a new entity of will that is free? Saying that such consideration makes the subject more difficult to parse, while possibly true, is not a response to the questions posed by such but simply an admission that you don't know what you are talking about.

[Rhythmcs]

When we say that things like animals™ are capable of making selections, then we're saying they have a vending machine like ability, at least - so if..when people talk about their free will, they really are referring to their ability to make selections, they're talking about a thing that isn't exclusive to self awareness, even. More fundamentally - a "dead" machine that can bootstrap itself is doing as much bootstrapping as a living self aware agent that can do the same, even though it's doing precisely zero living self awareness. Whether or not a thing is alive, evolved, conscious, self aware - none of these things seem to speak directly to whether or not a thing is also a bootstrapper in some otherwise closed causal chain.

[Dānu]

When we say that things like animals™ are capable of making selections, then we're saying they have a vending machine like ability, at least - so if..when people talk about their free will, they really are referring to their ability to make selections, they're talking about a thing that isn't exclusive to self awareness, even.  More fundamentally - a "dead" machine that can bootstrap itself is doing as much bootstrapping as a living self aware agent that can do the same, even though it's doing precisely zero living self awareness.  Whether or not a thing is alive, evolved, conscious, self aware - none of these things seem to speak directly to whether or not a thing is also a bootstrapper in some otherwise closed causal chain.

I beg to differ. As you yourself observe, something must be demonstrated to be able to bootstrap itself in an otherwise closed causal loop. Aside from observing that we're speaking figuratively in the case of the machine, what we're essentially asking is where is there a separation between the will and the deterministic causal processes of the rest of the universe. If free will is to be meaningful, there needs to exist some boundary between the causal processes of the will and the causal processes of the rest of the universe. In the machine, no such boundary exists, except metaphorically. The mind or consciousness at least suggests a plausible candidate for such a boundary that on one side there is consciousness which possesses a will, and on the other side of that boundary are the causal processes of the rest of the universe. This is not to say that the mind or consciousness actually is separate and demonstrates a boundary, but rather that, if anything is, it is a plausible candidate for an entity which does exist on the opposite side of that boundary to the rest of the universe. This is not the case with the bootstrapping machine.

To draw out this point, one needs to observe that while this boundary separates the will from the universe, it is not impermeable, and causes need to flow at least one direction across this boundary. For our will to be meaningful, my willing my arm to move must energize neurons in my arm that stimulate the muscles to move. If the will of the mind or whatever doesn't cause effects in the deterministic processes of the rest of the universe, then the point is moot. A separate causal loop is only relevant if it can affect the real world. Additionally, that causal flow must only be one direction, from the mind or will to the rest of the universe. If causes flow both directions across the boundary, then while such a separation of the part from the whole may seem mereologically valid, since things on one side of the boundary have all the same properties and causal powers as things on the other side of the boundary, they are in fact essentially the same thing (Liebniz' law). If that is true, then the will and the mind are essentially arbitrary names for parts that aren't in any meaningful way not a continuous part of the whole. The separating of mind out on its own then becomes merely an arbitrary designation with no actual objective consequences.

[Alan V]

Weren't you leaving?

Between last October and January, I stopped posting in the forum.  A question from a newbie, directed at one of my old posts, got me to post again.  Then I got drawn back in, though I tried to leave again on several other occasions.  One such attempt was too rude (on my part), so I ignored it.  At some point these discussions will have quieted down enough for me to slip away again.

However, I think I'm going to have to stop reading what other people post to truly get away.  Otherwise I keep thinking of things to reiterate or to add to the discussions.

[Alan V]

I believe I said something like that in this discussion, at the beginning, when I mentioned that THAT is what I would really prefer to talk about.  

This seems to be very illustrative of what I was meaning by us all operating from different perspectives and even definitions of free will it would seem. So what you guys are talking about right now, is one such perspective/definition, ie contrasting the experience of choice, conscious reasoning, planning etc with animals that are assumed not to have it, or have it to differing degrees... so that's one use of the word 'free' in a definition of free will ie freedom in contrast to instinctual or automatic (from a first person perspective) processes. That's generally not what I'm talking about when I'm talking about free will, but rather the altogether much more reductionistic, freedom/or not of that process itself, in terms of being reducable to scientific laws, and thus deterministic.

So I understand if you don't find my perspective on this relatable, and are not interested in discussing it, but if you are, I think your answer to one question would really help me understand not only your position but also your perspective, and that is, as an emergentist (and I'm reserving any judgement on that until I've read this book, which will be a long way off, and probably require several passes as well, as it is very technical and complicated), do you consider the emergent phenomenal consciousness to be a process/system? Ie reducible to some set of laws, even if they are emergent laws 'supplemental' to physical laws. Or do you consider it... ie what emerges... to be in some sense 'acausal'? Ie to me the theistic concept of a spirit or soul responsible for our choices, is what I would call 'acausal' in this sense, in contrast to the self and the machinery of consciousness, whether following physical or emergent laws, viewed as a system/process, and therefore determined, in that sense.

Here's my problem: Our brains obviously make choices, but some are automatic, some are habitual though overseen by a monitoring awareness, and some are truly free will decisions.  To make my case for free will, I have tried (to some extent) to confine myself to arguing in favor of the most obvious examples of such decisions, i.e. those which are based on human reasoning.  Once I can establish that such free will decision making exists, then we might be able to discuss to what extent such free will can be perceived in children, animals, and so on.  However, I have never been able to establish that one point, and now don't think it can be done, perhaps exactly because people have different ideas about what the words "free will" mean.  Some atheists take it as a purely spiritualistic concept, and so deny it out of hand.  I have been trying to say, no, there is an alternative, emergent-materialistic explanation for what we experience as free will decision making.

To clarify my position to answer your question, my thinking goes like this:
1) Determinism is not a law of nature.  Only some things are determined in the material sense of cause and effect.
2) Even in the macro material world, much occurs by chance or statistically.  Think of chaos theory for instance.
3) Evolution worked on such chance events to create both life and conscious selves, which try to bias chance events in their favors.
4) They do this haphazardly for the most part, without knowing the odds of success.  As long as they keep trying, they often succeed enough to survive and thrive.
5) Such behaviors are not determined by the chance events they try to control, only their outcomes are.
6) When human consciousness is involved, a further refinement of such efforts is possible.  We can think through scenarios and imagine outcomes.
7) Our behaviors are thereby "determined" largely by our information processing, which is an ever-changing affair based on our brain states rather than our brain hardware per se.
8) Such brain states are qualitatively different than the material cause and effect of simple physics.  They operate by their own rules even while depending on physics to work.  Think of careful research and the rules of logic for instance.
9) So the outcomes of such reasoning are not predetermined like the outcomes of simple physics.  That makes them literally non-deterministic IMO.
10) Although I believe determinism exists, I also believe libertarian free will exists.  The extent to which it exists is the more difficult question to my mind.

[Dānu]

Weren't you leaving?

Between last October and January, I stopped posting in the forum.  A question from a newbie, directed at one of my old posts, got me to post again.  Then I got drawn back in, though I tried to leave again on several other occasions.  One such attempt was too rude (on my part), so I ignored it.  At some point these discussions will have quieted down enough for me to slip away again.

However, I think I'm going to have to stop reading what other people post to truly get away.  Otherwise I keep thinking of things to reiterate or to add to the discussions.

It sounds like you're a bit conflicted about your priorities. You enjoy some aspects of the act of participating on a forum, but not others. So, in addition to determining what is more important to you, how not participating feels compared to how participating feels, and the benefits and disadvantages of each, you might want to consider whether you can manage the pluses and minuses associated with each in a different way. I'm facing a similar quandary. I want a social life and romance, but at the same time I don't want to give up the joys of solitude and being alone and independent. It's a question of priorities, but as yet, I'm on the fence. I recalled a DBT exercise for dealing with such situations that my therapist googled for me and that I'll briefly describe. Take a piece of paper, and draw lines to separate it into four quarters. On the upper left, write "pro" and on the lower left, write "con." Do the same for the other side. The left side represents one course of action, which for me is remaining single and alone, and the other side represents the opposite, which for me is being social and dating, which obviously will preclude certain things while enabling others. Anyway, just a thought. If you're conflicted, or a bit on the fence, you might find such an exercise useful.

[Rhythmcs]

When we say that things like animals™ are capable of making selections, then we're saying they have a vending machine like ability, at least - so if..when people talk about their free will, they really are referring to their ability to make selections, they're talking about a thing that isn't exclusive to self awareness, even.  More fundamentally - a "dead" machine that can bootstrap itself is doing as much bootstrapping as a living self aware agent that can do the same, even though it's doing precisely zero living self awareness.  Whether or not a thing is alive, evolved, conscious, self aware - none of these things seem to speak directly to whether or not a thing is also a bootstrapper in some otherwise closed causal chain.

I beg to differ.  As you yourself observe, something must be demonstrated to be able to bootstrap itself in an otherwise closed causal loop.  Aside from observing that we're speaking figuratively in the case of the machine, what we're essentially asking is where is there a separation between the will and the deterministic causal processes of the rest of the universe.  If free will is to be meaningful, there needs to exist some boundary between the causal processes of the will and the causal processes of the rest of the universe.  In the machine, no such boundary exists, except metaphorically.  The mind or consciousness at least suggests a plausible candidate for such a boundary that on one side there is consciousness which possesses a will, and on the other side of that boundary are the causal processes of the rest of the universe.  This is not to say that the mind or consciousness actually is separate and demonstrates a boundary, but rather that, if anything is, it is a plausible candidate for an entity which does exist on the opposite side of that boundary to the rest of the universe.  This is not the case with the bootstrapping machine.  

To draw out this point, one needs to observe that while this boundary separates the will from the universe, it is not impermeable, and causes need to flow at least one direction across this boundary.  For our will to be meaningful, my willing my arm to move must energize neurons in my arm that stimulate the muscles to move.  If the will of the mind or whatever doesn't cause effects in the deterministic processes of the rest of the universe, then the point is moot.  A separate causal loop is only relevant if it can affect the real world.  Additionally, that causal flow must only be one direction, from the mind or will to the rest of the universe.  If causes flow both directions across the boundary, then while such a separation of the part from the whole may seem mereologically valid, since things on one side of the boundary have all the same properties and causal powers as things on the other side of the boundary, they are in fact essentially the same thing (Liebniz' law).  If that is true, then the will and the mind are essentially arbitrary names for parts that aren't in any meaningful way not a continuous part of the whole.  The separating of mind out on its own then becomes merely an arbitrary designation with no actual objective consequences.

I think that we're not so much disagreeing as coming at it from different angles?  I don't think it would be inaccurate or ungenerous to presume that..especially for materialists and atheists who believe in some form of free will, the brain literally is a bootstrapping machine?  Keep in mind, I'm not trying to argue that this is true or demonstrate as much, simply saying that it's unclear what the difference would be between a brain that could bootstrap and a computer that could.  Between saying that the physical structure of a brain could bootstrap, and that any other physical structure likewise organized could do it too - even if it were different from "us" in so many other respects.

To be clear, I'm trying to navigate in the confines of a position on free will that - I think- is both ambiguous and inaccurate, but in such a way as the argument or expression itself might at least be valid. I think it's interesting that, when you try, it's hard to see how a river - just as one example, can't become a cause unto itself - in the manner we seem to be angling for this free will of ours.

[emjay]

This seems to be very illustrative of what I was meaning by us all operating from different perspectives and even definitions of free will it would seem. So what you guys are talking about right now, is one such perspective/definition, ie contrasting the experience of choice, conscious reasoning, planning etc with animals that are assumed not to have it, or have it to differing degrees... so that's one use of the word 'free' in a definition of free will ie freedom in contrast to instinctual or automatic (from a first person perspective) processes. That's generally not what I'm talking about when I'm talking about free will, but rather the altogether much more reductionistic, freedom/or not of that process itself, in terms of being reducable to scientific laws, and thus deterministic.

So I understand if you don't find my perspective on this relatable, and are not interested in discussing it, but if you are, I think your answer to one question would really help me understand not only your position but also your perspective, and that is, as an emergentist (and I'm reserving any judgement on that until I've read this book, which will be a long way off, and probably require several passes as well, as it is very technical and complicated), do you consider the emergent phenomenal consciousness to be a process/system? Ie reducible to some set of laws, even if they are emergent laws 'supplemental' to physical laws. Or do you consider it... ie what emerges... to be in some sense 'acausal'? Ie to me the theistic concept of a spirit or soul responsible for our choices, is what I would call 'acausal' in this sense, in contrast to the self and the machinery of consciousness, whether following physical or emergent laws, viewed as a system/process, and therefore determined, in that sense.

Here's my problem: Our brains obviously make choices, but some are automatic, some are habitual though overseen by a monitoring awareness, and some are truly free will decisions.  To make my case for free will, I have tried (to some extent) to confine myself to arguing in favor of the most obvious examples of such decisions, i.e. those which are based on human reasoning.  Once I can establish that such free will decision making exists, then we might be able to discuss to what extent such free will can be perceived in children, animals, and so on.[...]

I just think ultimately the problem comes down the terminology we use; ie it's not rich enough, varied enough, or specific enough to unambiguously describe what these differing perspectives mean by free will. So you, as you describe above, mean a completely different thing by free will than I do. Not saying I think any given perspective is right or wrong, just that they are different and hard to translate into each other. I mean, I can try and look at it from your perspective as much as possible, but ultimately I think that's going to mean substituting some words, for instance something like 'process of will' for 'free will'; because it's not that we disagree necessarily on the character of will as it's manifested in consciousness, ie automatic, habitual etc, but we do disagree, or have yet to determine how much we agree or disagree, on what that will actually is, ie whether it and/or the 'entity' that has it is a system/process following laws, emergent or otherwise, or something else, following no laws and thus truly free.

[...]However, I have never been able to establish that one point, and now don't think it can be done, perhaps exactly because people have different ideas about what the words "free will" mean.  Some atheists take it as a purely spiritualistic concept, and so deny it out of hand.  I have been trying to say, no, there is an alternative, emergent-materialistic explanation for what we experience as free will decision making.

Yeah, I agree except I would say not to put too much stock in what I say; ie I think my sort of viewpoint is a lot more reductionistic/rigid than most people's (and just characteristic of the way my mind works... or doesn't work depending on how you look at it ;-)), ie you've found lots of people, as far as I can see, that share similar perspectives to you on what free will is, on both sides of the fence, but yeah, where it comes to trying to convince my sort of perspective, I think there is real language or semantic barrier there.

I don't deny it out of hand, but just need to be clear what it is being ascribed to, ie some magical concept like a soul or spirit, or some scientific process. You calling yourself an emergentist suggests to me that you're not ascribing it to a magical concept but rather to science, which is why I thought we'd have some common ground in the first place.

I'll try and address your points but forgive me if I misunderstand any of them.

To clarify my position to answer your question, my thinking goes like this:
1) Determinism is not a law of nature.  Only some things are determined in the material sense of cause and effect.

Okay, agreed. I do make room in my deterministic worldview for quantum randomness, but have yet to understand what implication it has for free will, so for that reason I don't usually consider it an important distinction to make.

2) Even in the macro material world, much occurs by chance or statistically.  Think of chaos theory for instance.

I haven't really addressed chance at the macro level in my thinking, only the quantum level, because of my reductionistic viewpoint that macro events are ultimately reducible to micro events (pending arguments to the contrary in the book, obviously). As to chaos theory, I don't know anything about that but from a cursory glance at it on Google, it looks very similar to what we've been saying about emergentism, so I'd guess the same sort of thinking applies.

But if by this you just mean than from our perspective there are chance events in the world, regardless of how truly random they are, then I don't disagree.

3) Evolution worked on such chance events to create both life and conscious selves, which try to bias chance events in their favors.

I don't necessarily disagree. It's a bit complicated. But for argument's sake, say I agree that there is much chance involved in our developmental history (which I accepted as a possibility in another post), is that sufficient?

4) They do this haphazardly for the most part, without knowing the odds of success.  As long as they keep trying, they often succeed enough to survive and thrive.

I agree that from our conscious perspective, or the physical perspective of the biological organism as a system, we do not know the future or our odds of success.

5) Such behaviors are not determined by the chance events they try to control, only their outcomes are.

I don't understand what you mean here. Could you rephrase, or give an example?

If you mean something like we're not how Behaviourism would characterise us, just reflexive input-output machines, then I agree; our behavioural repertoire largely comes, or at least resides or accumulates (ie through learning), from within not without. Is that what you mean?

6) When human consciousness is involved, a further refinement of such efforts is possible.  We can think through scenarios and imagine outcomes.
7) Our behaviors are thereby "determined" largely by our information processing, which is an ever-changing affair based on our brain states rather than our brain hardware per se.
8) Such brain states are qualitatively different than the material cause and effect of simple physics.  They operate by their own rules even while depending on physics to work.  Think of careful research and the rules of logic for instance.
9) So the outcomes of such reasoning are not predetermined like the outcomes of simple physics.  That makes them literally non-deterministic IMO.
10) Although I believe determinism exists, I also believe libertarian free will exists.  The extent to which it exists is the more difficult question to my mind.

This seems the crux of the issue. From my reductive point of view, those emergent brain states and/or emergent phenomenal conscious states, are ultimately reducible to the physical, and therefore physical determinism, regardless of how qualitatively different they may be at their differing levels of description. So no matter what we may internally model and represent in the neural networks of the brain, and no matter how qualitively different such representations, mechanics, and dynamics are, they are still ultimately 'composed' of fundamental particles obeying physical laws. But as I said I'm open to arguments against that... ie in favour of emergentism... eg from that book, but as it stands I don't even have the vaguest conception of how such an argument would go, that's why it's exciting. But thanks for sharing your viewpoint... I think it's making a bit more sense now, ie I see where you're coming from... but as it stands I just cannot separate the different levels of the 'compositional hierarchy' the same way you do.

[Dānu]

Just a footnote: Chaotic processes are not random; they do not behave according to chance, but rather deterministically, at least at a macroscopic level.

[Rhythmcs]

With emergentism, we'd be arguing for a free will that is non deterministic (or not overly determined) but perhaps not contra-causal or a-causal. A situation where the caused thing (the emergent x) has a vote that wasn't there before, in a range of possible outcomes.

I actually don't think it's a huge stretch to say that things like processing and planning and selection are new outcomes of properties different from the previous outcomes and properties. At some point (I think long before the first human or even the first mammal) these types of things started popping up. I don't know how you'd get from there to a libertarian free will, though. There's arguably more dependence, not less, in the outcomes of an emergent systems selections. The emergent x is yet another physical constraint of determinative or causal processes.

[Rhythmcs]

Consider the dodder vine.  Aware of it's surroundings, possessed of preferences, but not aware of it's (impending) mortality.  Is a dodder vines ability to seek out it's preferred hosts - even to the detriment of it's own life, an emergent x happening at the level of a plant in the same way that an ant colony's seemingly intelligent and directed behavior is a (potential) emergent x?  

Does the addition of self awareness and specifically our awareness of our own mortality limit us with respect to dodder vines and ants? Might we be less free to, less independent in, act.... compared with them, as we have additional (and compelling) biological imperatives premised upon our seemingly enhanced awareness?

[emjay]

With emergentism, we'd be arguing for a free will that is non deterministic (or not overly determined)  but perhaps not contra-causal or a-causal.  A situation where the caused thing (the emergent x) has a vote that wasn't there before, in a range of possible outcomes.[...]

Very interesting indeed, but I'm not sure I understand why that would be non-deterministic, or less deterministic, in the sense that faced with exactly the same inputs, would not exactly the same emergent thing emerge each time, and thus be ultimately deterministic across those different levels in the compositional hierarchy? Ie in emergentism does not the same thing emerge given the same initial conditions?

[Alan V]

5) Such behaviors are not determined by the chance events they try to control, only their outcomes are.

I don't understand what you mean here. Could you rephrase, or give an example?

If you mean something like we're not how Behaviourism would characterise us, just reflexive input-output machines, then I agree; our behavioural repertoire largely comes, or at least resides or accumulates (ie through learning), from within not without. Is that what you mean?

To me, number 5 was one of the key assertions.  I will rephrase: self-motivated lifeforms like humans continue to try, whether we succeed or fail, in part because we can't perceive the odds against us.  We typically assume we could catch a break at some point.  So our behaviors are not determined by some mathematical equations that control the macro-physics events surrounding us, though whether we succeed or not may well be.  Instead, our behaviors are self-motivated and often scatter-shot.  This is the point at which we are separated from the world around us, and not just determined by it.  Our behaviors operate by evolved rules embodied in us, created by chance events over millions of years, not strictly by physics alone. 

Involved in such new rules are our abilities to observe and learn, certainly.  The more selective we are in our efforts per the information we gather, the more likely we will succeed.  At a point, we become so good at the game that we can choose between a large number of means to achieve our basic ends.  We literally have the freedom to choose between our means and even the ends we pursue as long as they can meet our minimum physical requirements.  Our inherent physics require only so much from us and, in fact, are flexible enough to serve most of our chosen purposes.  With the rest, we can be creative.  That is the "free" part of free will.

People work very hard to preserve their freedoms because they know how important they are for controlling their own lives and for their self-expression.  So when atheists talk about determinism, they tend to frighten other people off IMO.

[Rhythmcs]

Maybe, maybe not. The freedom or independence being asserted isn't in it's creation, though - but in what happens after that.

So, making an ant, for example, won't get you colony behavior. They don't individually know where to put the midden heap or even where the midden heap is or even what a midden heap is. With just a few ants colony construction and maintenance is haphazard and ineffective, and with a proper™ colony... placement is generalizable to a set of descriptive rules that imply effective parameters.

The colony is aware of things, or behaves as though it's aware of things, that none of them individually are or even could be. That's emergence - regardless of whether or not ants are, themselves, caused or the processes involved in that deterministic. Maybe neurons, for example, are like an ant colony. The question isn't so much whether they fit in the causal chain, but whether where or how they fit is as a cause unlike any of their constituent parts. Para causal, not contra causal, but out outside of scientific determinism (it's alleged) - such that an individual ant might do the same thing given the same circumstances 100 times out of 100 - but a colony of ants will fuck with you. Outsmart you. Out know you. On the basis of this, outwork you. That they can and perhaps even will do the Other Thing. I'm not at all embarrassed to say it's happened to me many many times. They're a menace - one of the few soil pests that you can't deal with just by lifting your crop out of the soil. Think about that.

[Alan V]

Just a footnote:  Chaotic processes are not random; they do not behave according to chance, but rather deterministically, at least at a macroscopic level.

I was thinking about the butterfly effect, how small changes can evolve into big impacts.  Obviously not all butterflies cause tornadoes, so some chance is involved.

[Rhythmcs]

This one is just for you EM, since you're a reader (we've got fuckin reader here!)

Explaining why the whole is sometimes smarter than the sum of its parts, Johnson presents surprising examples of feedback, self-organization, and adaptive learning. How does a lively neighborhood evolve out of a disconnected group of shopkeepers, bartenders, and real estate developers? How does a media event take on a life of its own? How will new software programs create an intelligent World Wide Web?

In the coming years, the power of self-organization -- coupled with the connective technology of the Internet -- will usher in a revolution every bit as significant as the introduction of electricity. Provocative and engaging, Emergence puts you on the front lines of this exciting upheaval in science and thought.

https://www.amazon.com/Emergence-Connect...7321&psc=1

It's a good book, I thoroughly enjoyed it. I couldn't stop telling people about it whether they asked or not, and this was twenty years back. Free will in emergentism, I think, is ultimately not the thing you're looking for (waves hand), but a term used to denote particularly effective forms of self organization. Self organization which is not at all limited to just human beings, just living things, or even just self aware things. An emergent free will is..perhaps disappointing, but certainly expansive. This, imo, is why emergentists would prefer to discuss in what way or by how much we are free, or independent, rather than whether or not we are strictly and truly speaking, either of those things. Because self organization is ubiquitous and undeniable even if or when it isn't "free" or meaningfully independent of some causal (or perhaps even deterministic) chain. Self organization is manifestly apparent all over the place, and doing crazy shit....and if you understand that translation then it makes little sense to bicker over whether or not we have the x.

[emjay]

I don't understand what you mean here. Could you rephrase, or give an example?

If you mean something like we're not how Behaviourism would characterise us, just reflexive input-output machines, then I agree; our behavioural repertoire largely comes, or at least resides or accumulates (ie through learning), from within not without. Is that what you mean?

To me, number 5 was one of the key assertions.  I will rephrase: self-motivated lifeforms like humans continue to try, whether we succeed or fail, in part because we can't perceive the odds against us.  We typically assume we could catch a break at some point.  So our behaviors are not determined by some mathematical equations that control the macro-physics events surrounding us, though whether we succeed or not may well be.  Instead, our behaviors are self-motivated and often scatter-shot.  This is the point at which we are separated from the world around us, and not just determined by it.  Our behaviors operate by evolved rules embodied in us, created by chance events over millions of years, not strictly by physics alone. 

Involved in such new rules are our abilities to observe and learn, certainly.  The more selective we are in our efforts per the information we gather, the more likely we will succeed.  At a point, we become so good at the game that we can choose between a large number of means to achieve our basic ends.  We literally have the freedom to choose between our means and even the ends we pursue as long as they can meet our minimum physical requirements.  Our inherent physics require only so much from us and, in fact, are flexible enough to serve most of our chosen purposes.  With the rest, we can be creative.  That is the "free" part of free will.

People work very hard to preserve their freedoms because they know how important they are for controlling their own lives and for their self-expression.  So when atheists talk about determinism, they tend to frighten other people off IMO.

Okay, I'm sorry but I think that's enough for me. I can't relate to any of this. Good luck with it, but it's just way too different a perspective for us to find any meaningful common ground I think. And I'm sorry if you think my sort of perspective scares people off, but like I said to cavebear, where he saw something depressing, I saw something comforting, so different personality types see things in different ways.